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Abstract
The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum is one of the most significant 
region-wide initiatives seen in recent times. Japan has played a significant role in 
its establishment, yet ironically, has spent half of APEC’s existence apparently 
disinterested. The purpose of this thesis is to attempt to understand how the 
Japanese view APEC, and seeks to find the motivating factors for Japan’s 
involvement in APEC from a Japanese point of view.
The thesis argues that although APEC is primarily seen as a vehicle for 
implementing regional trade liberalisation, it has also provided Japan with a 
convenient platform to promote its foreign policy. Japan’s major foreign policy 
initiatives focus on Asian relations, US relations and internationalisation. This 
regional economic forum is seen in some circles as useful in promoting both Asian 
and US relations, and in Japan’s attempts to improve its political legitimacy 
worldwide.
The Japanese government and business conglomerates, that once viewed Asia as 
a springboard to the West, now see Asia as central to their future. APEC fits into 
Japan’s Asia policy by serving to improve its relations with Asia. The frequent 
meetings with Asia Pacific nations, the equitable nature of APEC, and the 
consensus-based decision making process, provide Japan with a forum to portray a 
cooperative, non-aggressive leadership style. APEC is especially important, 
because it enables Asian leaders to meet and discuss regional economics, but also 
allows for discussion of political and strategic issues.
Although at times volatile, the US-Japan relationship is one of the most important 
bilateral relationships in the world, and the Japanese government seeks to maintain 
that significance. APEC can play a part in this endeavour by helping to maintain US
iii
interest in the Asia Pacific region. The diverse membership of APEC, as well as the 
economic benefits, act as a carrot to US involvement. From Japan’s perspective, 
APEC helps to contain a large and lucrative market for the export of Asian goods, 
but also serves to minimise any US tendency towards trade protectionism or 
unilateralism. Engaging the USA economically in the region also guarantees a US 
military presence in the Asia Pacific. It is widely recognised in Japan and Asia that 
the USA provides a stabilising influence in a potentially explosive region.
Japan’s commitment to globalisation translates easily into support for a forum like 
APEC. APEC, although regional and trade-focused, acts as a platform on which 
Japan can promote its cooperative and leadership skills. Since the end of the Cold 
War, the Japanese government appears more willing to elevate itself from the 
status of a regional power to one of global political force. A greater emphasis on 
global political leadership, commensurate with its economic power, has led to a 
particular interest in assuming senior positions in large multilateral organisations. 
While APEC is not of this scale, Japanese actions within the regional forum may be 
considered a preview to Japanese responses to greater global responsibilities.
It is important to keep the relative significance of APEC to Japan in perspective. It 
is a regional trade forum that makes up one aspect of Japanese foreign policy. 
Nevertheless, APEC is currently valued by the Japanese government for the 
support it gives to Japan’s foreign policy strategies for the future.
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A Note on Conventions
Throughout the text of the thesis Japanese personal names are written in the 
Japanese order; that is, with the surname followed by the given name. In the 
footnotes however, all first names precede surnames. Also, where Japanese 
names are well known internationally, names are written in the text with the given 
name preceding the surname. Japanese words in the thesis are romanised 
according to Kenkyusha’s Japanese-English Dictionary, with a macron mark 
indicating a long vowel sound. However, Japanese words that commonly appear in 
English, such as Tokyo and Osaka, appear without a macron. Australian spelling, 
according to the Macqüarie Dictionary, is used, with the exception of quotations 
from American sources, where the original spelling is used. China is used in place 
of the People’s Republic of China, South Korea in place of the Republic of Korea, 
and North Korea for the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea. I have chosen not 
to hyphenate ‘Asia Pacific’.
ix
A bbreviations
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ANU Austra lian National University
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A R F ASEAN Regional Forum
A S E A N Association of Southeast Asian N ations
A SE M Asia-Europe Meeting
CER A ustra lian-N ew  Zealand C loser Econom ic Relationship
EAEC East Asian Econom ic Caucus
EAEG East Asian Econom ic Group
EC European Com m unity
EPG Em inent Persons Group
ESC AP Econom ic and Social Com m ission fo r Asia  and Pacific
EU European Union
FDI Foreign D irect Investm ent
G A TT General Agreem ent on Tariffs and Trade
G DP Gross Dom estic Product
G NP Gross National Product
MITI M in istry of International Trade and Industry
lAPs Individual Action Plans
M O FA M inistry of Foreign A ffa irs, Japan
M O SS M arket O riented, Sector Specific
N A FTA North Am erican Free Trade Area
NICs New ly Industria lis ing C ountries
O D A O verseas Deve lopm ent Aid
O E C D O rganisation  fo r Econom ic C oopera tion  and D eve lopm ent
P AFTAD Pacific Trade and D eve lopm ent C onferences
PBEC Pacific Basin Econom ic C om m ittee
PECC Pacific Econom ic Cooperation  Council
PFP Partners fo r Progress
R TAs Regional Trad ing A rrangem ents
S il S tructura l Im pedim ents In itiatives
UN United Nations
U N SC United Nations Security Council
USA United S tates of Am erica
V ER s Voluntary Export Restra ints
VI Es Volun tary Im port Expansion
W TO W orld  Trade O rganisation
W W II W orld  W ar II
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Chapter 1. Introduction
...as yet there is no such thing as an APEC spirit. The members have 
entered into a marriage of convenience; love - if it is to come at all - lies in 
the future.1
Nukazawa Kazuo
The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum is one of the most significant 
region-wide initiatives seen in recent times. Japan has played a significant role in 
its establishment, yet ironically, has spent half of APEC’s existence apparently 
disinterested. The purpose of this thesis is to attempt to understand how the 
Japanese view APEC. This thesis seeks to investigate the motivating factors in 
Japan’s involvement in APEC from a Japanese point of view. It argues that, 
although APEC is primarily seen as a vehicle for implementing regional trade 
liberalisation, it may also provide Japan with benefits in diplomacy, politics and 
security. In 1994, one Japanese commentator wrote that each country has its own 
agenda for regional groupings. However, he believed that Japan had no clear 
strategy in terms of its global and regional standing, or the direction it will take as 
the twenty-first century approaches.2 An investigation of Japanese perceptions of 
APEC could help provide us with an understanding of Japan’s strategy for the 
future.
Significance of Study
Not everyone views APEC in the same light. Reporting and discussion of APEC 
has mostly assumed that APEC is viewed by all of its members as a vehicle for
1 Kazuo Nukazawa, ‘APEC: A Body in Search of a Spirit’, Japan Review of International 
Affairs, Vol.9, no. 3 (Summer, 1995), pp. 212-216, esp. p. 214.
2 Ichikawa Amane, ‘Nihon ni APEC was fuyö da’ (‘APEC is unnecessary for Japan’), ShOkan
Töyö Keizai, 12 November 1994, pp. 96-99.
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trade and investment liberalisation, facilitation and cooperation. This is not 
necessarily the case. As one Japanese academic has written, ‘APEC is a marriage 
of convenience’.3 Each member nation may have a different agenda for APEC, in 
line with its needs in the regional and international arena. The ability to recognise 
the agenda that each member has for APEC may make for greater understanding 
of each economy’s policy outcomes, international negotiations and the general 
decision making process.
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
Since the end of the Cold War in 1989 there has been a shift towards regional 
economic interdependence based on regional proximity and more pragmatic, 
multilateral factors, and away from global alignments based primarily on ideological, 
security and economic factors. Economies, rather than nations, are becoming 
integrated through expanding trade, investment and technological transfers. 
Although the concept of regional institution building is not new, with the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) dating back to the 1940s,4 the European 
Community (EC) from the 1960s,5 and the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) from 1967, there has been a significant rise in regional trade 
arrangements (RTAs). Possibly the most significant of recent regional initiatives in 
the post-Cold War era is the APEC forum.6 APEC, officially launched in Canberra, 
Australia, during 1989, evolved from the work of the Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Council (PECC) which began in 1980.7 Both PECC and APEC were designed to 
improve information about trade and investment in the region, with working groups
3 Kazuo Nukazawa, ‘APEC: A Body in Search of a Spirit’, p. 214.
4 GATT was made defunct in 1994 and was replaced with the World Trade Organisation
(WTO).
5 Now known as the European Union (EU), which includes the United Kingdom. While the
EU is an example of regional economic cooperation, it is also the best known example of 
a discriminatory trading arrangement.
6 Andrew Elek, Pacific Economic Co-Operation: Policy Choices for the 1990s, (Jakarta:
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1992), p. 11.
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set up to identify common regional economic interests, such as trade policy, human 
resource development, technology transfer, energy and the environment, and 
telecommunications.8 Today APEC has eighteen member economies9 with a 
combined Gross National Product (GNP) of US$13 trillion in 1994, which is 
equivalent to about half the world’s total annual output.10
One of the preconditions for the establishment of APEC has been the economic 
development of the Asian region. The region has enjoyed its highest levels of 
economic prosperity since the end of World War II (WWII), mostly thanks to the 
GATT-based system.* 11 Prior to WWII, trade was distorted by protectionism and 
discriminatory trading blocs, which negatively affected economies of developing 
nations. While the GATT-based system may be deficient in several important 
respects, it is built on the fundamental international view that global welfare is likely 
to improve if all economies conduct trade in line with their evolving comparative 
advantage.12 It is believed that to achieve this, partners for trade or investment 
should be chosen on commercial grounds, rather than according to government
7 Andrew Elek, Pacific Economic Co-Operation, p. 11.
8 In 1989 when the twelve members of APEC came together, they determined that there 
were six major areas that required addressing in the economic and political landscape. 
These included: completion of the stalled Uruguay Round of GATT and encouraging a 
global trading system; discouragement of the formation of regional blocs, especially in 
Europe and North America, but also potentially in East Asia; defusion of the bilateral US- 
Japan trade friction, which threatened to disrupt economic and political stability; engaging 
China, an emerging economic power, as a productive member of the Asia Pacific; use of 
APEC to retain US commitment to the region; and more discussion of political issues in 
the APEC region.
9 The members are the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Brunei, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines), Australia, Canada, Chile, China, 
Hong Kong, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, 
‘Chinese Taipei’ (Taiwan) and the USA.
10 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 1996, (Singapore: APEC Secretariat, 1996).
11 Andrew Elek, ‘An open economic association in the Asia Pacific: a conceptual framework 
for Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation’, paper read at ‘Australian, Indonesian and 
Japanese Approaches Towards APEC’ symposium, Australia-Japan Research Centre, 
September 1994, p. 4.
12 Andrew Elek, ‘An open economic association in the Asia Pacific’, p. 4.
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policies that seek to discriminate.13 Intellectual and political leadership in the USA 
can also take some credit for the survival of this relatively open multilateral trade 
environment since WWII, thanks to the advocacy of non-discrimination in trade, 
embodied in the Atlantic Charter. The Atlantic Charter of the 1940s played a large 
part in establishing the post-war economic order, in avoiding trade discrimination.14 
It is more recently that US capacity and interest in defending the multilateral system 
has dwindled, leaving the Asia Pacific with the challenge of defending the principles 
which have made its success possible.15
In a climate moving towards economic interdependence and regional prosperity, 
APEC emerged with the goal of developing and maintaining prosperity and 
integration in the region and strengthening the international trading system. This is 
in line with the forces of East Asian industrialisation, which rely on the opportunity 
for the region to catch up with the rest of the developed world, and to have equal 
access to international markets.16 To achieve this goal, the governments of APEC 
members have made a joint decision to reduce impediments to international 
economic transactions within the region, without creating any new, artificial 
distinctions between APEC and other economies, and avoiding any new forms of 
discrimination.17 Reform of the region’s economies and government regulations is 
also required to transform the region into a fully integrated unit. These two issues 
were identified by the APEC members as conditions for successful Asia Pacific 
cooperation, and were subsequently detailed as the essential points of the Bogor 
Declaration on free trade and investment at a conference in Indonesia in 1994. The
13 This basic principle of non-discrimination is embodied in Article I of the GATT Agreement. 
Andrew Elek, ‘An open economic association in the Asia Pacific’, p. 4.
14 Peter Drysdale, The APEC Initiative: maintaining the momentum in Manila’, The Asia- 
Pacific Magazine, May 1996, p. 45.
15 Andrew Elek, ‘An open economic association in the Asia Pacific’, p. 5.
16Peter Drysdale, ‘The APEC Initiative: maintaining the momentum in Manila’, p. 45.
17 Andrew Elek, ‘An open economic association in the Asia Pacific’, p. 20.
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Bogor Declaration saw the APEC members agree that developed APEC economies 
would strive to achieve free trade and investment by no later than 2010, and the 
developing economies by 2020.
The first three leaders’ summit meetings have set the basic direction of the APEC 
forum. In 1993, in Seattle, APEC was seen as ‘a community of Asia Pacific 
economies’ and, in Bogor, the leaders set its agenda as ‘a balanced package of 
trade liberalization, facilitation, and technical cooperation’.18 The Action Agenda for 
implementing the Bogor Declaration was adopted by consensus at the Osaka 
meeting in 1995. The focus on trade liberalisation, facilitation, and cooperation is 
central to APEC. For the purposes of this thesis, they will be referred to as the 
three pillars of APEC. A definition of these objectives follows:
Liberalisation
The APEC goal of a completely open market can be best described as aspiring to a 
market economy. It means the removal of all protective regulations, and practices 
that rig the market or bar new entries. The members of APEC are at varying stages 
of development and have differing levels of trade restrictions. They share in 
common, however, the knowledge that liberalisation of impediments to trade will 
increase their industries’ competitiveness in the world market. Individual members 
will set their own APEC liberalisation programs voluntarily and implement them on a 
most-favoured-nation basis, in line with GATTA/Vorld Trade Organisation (WTO) 
rules.19
18 Ippei Yamazawa, ‘Implementing the APEC Bogor Declaration’, Japan Review of 
International Affairs, Vol. 9, no. 3, (Summer, 1995), pp. 178-188, esp. p. 178.
19 Ippei Yamazawa, ‘Implementing the APEC Bogor Declaration’, pp. 181-83.
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Facilitation
The term ‘facilitation’ is interpreted in a very broad sense by APEC economies. 
Facilitation is generally used to describe the way in which impediments to trade can 
be eliminated. These impediments may not only be in the form of tariffs and 
quotas, but in transaction costs imposed on infrastructure problems, and in wide 
divergences in domestic regulations and administrative procedures that create 
difficulties or increase costs for trade, investment and other economic transactions. 
For example, realising the Bogor agreement goal may be facilitated by the adoption 
of an APEC code of practice for the settlement of disputes, setting intra-regional 
standards or, increasing compatibility in administrative procedures, transportation, 
telecommunications, and professional qualifications. Intra-regional travel may also 
be facilitated with the use of ‘smart card’ passports and visa-free short term travel. 20
Cooperation/Development
Considering the vast differences in the stages of development, ievel of technology 
and managerial and administrative capability across the Asia Pacific region, some 
assistance may be required to maintain the momentum of development of Asia 
Pacific economies. Neither liberalisation nor facilitation programs can be 
implemented effectively without complementary development programs. Such 
development programs might include the development of public infrastructure in 
transportation, telecommunications and public utilities. There is also room for the 
development of human resources, technical and financial cooperation, and the 
environment and energy.21
Aims and Objectives
The APEC forum is in its infancy, and writing on or discussion of, this forum is 
relatively limited. The focus has generally been on APEC’s objectives, its pros and
20 Ippei Yamazawa, ‘Implementing the APEC Bogor Declaration’, pp. 183-86.
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cons, and its progress or potential success or failure. This thesis attempts to 
uncover the perceptions of APEC entertained by the Japanese at a variety of levels. 
This is not an evaluation of APEC and, as such, there is little commentary on 
whether APEC is good or bad. Rather it considers what some schools of Japanese 
thought think of an existing forum, and seeks to evaluate why and how Japan has 
adopted APEC. On the surface, Japan has appeared to waiver between strong 
support and indifference for APEC. APEC objectives promote trade and investment 
liberalisation, facilitation and cooperation. The motives behind Japan’s support for 
these three objectives and the forum itself may provide us with a useful gauge with 
which to determine Japan’s intentions and future. It may throw light on Japan’s 
economic strategies in an age of globalisation, as well as foreign and defence 
policy directions.
The thesis endeavours to determine Japanese perceptions mostly through 
Japanese sources: Japanese and English-language publications, including 
newspapers, journals, and monographs, as well as some interviews and 
correspondence. The data provides only a limited sample, and therefore the results 
cannot be considered conclusive of all Japanese thought. Nevertheless, it may 
throw some light on the motivations behind Japan’s role in APEC.
Structure of Thesis
This thesis is structured according to the three pillars of Japanese foreign policy. 
That is, the Asia-Japan relationship, the US-Japan relationship and Japan’s 
relations with the world, including its role in international and multilateral fora.
21 Ippei Yamazawa, ‘Implementing the APEC Bogor Declaration’, pp. 186-88.
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The Data
After briefly surveying Japan’s historical and contemporary relations with Asia, the 
USA, and, the rest of the world, I will trace the development of APEC and, at the 
same time, analyse Japanese perceptions of the forum. Data based on 
publications, print media and personal interviews will be used to consider how 
Japan’s relations with Asia, the USA, and the world, have shaped Japan’s 
involvement with APEC. Asia’s recent emergence as a major economic force, its 
historical, cultural and geographic links with Japan, and the legacy of Japan’s 
aggression in Asia are major points of interest. Other topics will include: Japan’s 
leadership in the Asian region; American assistance in moving post-war Japan from 
a developing country to a major industrial nation; US-Japan trade conflicts; the 
change in the global political environment; and the US-Japan Security Alliance. 
These will all be discussed in terms of Japan’s role in APEC. Japan’s strong 
support for globalism and international organisations, such as the United Nations 
(UN), will be considered as a motivating factor in Japan’s enthusiasm for APEC.
In order to survey Japanese media reactions to APEC, four Japanese periodicals 
have been selected as data: The Nikkei Weekly, The Japan Times, Shükan Töyö 
Keizai and Gaiko Forum. The first two are published in English and the latter two in 
Japanese. While other journals and periodicals are referred to, these four provided 
statistical information with which to gauge reactions to various APEC issues.
Most of the literature on APEC has focused on the progress of APEC and the three 
pillars of liberalisation, facilitation and cooperation. The short history of APEC, and 
the major changes that have occurred as the forum has developed, have made it 
difficult for any comprehensive analysis of the topic. The available material has 
mostly appeared as short newspaper articles, slightly longer articles in academic
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and economic journals, and government-produced papers. There is little material in 
monograph form on APEC. In contrast, there is a vast amount of information on 
Japanese foreign,22 economic and defence policy,23 and its relations with the USA 
and Asia in the post-Cold War period. The study of multilateralism, regionalism and 
globalism, although not specifically related to Japan, is also becoming popular.24
One of the most significant publications relevant to this thesis is Yöichi Funabashi’s 
Asia Pacific Fusion - Japan’s Role in APEC.25 It is probably the first in-depth study 
of the APEC forum to date. It differs from the bureaucratic writings of governments 
and the APEC Secretariat in that it is not a description of APEC objectives, working 
groups and agendas, but goes ‘beyond economics to focus on the political, cultural 
and civilizational factors that are at work in the region today’ .26 Funabashi argues 
that a key force behind APEC is a potential ‘fusion’ of Asia Pacific nations mobilised 
by the region’s dynamic economic integration. He is especially interested in 
analysing the potential role of Japan in forging a ‘fusion’ between the two sides of 
the Pacific, due to its oscillating and complex engagement with both the USA and 
Asia.
22 For example, Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s. From Economic 
Superpower to What Power? (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), and Takashi Inoguchi, 
Japan’s International Relations, (London: Pinter Publishers & Westview Press, 1991).
23 For example, Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill (eds), Pacific Cooperation: Building 
Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific, (Canberra: Allen & Unwin in 
association with RSPAS, ANU, 1994).
24 For example, Ross Garnaut and Peter Drysdale (eds), Asia Pacific Regionalism 
Readings in International Economic Relations, (Canberra: Harper Educational Publishers 
in association with The Australia-Japan Research Centre, ANU, 1994), and Andrew Mack 
and John Ravenhill (eds), Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes 
in the Asia-Pacific, (Canberra: Allen & Unwin in association with RSPAS, ANU, 1994).
25 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion Japan’s Role in APEC (Washington: Institute of 
International Economics, 1995). The release of Funabashi’s book in late 1995 caused a 
political stir in Australia. The Australian Government was disturbed by Funabashi’s 
account of the MITI inventing the idea of APEC in 1989. I found that he did not dwell on 
this issue and was generous in his praise of actions taken by Prime Ministers Bob Hawke 
and Paul Keating, and their ministers. While Funabashi suggests that it was MITI’s idea, 
he clearly points out that the Australian Government took the initiative to make APEC 
happen in 1989.
26 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, p. xii.
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In Funabashi’s examination of the development of APEC, he is very optimistic about 
the forum and its potential impact on the region. In contrast to other Japanese 
writers on APEC, he verges on the effusive. He particularly focuses on APEC’s 
attempts to facilitate economic liberalisation. For him, Japan can assume regional 
leadership for the first time through an active APEC policy, without raising concerns 
in the Asia Pacific.
As there is limited material on APEC in monograph form, many newspaper articles 
were consulted. These generally presented a snapshot of APEC developments and 
topical issues. While there is minimal in-depth analysis, they provided a quick 
barometer of prevailing attitudes in Japan. Australian media reporting on APEC 
has also been closely followed. While many Australian newspaper articles were 
read, they have not been specifically cited; nevertheless, they also provided a 
useful gauge with which to measure differences in opinion among APEC nations.
Articles on APEC are most common in academic, economic and international 
relations journals. For example, in Keizai Keiei Kenkyü Nenpö (Annual Report on 
Economics and Business Administration), Chuö Koron (Central Opinion), Ajia 
Taiheiyö Ronsö (Bulletin of Asia Pacific Studies),27 and Gaiko Forum, in the 
vernacular. And in Japanese-produced, English-language journals, like Japan 
Review of International Affairs, Japan Echo, AMPO Japan-Asia Quarterly Review, 
Look Japan, Journal of Japanese Trade and Industry, Japan 21st , Japan Update 
and Look Japan. The content is generally more analytical and questioning than 
newspaper sources; however, many of the articles concentrate on relating the 
history of APEC. The articles often discuss the benefits of APEC, but usually this is
27 Osaka University of Foreign Studies Bulletin of Asia Pacific Studies, (Osaka: Kansai 
Institute of Asia Pacific Studies).
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limited to economic interests; nevertheless, this focus was indicative of the 
Japanese point-of-view. Authors of journal articles tend to be more willing to 
criticise and question APEC than newspaper journalists. Bearing in mind the limited 
survey of Japanese print media, this appeared to be slightly more apparent in 
Japanese vernacular periodicals.
There are many Japanese government publications on APEC. However, this 
material is generally very similar to other nation’s government publications, and the 
content is dry and bureaucratic. Most of the material took the line of publications 
produced by the APEC Secretariat in Singapore. Generally both the APEC 
Secretariat and Japanese government material covered a short history of APEC 
and listed the results of each major meeting; nevertheless, this type of material was 
useful in tracking Japan’s involvement in APEC.
One of the most prolific Japanese writers on APEC is Professor Ippei Yamazawa, 
Japanese representative on APEC’s Eminent Persons Group (EPG) 1992-1995. 
His work can be found in the form of feature articles in newspapers, journals, EPG 
publications and academic conference papers. Perhaps as a result of his position 
on the EPG, his work rarely strays from the universal APEC line of the three pillars. 
Even his presentation at the Australian, Indonesian and Japanese Approaches 
Towards APEC conference, entitled ‘Regional Economic Integration in the Asia 
Pacific: A Japanese Perspective’,28 revealed little about the Japanese perspective; 
nevertheless, his discussions of APEC appear to be accurate and detailed.
28 Ippei Yamazawa, ‘Regional Economic Integration in the Asia Pacific: a Japanese 
Perspective’, presented at a conference titled Australian, Indonesian and Japanese 
Approaches Towards APEC. (Canberra: Australia-Japan Research Centre, ANU, 2 
September 1994).
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According to one Japanese academic, his work on APEC is more indicative of 
Japanese attitudes than Yöichi Funabashi.29
Another source of material on APEC was the Australia-Japan Research Centre 
(AJRC) at the Australian National University (ANU). A number of publications and 
conferences have been produced under the auspices of the AJRC. Material 
produced by Japanese academics affiliated with the AJRC, as well as papers based 
on conferences with Japanese guest-academics, provided insights into Japanese 
perceptions of APEC. One such publication was in the Pacific Economic Papers 
series, and entitled ‘Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation and Australia-Japan 
Relations: A Japanese Perspective’ .30 The ANU’s Professor Peter Drysdale 
(Director of the AJRC), and Dr Andrew Elek who has been affiliated with the AJRC, 
have written prolifically on APEC. The writings of these academics provided useful 
background, but are not frequently cited because of their Australian origin.
Foreign Policy
Japan’s involvement in APEC is no doubt closely linked to Japanese economic 
policy. The adoption of the three pillars of APEC in Japan’s economic policy is 
recognised as a step towards globalisation. Although Japan is currently suffering 
an economic downturn, it has historically produced significant economic growth, 
sometimes considered ‘miraculous’. Japan’s foreign policy, on the contrary, is not 
so acclaimed. Japan is often accused of not having its own foreign policy. Instead, 
it is said to have evolved around US concerns. This has not been denied by official 
Japanese government statements, which rarely fail to reiterate the pivotal 
importance of US-Japan relations in the foreign policy of Japan. The fact that
29 Personal discussion with Japanese research student, ANU, October 1996.
30 M. Inouchi & T. Terada, ‘Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation and Australia-Japan 
Relations: A Japanese Perspective’, Pacific Economic Papers, No. 224, October 1993.
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Japanese foreign policy objectives have not included global leadership has 
contributed to the perception that Japan has no foreign policy. It is not the purpose 
of this thesis to debate such matters. There is no doubt that Japan has a foreign 
policy of its own, and it has been very effective in securing its objectives. Nor is 
there any doubt that Japan’s post-war relationship with the USA has played a major 
role in moulding Japanese foreign policy. Of greater importance to the thesis is 
determining the fundamental issues of Japanese policy and how they are shaping 
Japan’s future.
In 1957 the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) published the first volume 
in its Diplomatic Bluebook series: an annual report on the state of Japan’s foreign 
policy. Having restored diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in October 1956 
and joined the UN in December of that year, Japan gradually reintegrated itself 
back into the international community. The time had come for Japan to make a 
comprehensive review of the nation’s diplomatic stance and the Diplomatic 
Bluebook would act as the messenger. It set out three basic principles for 
conducting diplomacy: focus on the UN, cooperate with, and be accepted by, 
liberal democracies, and strengthen Japan’s status as a member of Asia.31 These 
three principles have remained virtually constant for almost forty years.32 I have
31 Japanese foreign policy after World War II was established in the early 1950s by the then
Prime Minister, Shigeru Yoshida. Yoshida’s foreign policy principles have been described 
as consisting of three parts: 1) to base foreign policy on the alliance with the USA and by 
so doing, maintain security: 2) to keep national defence at a minimum level; and 3) to use 
the extra wealth for economic activities, and pursue the route of a trading nation. 
Masataka Kosaka, Nihon sonbö no toki (Japan’s time of crisis) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1992) 
as cited by Ryo Sano in The Ambitions and Limitations of Japan’s Foreign Policy in the 
Post-Cold War Era: Loosen the Ties or Reaffirm the US-Japan Alliance?’, Institute
Reports, (Columbia University: East Asian Institute, 1996), pp. 5-6.
32 This definition is also in line with the draft report submitted in 1992 by the Ozawa 
Committee, which was set up to consider ‘Japan’s Role in the International Community’. 
The following four principles were proposed (in the stated order) as the basis on which 
Japan should develop its new role in the changing international environment: maintain 
close ties with the USA, ‘cooperate in, and seek to strengthen, the Group of 7 leadership 
set-up’, play an active part in the UN, and that ‘..as an Asian country, Japan must strive to 
preserve peace and maintain stability in the Asian region’.
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used these basic principles to frame this study of Japanese attitudes to APEC, 
Asian relations, US relations and globalism.
The term ‘foreign policy’ is generally associated with the workings of a 
government’s foreign affairs department. International relations, however, are 
increasingly interconnected with financial and trade issues. For this reason, 
decisions about Japanese foreign policy involve the government (especially the 
bureaucracy), members of the Diet, and big business.33 Within the bureaucracy, 
MOFA holds the central coordinating role for foreign policy. However, the area of 
foreign economic policy is hotly contested by the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI). MITI’s role has changed with the increased number of foreign trade 
issues, especially pertaining to the US-Japan relationship. APEC is another area in 
which MITI is heavily involved with policy making. In fact, MITI officially shares 
responsibility for it with MOFA, unlike in other APEC countries. For this reason, and 
given MlTl’s involvement in APEC’s establishment, MOFA has been suspicious of 
the APEC forum from the beginning. The suspicion appears to be territorial, rather 
than related to APEC content or objectives. Since the beginning of APEC, the two 
ministries have pursued largely separate, and at times divergent, approaches 
towards APEC.34 To ensure that neither ministry gets the upper hand, both 
ministries are usually represented at APEC gatherings, no matter what the content 
of the meeting.35 The increase in transnational relations has also meant that many 
other ministries have become involved in foreign policy matters and MOFA has to
33 ‘Big Business’ refers to the Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organisations), Nisho 
(Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry), Keizai Doyukai (Japan Committee for 
Economic Development), and Nikkeiren (Federation of Employers’ Organisation).
34 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion’, p. 136.
35 Despite the Information Technology focus of the Second APEC Ministerial Meeting on the 
Telecommunications & Information Industry on the Gold Coast, Australia, in September 
1996, Japan was represented by MOFA, MITI and the Ministry of Posts & 
Telecommunications.
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rely on their expertise over a broad spectrum of fields. The Ministry of Finance, in 
particular, plays a significant role in steering Japan’s foreign policy.
While this thesis is not about Japanese foreign policy, it does provide a useful 
framework for assessing Japanese perceptions of APEC. For the purposes of this 
thesis, the term ‘foreign policy’ will refer to three major relationships which affect 
Japan and influence how Japan acts in the global arena. These are listed below.
Japan-Asia Relations
While Japan’s post-Cold War identity is moving in the direction of globalism, there 
is a realisation that it must also have a strong regional strategy, which should not be 
confined to Asia or East Asia alone, but be widened to include the Asia Pacific, as 
far as North America. Its objective is to keep the region open, peaceful, democratic 
and prosperous. Within Asia, Japan has already replaced the USA as Asia’s 
principal market, main source of investment and provider of development 
assistance. It has taken tentative steps towards providing political leadership as 
spokesman for ASEAN in the Group of Seven (G7) and through various attempts to 
mediate in regional conflicts. It has played a leading role in launching a multilateral 
approach to regional security through the Asian Regional Forum (ARF), and has 
recently proposed a partnership with Southeast Asia that extends beyond 
economics, into high-level security and political cooperation.36 Japan’s role in 
establishing APEC and other regional economic groupings will be discussed in 
some detail later in this thesis. These strategies are in line with Japan’s desire to: 
promote economic growth and development, as well as liberalise trade and 
investment in the region; enhance the peace-keeping and peace-maintenance, 
which involves maximising US commitment and continued engagement in the
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region; and incorporate developing countries in the region as responsible players.37 
A recent development in Japan’s Asia policy has been its willingness to take more 
vigorous steps towards regional leadership. Japan has encountered some 
problems in its attempts to strengthen ties with Asia and to assert power 
commensurate with its economic status. This mainly relates to Japan’s role in 
WWII and pre-war aggression. Some of Asia is still wary of Japanese leadership 
and resentful of the lack of Japanese remorse. Japan, in turn, is wary of Asian 
sensitivities. Both attitudes have led to a very gradual approach to Japan-Asia 
unity.
The importance of the Asian region and Japan’s relations with its Asian neighbours 
is reflected in recent editions of the Diplomatic Bluebook. Japan has gradually 
taken on a role as the major market for the products of the region. Japan has 
invested heavily in Asia in order to offset the steep rise in the value of the yen. The 
whole region has become more closely integrated with the increase in economic 
flows, and the success of the Asian economies has led to greater interdependence. 
The divide between Japan and Asia is disappearing and Japan can no longer 
regard itself as ‘an ultra-modern skyscraper towering alone above a vast garbage 
dump called Asia’, as a well known Japanese political critic stated in 1986.38 The 
development of many of the Asian nations, especially the Newly Industrialising 
Countries (NICs) 39 and ASEAN,40 and the economic restructure in China, has 
produced a highly dynamic economic community. The potential for continued
36 The latter was proposed by Prime Minister Hashimoto in January 1997 during his tour of 
Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore. Hashimoto visited Thailand and the 
Philippines in November 1996.
37 These three points are considered to be three pillars in Japan’s Asian policy by Yöichi. 
Funabashi. See Yöichi Funabashi (ed), Japan’s International Agenda, (New York: New 
York University Press, 1995), pp. 1-27, esp. p. 18.
38 Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Foreign Policy, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
Chatham House Papers, 1990), pp.103-110, esp. p. 107.
39 South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.
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prosperity in these nations and this region is high, but a global market is required to 
support Asian output. Continued Japanese involvement in Asia, therefore, is an 
economic necessity for Japan. Full integration with Asia, however, is based on 
‘mutual trust’ and Japan must ‘look squarely at the history of its relations with 
neighbouring Asian countries and elsewhere and work positively with these 
countries to promote mutual understanding and mutual confidence in the future’.41 
The Diplomatic Bluebook reports that Japan is attempting to achieve this goal 
through official government statements regarding Japan’s remorse over the past 
and declaring that ‘Japan’s future path should be to make every effort to build world 
peace in line with its no-war commitment’. It may also be achieved through ‘the 
Peace, Friendship and Exchange initiative and other measures’.42
Japan-US Relations
Until 1993, the Diplomatic Bluebook stated that Japan was: (1) a free and
democratic nation, and (2) an Asia Pacific nation.43 Japan saw itself foremost as a 
major industrial democracy. In fact, as recently as 1983, MOFA stated that Japan 
had diplomacy ‘grounded on the Asia Pacific Region’44 but did not consider itself a 
‘member’ of the Asia Pacific. Instead the 1983 Diplomatic Bluebook stated that 
Japan’s foreign policy was primarily based on being ‘a member of the West’.45 This 
attitude is no longer extolled in the Diplomatic Bluebook 1995. The importance of 
Japan-US relations to the Japanese government has not diminished in any way 
despite anti-American feeling recently in Okinawa. The emphasis on maintaining a
40 Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Brunei.
41 Diplomatic Bluebook 1995, Japan’s Diplomatic Activities, 1996. Public Information Bureau, 
MOFA, Tokyo.
42 Diplomatic Bluebook 1995.
43 Diplomatic Bluebook 1987, Japan’s Diplomatic Activities, 1988. Public Information Bureau, 
MOFA, Tokyo. This attitude continued until 1993, after which the Bluebook discontinued 
with this line of positioning Japan. Instead it placed greater emphasis on ‘globalism’ or 
‘internationalisation’.
44 Diplomatic Bluebook 1983, Japan’s Diplomatic Activities, 1984. Public Information Bureau, 
MOFA, Tokyo.
45 Diplomatic Bluebook 1983.
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strong security alliance with the USA perhaps indicates the strength of the 
relationship at this stage. Despite a ‘host of unresolved problems...including 
heightened military tensions’46 in the region that may disturb the relative calm, the 
Japanese government embraces a security policy that maintains the US-Japan 
security arrangements, securing Japan’s own defence capability and supports the 
Japanese government policy that seeks to secure international peace and security.
The USA has played a large part in Japan’s development over the last five 
decades. The context and nature of the US-Japan relationship, however, is 
changing. Some argue that, the close alliance between the two nations is no longer 
necessary. Others argue that to facilitate the change, the relationship should be 
maintained and deepened. At this stage the Japanese government appears to 
have sided with the latter, citing security and economic reasons. There are three 
distinct advantages for Japan maintaining this relationship. The first is that it avoids 
protectionism and isolation in the region, and in the world as a whole. The fear of 
isolation has been an important motive in guiding Japan’s post-war relations. 
Experience has shown that isolation can have a negative affect on Japan’s 
prosperity and security. Protectionism by other nations would isolate Japan. The 
second advantage is that it minimises the suspicion of Japan’s East Asian 
neighbours. The USA is regarded as having a restraining influence on any potential 
Japanese power play. The alliance enables Japan to pursue its interests without 
the obstacle of fears of revived Japanese militarism. Thirdly, many Japanese see 
the close association with the USA as a means of actively contributing to the 
management of global affairs alongside the other leading industrial powers. These 
advantages are nevertheless countered by disadvantages, such as conflicts of 
interest in China, human rights, and terms of trade. It appears, however, that at this
46 Diplomatic Bluebook 1995.
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stage the advantages outweigh the disadvantages, and containing the USA in the 
Asia Pacific region is of considerable importance to the Japanese government.
Japan and the World
In Diplomatic Bluebook 1995, the Japanese government concedes that under the 
Cold War structure, ‘Japan had been carrying out its foreign policy as a ‘member of 
the West’, but it now emphasises a global motif and avoids defining Japan in terms 
of Asia or the West, but rather as a champion of international cooperation.47 Its 
focus is on Japan’s role in the international community and on global 
interdependence. MOFA considers that ‘it is important to strengthen cooperation 
among Japan, the USA and Europe; such cooperation is indispensable in 
addressing a wide range of issues facing the international com m un ity ’. It is also 
Japan’s responsibility to ‘play an active role in further promoting regional 
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region’ which will in turn complement and accelerate 
global cooperation.48 Approximately three and a half pages are allocated to 
‘Multilateral Cooperation’, and two pages to ‘Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation’ 
covering APEC and the ARF. This would suggest that considerable importance is 
placed on APEC.
The post-Cold War trend in global interdependence demands that Japan show 
leadership across a range of political, strategic and economic issues. There has 
been some reticence and uncertainty about how to do this. Japan is able to use its 
strategic position between Asia and the ‘West’ in the 1990s to act as a ‘bridge’ or 
mediator. As already stated, Japan represents ASEAN at the G7, but there is some 
hope that when APEC matures, an APEC representative might attend the G7
47 Diplomatic Bluebook 1995.
48 Diplomatic Bluebook 1995.
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summits in a fashion similar to ELI representation.49 One of the Japanese 
government’s goals is for permanent membership in the UN Security Council 
(UNSC). This goal is probably partially inspired by its original exclusion from the 
UN along with WWII ‘enemies’, Germany and Italy. Although these countries make 
financial contributions to the UN, none of them are represented on a permanent 
basis in the UNSC. Their exclusion will continue until Article 107, the ‘enemies’ 
article, of the UN Charter is deleted.50 Japan sees the UN and other international 
organisations as a way of articulating its position in the world. At present, Japan’s 
interests derive largely from its ‘search for an honourable place in the world 
community’, arising from its apprehension of being isolated, and from its desire to 
make a positive contribution to international peace and security.51 In the following 
chapters, we will see how APEC figures in Japan’s view of its future.
49 Yöichi Funabashi (ed), Japan’s International Agenda, p. 23.
50 Takashi Inoguchi, Japan’s Foreign Policy in an Era of Global Change, (London: Pinter 
Publishers, 1993), pp. 139-155, esp. p. 149.
51 Takashi Inoguchi, Japan’s Foreign Policy in an Era of Global Change, p. 153.
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Chapter 2. Japan and Asia: The Legacies of History
Since the Meiji era (1853-68), Japan has been ‘in Asia’ but not fully ‘of Asia’ 
according to the senior Japanese journalist Yöichi Funabashi. Japan’s geography, 
history, economic base, and the international environment have given it a unique 
identity. Its uniqueness was cemented by Japan becoming the first Asian nation to 
be declared a major industrial democracy. Because of this status, Funabashi 
believes that Japan will play a critical role in the Asia Pacific’s ‘evolution’.1 Asia is 
now facing some of the issues and challenges, such as coping in the world trading 
system, the conflict between tradition and modernisation, and the pressure to 
liberalise markets, that confronted Japan in the 1960s and 1970s. Although 
Japan’s position has been weakened by prolonged recession, some believe that 
Japan is in a good position to share its developmental experiences with Asia. 
Japan, however, can no longer keep a safe distance from Asia but should learn 
from the experiences of its Asia Pacific neighbours in order to integrate itself more 
fully with Asia.2
This chapter will look at Japan’s Asian relations, especially in light of the so-called 
wave of Asianism that Japan is experiencing in the 1990s. The discussion will 
cover periods of Japanese ‘Asianism’, contemporary trade ties with Asia, and Japan 
and Asia in the changing international arena. This discussion will predicate Japan’s 
links to Asia, before a discussion of Japan, Asia and APEC in chapter three.
Japan’s History of ‘Asianism’
Modern history has seen the Japanese searching for an appropriate way by which 
to identify themselves. Japan has swung back and forth between so-called
1 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, p. 10.
2 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, p. 11.
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Asianism and Westernism. Japan’s first pan-Asianist period, which began in the 
Meiji era, was a romantic ideal, stemming from a consciousness of common Asian 
cultural heritage.3 At the turn of the century Asians and Japanese alike celebrated 
an Asian spirituality. Japanese supporters of this ideology, Noguchi Yonejirö and 
Okakura Tenshin for example, saw in Asia’s spiritual heritage a bond which made 
Asia superior to the materialistic West; a view that has been recycled a number of 
times since the beginning of this century.
In the early twentieth century the concept of Asian solidarity continued. An Asia- 
first policy was suggested by the intellectual Sugita Junzan, author of ‘Köa-saku’ 
(Plans for Asian Prosperity), a book which detailed several ways to avoid Asia’s 
colonisation by Europe. Sugita belonged to a group known as ‘Jiyu-Minken Undo’ 
(Freedom and People’s Rights Movement) which feared the colonisation of Japan, 
and sympathised with already colonised and semi-colonised Asian neighbours. The 
group promoted the idea of Japan forming a coalition with Asian nations, such as 
Korea, China, Vietnam and India, in an effort to prevent further colonisation. The 
coalition would be based on a feeling of shared ‘Asianess’(sic) and merited the 
phrase ‘döbun döshu’ (same character, same ethnicity) . 4 A number of patriotic 
societies were established, the Kokuryükai, Gen’yösha and others, which endorsed 
the encouragement and protection of political exiles and revolutionaries from other 
Asian nations. Sun Yat-sen, Kim Ok-siun, Aguinaldo, Phan Boi Chau and Rash 
Bihari Bose were some of the recipients of this Japanese insistence on Asian 
brotherhood.5
3Joyce C. Lebra, Japan’s Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II: 
Selected Readings and Documents, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. xi.
4 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, pp. 223-27.
5Joyce C. Lebra, Japan’s Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II, p. xii.
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The second Asianist period resulted from growing Asian trade interdependence and 
conflicting trade relations with the West. At the end of the nineteenth century, when 
relatively comprehensive regional trade data became available, the level of East 
Asian regional interdependence was already high. By 1913 about 42 per cent of 
the region’s trade was intra-regional, rising to 46 per cent in 1938 and 47 per cent in 
1990.6 Japanese exports destined for the USA accounted for 40 per cent of total 
exports in the first two decades of this century, and those to Asia were slightly 
higher. The share of exports to the USA dropped rapidly to 18 per cent by 1939, 
while exports to Asia rose to 65 per cent (mainly to Manchuria and North China, as 
they were part of Japan’s informal empire).7 In the 1930s, Japan had adapted to 
Western trade systems to such an extent that it became the world’s largest exporter 
of cotton cloth by 1933. The world economy was made up of competing economic 
blocs due to the effects of the Great Depression. Japan’s success in textiles upset 
British India’s position as leader in textiles, and prompted Great Britain to form an 
Imperial Preference System: later known as the Commonwealth. Japan responded 
to Britain’s protectionism by turning to Asian markets, more for economic reasons 
than for any feeling of solidarity with Asia. Unlike Meiji pan-Asianism, it was 
ideological, economic and strategic concerns that fostered the pan-Asianism of the 
1930s. Japan was annoyed that it had been ostracised by the British just as it was 
becoming successful. The closure of markets and creation of trading blocs only 
served to incite anti-Western feelings within Japan. This wave of Asianism, inspired 
by an aversion to the West and an attempt to save Japan’s own markets, eventually 
led to Japan’s invasion of East and Southeast Asia.
6 Peter A. Petri, The East Asian Trading Bloc: an analytical history’. In Jeffrey A. Frankel 
and Miles Kahler (ed.), Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the United States in Pacific 
Asia, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993) p. 24.
7 Edward J. Lincoln, Japan’s New Global Role, (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution,
1993), p. 162.
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China’s resistance to Japan’s economic advance and the Great Depression also 
stimulated a change in Japan’s economic strategy from the colonial-style of 
exchange of light manufactures for raw materials, to a concerted effort to develop 
independent bases of industrial investments outside mainland Japan.8 This led to 
substantial industrial development outside Japan proper, and eventually resulted in 
quite sophisticated economic linkages between Japan, Korea, Taiwan and 
eventually China.9 Soon after the invasion of China, Prime Minister Konoe 
announced a ‘new order’ for Asia that called for close cooperation or ‘co-prosperity’ 
between China, Japan and Manchuria. By 1939 the Shöwa Research Institute had 
developed an extensive plan for an East Asian Economic Bloc10 which could be 
self-sufficient by relying on rubber, bauxite, tin, tungsten, nickel and chromium from 
Thailand, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies and Malaya.* 11 The scope of 
Japan’s East Asian cooperative sphere expanded to include Indochina as WWII 
approached. It became known as the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.
Prior to the APEC Osaka summit in 1995, the last time Japan had held an Asia­
wide summit meeting was in 1943, when Japan invited the rulers of China, 
Manchuria, the Philippines and Burma, along with leaders from Thailand and ‘Free 
India’ to a Greater East Asia conference. As Japan became more vulnerable during 
the war, the more Japanese leaders called on all Asia to break the shackles of 
Western imperialist control, and proclaimed that Japan would help liberate the rest 
of Asia from oppressive control in a new ‘Asia for Asiatics’.12 In 1943 Prime Minister 
General Töjö Hideki addressed the ‘Assembly of Greater East-Asiatic Nations’ with
8 Peter A. Petri, The East Asian Trading Bloc: an analytical history’, p. 33.
9 Peter A. Petri, The East Asian Trading Bloc: an analytical history’, p. 33.
10 Joyce C. Lebra, Japan’s Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II, pp. 
100-103.
11 Peter A. Petri, The East Asian Trading Bloc: an analytical history’, p. 34.
12 Joyce C. Lebra, Japan’s Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II, p. xiii.
Chapter 2. Japan and Asia: The Legacies of History 25
details of the war and Japan’s Greater East Asia. He condemned American and 
British imperialism and their attempts to subordinate Asia. It was in response to 
these aggressors, he explained, that Japan ‘inevitably but resolutely came to fight 
the challenges against Asia’. Furthermore, Japan’s ambitions were ‘fundamentally 
different from the old order designed to serve the interests of the United States and 
Britain who do not hesitate to practise injustice, deception and exploitation in order 
to promote their own prosperity’.13 Töjö explained that Japan aspired to create 
‘family-type links’ with Asian nations, with little doubt that in this family Japan would 
be the ‘father’ who possessed absolute power.14 Although constant reiteration by 
the Japanese military and government that the themes of co-existence and co­
prosperity were designed to gain Japan friends in Asia, the development of Greater 
East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere is more likely to have been in response to a 
sudden downturn for Japan in international events rather than a consequence of a 
widely held interest in the co-prosperity of Asian people.15 The realisation of the 
Co-Prosperity Sphere resulted in education, such as cultural programs, writers’ 
conferences in Tokyo, dissemination of Japanese language, and study in Tokyo by 
Asian students. Religious and youth programs were also pursued with the 
encouragement of Islam and Buddhism, and the fostering of political and youth 
groups. There was also training of volunteer and independence armies, 
mobilisation of labour, and requisitioning of raw materials and agricultural products 
which both enhanced and aggravated Asian interdependence.
Although Japan’s role in the pre-war economy substantially increased East Asian 
interdependence, particularly between China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan in the 
1930s, the period of Japan’s Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, especially
13Joyce C. Lebra, Japan’s Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II, p. 91.
14 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, p. 187.
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from 1940, saw the region suffer a deep economic decline resulting from the 
onslaught of the war. Integration between the Asian nations dwindled as the sea 
lanes were not safe enough to allow large scale transport.16 Needless to say, the 
end of the war saw this strong Asia-centric view discredited. This was further 
weakened by the virtual closure of the Chinese market after 1949, and the USA 
rather forcefully cutting many of Japan’s pre-war ties.
Since Japan achieved the status of a major industrialised democracy in the mid- 
1970s, Japan has endeavoured to gradually improve its relations with Asia. There is 
some feeling that Japan is experiencing a third ‘Asianist’ wave in the 1990s. This 
coincides with the Japanese desire to define a new national identity, or at least 
prepare for the twenty-first century. Young Japanese people are feeling drawn to 
Asia. For many of them, Asia is not just a region of dynamic economic growth, but 
also the latest chic spot. Trends in the Japanese media suggest an increased 
interest in the region which is reflected in reporting on Asia. News articles on Asia 
in Japan’s leading newspaper, Asahi Shimbun, increased from 1000 stories in 1985 
to more than 6000 in 1994.17 A survey by Japan’s weekly magazine, AERA, of 
predominantly young people showed that they would choose Asia over the USA if 
they had to choose between the two in foreign policy.18 Asia and Japan are enjoying 
increased cultural interaction, especially with the rise of consumerism.
Another apparent source of Asianism is the promotion of Confucian or Asian values 
across Asia in general. This represents an effort to avoid the social decay that 
reputedly stems from ‘Westernisation’. Social decay is reflected, for example in the
15 Peter A. Petri, The East Asian Trading Bloc: an analytical history’, p. 36.
16 Peter A. Petri, ‘The East Asian Trading Bloc: an analytical history’, p. 34.
17 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, pp. 223-27.
18 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, pp. 223-27.
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weakening of work ethics, hedonistic consumption, and excesses of individualism. 19 
Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad and Shintarö Ishihara jointly authored a book entitled 
The Voice of Asia, in which they agree that the core Asian values are discipline, 
deference and obedience.20 They credit Asia’s economic success with the 
Confucian way of family and community over individualism. While mainly 
extremists have adopted this view in Japan, it is nevertheless an issue receiving 
some attention.
The previous two ‘Asianist’ waves, at the turn of the century and the period 
culminating in WWII, are often explained in terms of Japanese antipathy to Western 
countries and their actions. This apparent ‘third wave’ may be partially explained by 
the Japanese desire to dissociate itself from the USA. The end of the Cold War 
may have provided the signal to Japan to reconsider its position as ‘little brother’ of 
the USA. Miyake Wasuke, a former diplomat, has suggested that Japan shift its 
diplomatic emphasis from the USA to Asia. He has argued that, ‘until now, Japan 
has often listened to American voices and persuaded Asians. From now, Japan 
needs to listen to more Asian voices and persuade Americans’ .21 Increased anti- 
American sentiment, known as kenbei, has resulted from recent USA-Japan trade 
conflicts and tension over American bases in Japan. Of course, the critical 
underpinning of the US-Japan security relationship has limited the extent of anti- 
American feeling. The Japanese government continues to tread a fine line between 
taking greater responsibility in a number of areas in the region, and ensuring that 
the USA is engaged in the region for the foreseeable future.
19 John Naisbitt, Megatrends Asia. Eight Asian Megatrends That Are Reshaping Our World, 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 63.
20 Mahathir Mohamad & Shintarö Ishihara, The Voice of Asia. Two Leaders Discuss the 
Coming Century, (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1996).
21 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, p. 225.
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Although there is some American rhetoric about Japan’s dark intentions in this third 
wave of Asianism, this has probably more to do with political point scoring than any 
real fear of a rise in Japanese power. Even Asian nations who suffered under 
Japanese colonialism appear unconcerned. Yöichi Funabashi believes that Japan 
is becoming ‘peacefully enmeshed in Asia’ through increased travel, business 
interaction and personal links. Japan has come to consider its Asian neighbours as 
‘normal’ foreign countries on a par with North America and Europe. Similarly, 
Nakanishi Teramasa argues that this time there are no dreams of Japanese 
hegemony because the younger generation ‘do not harbour the sense of 
superiority’ over other Asians that their forebears felt prior to WWII. He believes 
that recent discussions of cooperation and competition between Japan and its 
Asian neighbours are premised on the recognition of ‘fundamental equality’.22
Contemporary Trade Ties with Asia
Although Japan has had a long history of trade relations with Asia, recent trade 
statistics indicate that levels of interdependence between Japan and the other Asia 
Pacific economies are still growing. In 1993 the Asia Pacific accounted for 78.9 per 
cent of Japan’s exports, or nearly US$268 billion, and 69.5 per cent or US$162 
billion in imports.23 These percentages are up from 1992 figures of 74.3 per cent 
and 67.4 per cent for exports and imports respectively.24 The interdependence of 
this region is giving rise to a new global powerhouse. East Asia represented four 
per cent of the world’s GNP in 1960, while the USA commanded 37 per cent. 
Today, their shares are nearly equal (between 23 and 24 per cent each) with most
22 Nakanishi Teramasa, ‘Japan’s Place in the World’, Japan Echo, Vol. XIX, Special Issue, 
1992, pp. 2-5.
2j Asia Pacific is not defined in the article entitled ‘Japan’s Basic Approach to APEC and 
Close Relations with Member Economies’, 1995. MOFA APEC Information. 
[http://www.nttls.co.jp/infomofa/apecinfo.html]. However, as it is an APEC ‘homepage’, it 
is assumed that this refers to the seventeen member economies (excluding Japan).
24 ‘Japan’s Basic Approach to APEC and Close Relations with Member Economies’, 1995. 
MOFA APEC Information.
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of the Asian nations still developing. If present trends continue, East Asia could 
exceed half of the world’s GNP by 2040. On the basis of recent growth rates, East 
Asia’s GNP will overtake that of North America in 2003 and Western Europe in 
2011.25
Steady economic growth in the Asia Pacific countries has been fuelled by 
increasing flows of private capital since the beginning of the decade. While the 
world’s public capital flows to developing economies have levelled off, Japan 
remains the world’s largest investor and the world’s largest aid donor.26 These are 
two immensely powerful international levers. Because Southeast Asia alone 
receives approximately half of all Japanese direct investment in Asia27 and a 
considerable percentage of its aid, it has been suggested that its actions are 
motivated by purely commercial interests. Japan’s portfolio investment in Asian 
equities accounted for approximately 20 per cent of the world’s total investment in 
Asian equities in 1994.28 Japanese portfolio investment in Asia has been driven by 
the good performance of the emerging economies of the region. The outlook 
however, is likely to be long term as Asian investment expertise and experience 
increases, particularly from the viewpoint of Japanese investors. Accordingly, this 
type of direct investment from Japan to Asia will continue to play a major role in the 
capital formation of Asian business. Japan is clearly keen to build up business ties 
in the developing Asian nations, like Vietnam and Cambodia, on the back of its aid 
programs. Although this process is often perceived as Japanese commercialism, it
25 Joseph Camilleri, ‘Asia Pacific in the Post Hegemonic World’, in Andrew Mack and John 
Ravenhill, (eds) Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the 
Asia-Pacific Region, (Canberra: Allen & Unwin in association with RSPAS, ANU, 1994),
pp. 180-208, p. 182.
26 Greg Sheridan, ‘Japan, the Unintentional Superpower’, The Australian, 15 January 1997,
p. 11.
27 Roberto Coloma, ‘Japan plans S-E Asian Accord’, The Australian, 14 January 1997, p. 9. 
28Takatoshi Katö, ‘Japan’s Interaction with APEC Economies’, Look Japan, March 1996, pp.
16-17.
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plays a significant role in the daily lives of people in countries like Cambodia. 
Japanese aid to Cambodia has boosted electricity supplies, rehabilitated Phnom 
Penh’s main water treatment plant, rebuilt a bridge linking the city to central and 
eastern Cambodia and increased port facilities.29 Japan nevertheless benefits from 
providing aid packages to developing nations. Through its Overseas Development 
Aid (ODA) program, Japan has the opportunity to invest in the hard infrastructure of 
the region, such as civil works transport, communications and energy, and also in 
‘soft’ intellectual infrastructure, such as education, welfare, population issues and 
environmental protection.30 Criticism of Japan’s aid stems from the commercial 
nature of the aid programs, where the allocation of aid is seen to result in the 
recipients subsequently procuring Japanese goods to implement the infrastructure 
projects. There is the perception that Japanese companies win the contracts, while 
Western firms are somehow prevented from bidding successfully for lucrative 
Japanese aid contracts.31
A considerable amount of Japanese investment in Asia has arisen from the 
‘hollowing out’ of Japan whereby Japanese manufacturers have moved production 
plants to other parts of Asia, to cope with the high yen in Japan. Japan has 
experienced economic stagnation in the 1990s, and although its economy is picking 
up, the high yen, soaring labour costs and the need to stay cost competitive have 
driven Japanese transnational businesses off-shore, where they will remain for the 
foreseeable future. The exodus has been extraordinary. According to projections 
by the Nomura Research Institute, 35 per cent of car stereos, 70 per cent of colour 
televisions, 40 per cent of VCRs and 80 per cent of hi-fi audio equipment made by
29 Leo Dobbs, ‘Generous Japan Leads Cambodia’s Rejuvination’, Reuter’s News Service, 25 
July 1996.
30 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, p. 239.
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Japanese companies will be produced in other parts of Asia in 1996.32 Japan now 
supplies the world market from manufacturing plants in China and Southeast Asia.
Japanese labour costs can no longer compete with costs in China, Indonesia, India 
or Vietnam. Japanese conglomerates are beginning to recognise the demands of 
the future and the manufacturing reform process will accelerate regardless of the 
social costs.33 On top of goods being assembled overseas, there will be an 
increase in the use of locally manufactured parts, and a shift away from Japan in 
product development and design operations. According to a 1994 Japanese 
government survey, it was 16 per cent cheaper to manufacture colour televisions in 
Southeast Asia than in Japan. Recently, the general manger of Sony Television 
Industries reported that 30 per cent of television components were still being made 
in Japan, but the company would reduce that figure to less than 10 per cent in the 
near future.34 These measures are increasingly required as tough competitors from 
South Korea, Europe and elsewhere move into similar markets and reduce profits. 
In the bid to maintain market supremacy, Japanese companies are being squeezed 
to force far-reaching and domestically divisive changes in social attitude.
Not only has Asia become a production base, Asia is also an enormous consumer 
market. ASEAN accounted for more than 16 per cent of Japan’s trade in 1995, 
while Japan accounted for close to 19 per cent of ASEAN trade.35 Asia accounts 
for about 25 per cent of Japan’s world sales in electronics and ranks as one of the
31 Susan J Pharr, ‘Japanese Aid in the New World Order’, in Craig Garby & Mary Brown 
Bullock (eds), Japan A New Kind of Superpower? (Washington: The Woodrow Wilson 
Center Press & The John Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 159-179, esp. p. 171.
32 Russell Skelton, ‘Japan goes to Asia, Where it’s Cheaper’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 
27 July 1996, p. 34. (Reuter’s Business Briefing, 26 July 1996.)
33 The hollowing out of Japanese mainland manufacturing is having a negative effect on the 
job market in Japan. Unemployment has reached an unheard of 3 per cent, and could go 
much higher.
34 Russell Skelton, ‘Japan goes to Asia, Where it’s Cheaper’, p. 34.
Chapter 2. Japan and Asia: The Legacies of History 32
world’s four largest markets. By 2000, it is estimated that China alone will account 
for 25 per cent of all air conditioner sales, 20 per cent of washing machine and 15 
per cent of television and refrigerator sales.36 This will have an enormous impact 
on the Japanese economy. Japan must therefore maintain good economic 
relations with China to ensure that it can benefit from China’s increasing consumer 
demands.
Japan and Asia in the Changing International Arena
The foreign policy course taken by Japan prior to WWII aligned Japan with other 
Asian nations. However, it used the power and local advantage of its position in 
Asia to associate with the Western powers and to consolidate its status in the 
international community. This meant that Japan’s status in the international 
community depended on its position and power in Asia. The second major course 
taken by Japan occurred after the war, and placed Japan in the Western or non- 
Asian world. Japan shared the technological development and democratic values 
of the West and was generally accepted as part of the ‘Western-bloc’. During this 
era, Japan’s prestige and influence in Asia depended on it being an industrially 
advanced, democratic, Western nation, virtually defining its position in Asia by its 
status in a different part of the world.37 Generally, Japanese foreign policy has 
remained relatively stable since the end of WWII, focusing on: acceptance in the 
international community; an international order that allowed its trade and investment 
interests to flourish, especially in Asia; and a benign security environment under 
American surveillance. Today the economic situation in Asia has changed for the 
better, and a new course for Japan is becoming both a possibility and a necessity. 
The rapid economic development of Asia means that Japan can no longer use
35 Roberto Coloma, ‘Japan plans S-E Asian Accord’, The Australian, 14 January 1997, p. 9.
36 Russell Skelton, ‘Japan goes to Asia, Where it’s Cheaper’, p. 34.
37 Kazuo Ogura, ‘Japan’s Asia Policy, Past and Future’, Japan Review of International 
Affairs, Winter 1996, pp.3-15, esp. p. 3.
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these nations as a stepping stone to the West. Japan must cooperate and 
collaborate with Asian countries for its own economic well-being. As part of this 
strategy, Japan sees itself assisting Asia by taking on a leadership role to help 
facilitate Asia’s successful internationalisation to the level of Europe and the USA. 
The January 1997 offer by Prime Minister Hashimoto, of a new partnership between 
Southeast Asia and Japan, signals a more assertive Japanese foreign policy and a 
determination to assume an international role commensurate with its economic 
status. This is a significant Asian play by Tokyo, aimed at ASEAN, which has less 
pronounced resistance to Japan than Northeast Asia. Northeast Asian resistance 
will be harder to crack, with Korean anti-Japanese sentiment almost ritualised in 
South Korean politics, and Chinese sentiment designed to gain some advantage 
over Japan.38 Japan is keen for Asia to assume a more responsible role in global 
issues, as economic sustainability and future political power relies on cooperation 
between the Asia Pacific, Europe and the USA. Japan is increasingly aligning itself 
closely with all three. It has close relations with Asia and the USA, and is 
endeavouring to improve its relations with Europe. Japan’s current foreign policy 
reflects the globalisation of the international economic system.
Conclusion
The growing influence of Asia in world trade is one of the most significant economic 
developments in modern history.39 East Asia’s potential to overtake the GNP of 
North America and Western Europe within the next decade demands world 
attention. This sea change has challenged basic assumptions about the world 
economic system. The Japanese government and business conglomerates are
38 This is according to Sato Seisaburo of the Institute for International Studies in Tokyo. 
Greg Sheridan, ‘Japan, the Unintentional Superpower’, The Australian, 15 January 1997,
p. 11.
39 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, p. 6.
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also altering their assumptions about the future of Asia. Financial necessity is 
central to this change. Fortunately for Japan, it is well regarded in the region as the 
first Asian nation to reach major industrial power status. Its Asian heritage has also 
allowed Japan to develop economic links with Asia. However, its oscillating 
changes in political affiliation and, at times, aggressive relations with Asia, have 
meant that Japan must work to alleviate any Asian concerns about Japanese 
intentions and affiliations.
♦
This change in world affairs is assisting Japanese politicians, often seen as weak in 
their implementation of policy, in implementing unpopular policies. To ensure 
Japan has a secure future, changes are slowly being implemented across Japan’s 
economic arena. Increased investment in Asia to reduce the value of the high yen 
and the hollowing out of Japan’s manufacturing sector, has resulted in rising 
unemployment levels and changes in the life time work ethic. These changes have 
been necessitated by the changing world trade structure. The latest change is 
towards the liberalisation of Japan’s barriers to trade and investment. Fearing that 
Japan will be denied access to foreign markets, Japanese economic institutions are 
changing accordingly.
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In light of the development of Asia, Japan recognises that it must have a strong 
regional strategy. Japan’s lingering economic recession in the 1990s has cast 
some doubt on the Japanese economic miracle and indicated a clear need to 
stimulate the economy. While Japan has often managed to emerge victorious from 
difficult situations in the post-war period, the Japanese system may not be able to 
‘catch-up’ as well in the new environment. And meanwhile, Asian nations are in the 
process of catching up with Japan. The Japanese government has come to 
recognise that a harmonious and expanding regional economic relationship is a 
necessary prerequisite for Japan’s own prosperity. Its objective is to keep the 
region open, peaceful, democratic and prosperous. Japan hopes to achieve this 
goal by promoting economic growth and development, liberalising trade and 
investment in the region, and incorporating the countries of the region in one 
integral body. Deregulation and close relations in the region are what is required. 
A wide range of deregulation in trade and investment restricting measures are 
aimed at opening markets. The APEC forum is part of Japan’s strategy to achieve 
these goals. Trade, under the auspices of APEC, could be used by Japan as an 
‘engine of adjustment’ in the 1990s.1 APEC may provide a way to stimulate the 
economy, while allowing Japan to keep pace with the region. The APEC concept 
represents one of the major external economic policy drives of Japan.2
As we have seen in previous chapters, Japan was relatively slow to fully embrace 
APEC. However, Japan’s hosting of the 1995 leaders’ summit in Osaka raised 
Japanese public awareness of APEC. The Japan Times placed the ‘APEC in
1 A. Hirata, J. Okamoto & T. Ogita, ‘Strategy toward APEC: the Case of Japan’, in I.
Yamazawa & A. Hirata (eds), APEC: Cooperation from Diversity, (Tokyo: Institute of
Developing Economies, 1996) pp. 29-40, esp. p. 33.
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Osaka’ story as the fifth most important story of the year and the readers 
themselves selected APEC as the ninth most important topic for 1995.2 3 Interest in 
APEC was at a level on par with stories on the Hanshin earthquake, the subway 
attack, Okinawa bases, dollar dives, Daiwa Securities’ losses, the WWII 
anniversary, financial failures, and religious law.
This chapter will consider the role that APEC plays in Japan’s relations with its 
Asian neighbours. Of particular importance are the trade links that Japan has with 
Asia. However, there are also diplomatic and strategic issues that play a large role 
in relations as well. APEC may provide a convenient framework for implementing 
strategies to ensure the prosperity and stability of the Asian region.
Economic Pragmatism
Many Japanese believe that APEC was established out of economic necessity and 
political expedience born of Asia Pacific dynamism, the changes the USA has 
undergone since the end of the Cold War, and Japan’s own relative economic 
decline.4 Japan had been promoting regional cooperation since the 1960s,5 but it 
was felt that, because of the economic and political situation in the late 1980s, the
2 A. Hirata, J. Okamoto & T. Ogita, ‘Strategy toward APEC: the Case of Japan’, p. 33.
3 The Japan Times homepage: [http://shrine.cyber.adjp/~jtinter/home.html], 1996.
4 Personal interviews with Sumio Kusaka and Keiichi Higuchi, Developing Economies and 
APEC Division, Economic Affairs Bureau, MOFA, Japan, 3 & 4 September (respectively) 
1996.
5 In the 1960s, calls for the establishment of an economic community in the Pacific region,
much like the EC, were being made in Japan. An early manifestation of this idea was the 
Conference of Measures for Trade Expansion of Developing Countries sponsored by the 
Japan Economic Research Centre. In 1967, business leaders in Japan, the USA, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand set up the private sector Pacific Basin Economic 
Council (PBEC). In 1968 scholars established the Pacific Trade and Development 
Conference. Ten years later, Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira set up the Study 
Group on Pacific Basin Cooperation, one of a number of policy deliberation bodies he 
established around that time. In 1980, the group issued a report on the ‘Pacific Basin 
Cooperation Concept’ and later that year a Japanese-Australian initiative resulted in the 
first PECC. PECC’s membership grew to include six ASEAN countries, Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, USA, China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Chile, Peru and 
Mexico. The focus of this group was broad and varied, and included agriculture and
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vision of an APEC-type grouping could be more easily made into reality, what with 
the Japan-East Asia market place having shown huge growth.6 Regional 
interdependence was already happening of its own accord7 prior to APEC. 
Newspaper headlines, such as ‘Enter the Century of the Asia Pacific - Cooperation 
is Central to Continued Prosperity’,8 reflected the feeling that APEC was becoming 
necessary for Japan’s future prosperity.9 There were suggestions that APEC was 
born out of ‘a real economic reaction in the Asia Pacific region’.10 One factor that 
made APEC a ‘sheer necessity’ for Japan was the very high yen which forced the 
relocation of many large manufacturers to overseas. The high yen was partly 
caused by the low level of imports into Japan. One Japanese official regarded 
APEC as a ‘vehicle for increasing the velocity and volume of trade in both 
directions’ which could resolve this problem.11 That APEC was created out of 
economic necessity and political expedience suggests that ‘APEC will live on even 
after 2010 or 2020’.12
Shocking Bogor
Some Japanese economic analysts believed that the Bogor Declaration of 1994 
came at a time when Japan most needed deregulation to stimulate the economy.13 
According to Japanese economists, Japanese capital markets were being
fisheries, minerals and energy, trade, transportation, telecommunications, tourism, 
science and technology, human resource development, and economic forecasting.
6 Personal interview with Sumio Kusaka, Director Developing Economies and APEC Division,
Economic Affairs Bureau, MOFA, Japan, 3 September 1996.
7 Personal interview with Sumio Kusaka, 3 September 1996.
8 ‘Enter the Century of the Asia Pacific - Cooperation is Central to Continued Prosperity’, The
Nikkei Weekly, 15 November, 1993.
9 Personal interview with Keiichi Higuchi, Developing Economies and APEC Division, 
Economic Affairs Bureau, MOFA, Japan, 4 September 1996. This was also the opinion of 
Sumio Kusaka.
10 Personal interview with Keiichi Higuchi, 4 September 1996.
11 Personal interview with Keiichi Higuchi, 4 September 1996.
12 Personal interviews with Sumio Kusaka and Keiichi Higuchi, 3 & 4 September 1996.
13 For example, Keiichi Higuchi. Personal interview with Keiichi Higuchi, 4 September 1996.
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liberalised, and trade-impeding processes eliminated.14 However, when it came to 
the Bogor Declaration, there were some who found the concept of setting specific 
goals for liberalisation took APEC beyond its original specification. APEC was, for 
the most part, considered to be a consultative forum on regional economic issues 
that did not lead to the adoption of mandatory directives.15 Despite the apparent 
acceptance of APEC at the Seattle leaders’ summit in 1993, Japan withheld formal 
support for the proposed 2020 deadline for trade liberalisation until late October 
1994, one month prior to the next summit. The proposed Bogor Declaration was 
described as ‘shocking’16 and it was felt that ‘liberalisation is being conducted in a 
hasty, dangerous way’.17 One Japanese economic journal described the results of 
Bogor as ‘Premature policies for the realisation of liberalisation’.18 The reason for 
these perceptions apparently stemmed from Japan’s style of economic 
development over the last fifty years. Japan’s gradual development over that half 
century had enabled Japan to conduct its trade liberalisation as a gradual process 
over a long period, certainly not the 15 or 25 years the Bogor Declaration specified. 
According to one academic, the fact that Indonesia and other developing 
economies recommended and supported such a revolutionary proposal as that 
made at Bogor, meant that Japan had to agree to the Declaration.19 The developed 
economies could only support the proposal in light of the hardship such a deadline 
would impose on developing economies.20
14 Kozo Yamamura, The Deliberate Emergence of a Free Trader: The Japanese Political 
Economy in Transition’ in Craig Garby & Mary Brown Bullock (eds), Japan A New Kind of 
Superpower? (Washington: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), pp. 35-52.
15 In line with ASEAN’s Kuching Consensus set in 1990. Australian, Indonesian and 
Japanese Approaches Towards APEC, (Canberra: Australia-Japan Research Centre, 
Research Schools of Pacific and Asian Studies, ANU, 1994), p. 4.
16 Personal interview with Sumio Kusaka, 3 September 1996.
17 Personal interview with Takashi Terada, Research Scholar, Australia-Japan Research 
Centre, ANU, 18 September 1996.
18 ‘APEC kakuryö shunö kaigi. Saki-okuri ni naru jiyü gutaisaku’ (‘APEC Senior Officials- 
Leaders’ Meeting. Premature policies for the realisation of liberalisation’), Shükan Töyö 
Keizai, 19 November 1994, pp. 70-75.
19 Personal interview with Takashi Terada, 18 September 1996.
20 Personal interview with Takashi Terada, 18 September 1996.
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Courageous Osaka
Japan’s concern about the Bogor Declaration looked like unravelling the Bogor 
pledge in 1995. Japan, South Korea and China sought to loosen the free trade 
agreement made in Jakarta with regards to agricultural import restrictions. Japan, 
chair of the 1995 APEC summit, proposed ‘sectoral specificity’ and ‘flexibility’ in the 
pre-summit draft of the leaders’ statement, known as the Action Agenda. The 
phrase ‘sectoral specificity’ was regarded by some other member economies as a 
code for excluding agriculture from APEC’s plans to achieve free trade in the Asia 
Pacific by 2020,21 and thought that the language of the agreement would provide 
room to manoeuvre in particular sectors. Pressure was applied on Japan before 
the Osaka meeting, with other economies insisting that the language used in the 
Agenda could not change the basic commitment to the Bogor agreement.22 In the 
end, the Action Agenda, with its emphasis on flexibility, was adopted at Osaka, but 
there was no stepping back from the Bogor commitment. In fact, the target dates 
were reaffirmed, some useful ‘down payments’ were made on delivering faster 
trade liberalisation and a timetable was established for each member country to 
present plans, known as Individual Action Plans (lAPs), for achieving the Bogor 
targets. Some suggested that the Osaka meeting was seen as an important 
opportunity for further strengthening of the reform process in Japan. According to 
one Japanese academic, Japan made a considerable domestic concession on 
agriculture for the benefit of the international system.23 The decision to drop the 
emphasis on flexibility for agricultural trade was also possibly the result of Japan’s 
greater desire for respect in the region. The Japanese government knew that the
21 R. Garran & C. Stewart, ‘Japan backs agriculture free trade push’, The Australian, 15 
November 1995, p. 2.
22 ‘Asia Pacific leaders iron out accord’, The Canberra Times, 17 November 1995, p. 3.
23 Personal interview withTakashi Terada, 18 September 1996.
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summit was being viewed as a gauge as to how far it could be ‘bold and 
reformist’ .24
APEC Membership
That Japan was prepared to make domestic concessions on agriculture for regional 
economic gains indicated to some Japanese commentators that APEC would have 
a long and prosperous future.25 This argument sees economic pragmatism and 
political expedience as the key to APEC’s future and its continuing success. 
Others, however, were more circumspect about its future because of the potential 
size of the Asia Pacific. The desire by a number of other countries to join the APEC 
group, especially countries like Vietnam and Laos, was viewed by some Japanese 
as potentially damaging to the forum.26 People subscribing to this view felt that 
access could not be denied these countries when APEC already includes Mexico 
and Chile, arguably outside the Asia Pacific. A larger APEC would subsequently 
become complicated and unwieldy.2/ The size of the APEC group would also 
encourage the emergence of smaller, more relevant groups, like ASEAN, or a 
South American sector. The emergence of smaller groupings, it was warned, would 
diminish the strength of the larger forum.28 ‘If APEC over-emphasises openness, 
the number of members will increase and deprive APEC of its centripetal force, so 
that the organisation will then become a nominal entity’ .29
As seen above, APEC is by no means considered infallible by the Japanese, nor 
necessarily the correct way ahead for the region. The Japanese vernacular
24 Ponciano S. Intal, ‘Comments’ on A. Hirata, J. Okamoto, T. Ogita, ‘Strategy toward APEC: 
the Case of Japan’, in I. Yamazawa et al., Cooperation from Diversity, p. 45.
25 Personal interview withTakashi Terada, 18 September 1996.
26 This perception is not only held by Japanese commentators and bureaucrats. Australia is 
one of the most fervent economies on this issue.
27 Personal interview with Kazutomo Irie, Counsellor (Economics), Embassy of Japan, 
Canberra, 18 September 1996.
28 Personal interview with Kazutomo Irie, 18 September 1996.
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economic journal, ShOkan Töyö Keizai, has published relatively few articles on 
APEC since 1989. (Refer to Appendix C: Article Titles from Surveyed Journals.) 
As APEC is an economic forum, this is where one might expect to find information 
on APEC. In general, the journal covered many international trade issues, but the 
highest number of articles produced on APEC was only six in November 1994. The 
Bogor Declaration probably received the greatest attention because of the 
significance on the member economies. Otherwise, APEC received little attention 
from this journal. The few articles that were issued on APEC in ShOkan Töyö Keizai 
provided some of the most frank and cautious perspectives on APEC of the four 
periodicals surveyed, as seen in some of the following articles: The Ironic Success 
of the Osaka Meeting’30 and ‘Does Japan have the Strength to Shed Blood in order 
to Protect Free Trade’.31 In one article entitled ‘Nihon ni APEC wa fuyö da’ (‘APEC 
is unnecessary for Japan’),32 the UN’s regional commission, ESCAP (Economic & 
Social Commission for Asia and Pacific), is touted as a far superior strategy for 
Japan than APEC. It was argued that APEC is losing its way as a forum for 
consensual multinational cooperation, and becoming a US forum to schedule others 
towards liberalisation. Furthermore, ESCAP, which should exclude the USA and 
include Asia and Oceania, would not be a place of bilateral trade negotiation, but a 
forum for economic cooperation. The article also argued that GATT and the WTO 
are the fora for issues relating to trade and commerce, not APEC.33
29 M. Inouchi & T. Terada, ‘Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation and Australia-Japan 
Relations’, p. 10.
30 ‘APEC Osaka kaigi no hiniku na seikö’ (The Ironic Success of the Osaka APEC meeting’), 
ShOkan Töyö Keizai, 2 December 1995, pp. 42-43.
31 ‘Nihon koso ga jiyü böeki o mamoru tame ni ketsu o nagasu chikara o motte iru?’ (‘Does 
Japan have the Strength to Shed Blood in order to Protect Free Trade’), ShOkan Töyö 
Keizai, 26 June 1993, p. 58.
32lchikawa Amane, ‘APEC is unnecessary for Japan’, pp. 96-99.
33 Ichikawa Amane, ‘APEC is unnecessary for Japan’, pp. 96-99.
Chapter 3. Japan and Asia: The APEC Future 42
Improving Asian Relations
As discussed in the previous chapter, Japan still faces the problem of lingering 
memories of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere and its wartime 
aggression. It must walk a careful line, mindful not to threaten other countries, nor 
to nullify its own positive actions. Although generational change in leadership is 
modifying this fear of Japan, many countries in the region are concerned that any 
formal cooperative arrangement may become a vehicle for Japanese domination of 
the Asia Pacific, especially if the USA is not present.34 Japan is well aware of these 
sensitivities and has generally approached any regional initiatives with caution; 
nevertheless, improving relations with Asia has been a priority,35 primarily because 
of the strong trade links between Japan, Asia and the USA.36 Through APEC, 
Japan can demonstrate that it wants to play a constructive role in Asia.37
APEC provides Japan with a means to show Asia that its activities are inspired by a 
desire to work for the development of the Asia Pacific region in a cooperative 
fashion, and not as part of a hegemonic or militaristic strategy for Asia. Newspaper 
articles have indicated as much, with headlines like ‘Japan seeking to strengthen 
ties in Asia’38 and ‘We Need an Asian Policy, not ‘Asianism” 39 The low-key 
approach that Japan took to APEC in the early years has been ascribed to Japan’s 
approach to its relations with Asia, and Southeast Asia in particular.40 According to 
MITI officials, MITI urged Australia, a less threatening country in the region, to
34 Even the Japanese dispatch of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf after the Gulf War 
required careful consultation with other Asian governments to allay any suspicions.
35 Personal interview with Kusaka Sumio, 3 September 1996.
36 Personal interview with Sumio Kusaka, 3 September 1996. Kusaka stated that the Asia- 
US-Japan triangle had seen US$240 billion worth of trade, with 60 per cent increases in 
both imports and exports over four years.
37 Personal interview with Kusaka Sumio, 3 September 1996.
38 ‘Japan seeking to strengthen ties in Asia’, The Nikkei Weekly, 8 February 1993.
39 ‘[Ajia-shugi] denai Ajia gaikö o’, (‘We Need an Asian Policy, not ‘Asianism”), Gaikö Forum, 
no. 65, February 1994, pp. 52-58.
40 Yöichi Funabashi subscribes to this view in Asia Pacific Fusion.
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implement the idea of a regional economic forum in the late 1980s. Japan’s fear of 
intimidating its Asian neighbours with a program not dissimilar from that of the 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere ensured that Japan kept a relatively low 
profile in APEC’s formative years, and ‘conspicuously refrained from asserting 
influence over the APEC process’.41
The cooperative and supportive role that Japan has taken in APEC may also 
encourage Asia Pacific nations to look on Japan as less of an ‘economic power 
house’ and source of aid, and more as a partner.42 That Japan is perceived in this 
way by its Asian neighbours is important to many Japanese people. Some 
Japanese saw the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC)43 as an invitation from 
Asia that they should not refuse, as the forum could be used ‘for developing and 
affirming an Asia-Pacific identity’.44 The concept of an East Asian Economic group 
alerted many intellectuals in Japan and elsewhere to the possibilities for new 
regional relations because it dismissed any threat of Japanese aggression and 
indicated a new sense of trust. It therefore signalled the emergence of a new 
attitude towards Japan from other countries in Asia, such as Malaysia, Indonesia 
and Singapore. Japan has remained reluctant to embrace this proposal because of 
the anti-American sentiment that appeared to accompany it. Instead, the Japanese 
government saw fit to use the APEC forum, which favoured neither Asia nor the 
USA, but embraced both, to promote Japan’s non-aggressive role in an Asia Pacific 
community.
41 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, p. 192.
42 Personal interview with Keiichi Higuchi, 4 September 1996.
43 The EAEC was proposed by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir in 1991. The concept 
would embrace ASEAN, Hong Kong, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan and other 
countries in the Indochina region. The grouping was said to be a low-level economic 
alliance that provided both protection and a voice for the members within the global 
economy.
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Japan’s strategy to prove its good intentions to Asia may also be seen in Japan’s 
strict adherence to the three APEC pillars: liberalisation, facilitation and 
cooperation.45 Japanese commentary frequently berates non-Asian APEC 
members for being too closely focused on liberalisation and setting schedules. 
According to MITI officials, Australian officials were eager to set specific agenda 
items, clearly aimed at trade liberalisation.46 MITI, anxious to encourage the 
development of ASEAN, focused on promoting economic growth and development. 
Japan has concentrated on ASEAN relations because its resistance to Japan is less 
pronounced than that of Northeast Asia. APEC allowed Japan to focus on 
Southeast Asia without causing regional concerns. Furthermore, Japan was able to 
advance its ideas for economic development in five principles framed in terms of 
APEC’s objectives, and through APEC, proposed standardised economic statistics, 
intellectual property rights, and specifications for industrial products in the region. 
Japan has also suggested business management training and personnel 
exchanges.47
According to one Japanese academic, Japan’s focus on trade liberalisation, 
facilitation and development is the result of Japan’s economic development since 
WWII.48 Japan has transformed from a developing economy into a major 
industrialised global force. In contrast, non-Asian economies of APEC have not 
experienced this type of transformation, and focus primarily on bettering their own 
economies.49 Japan’s policy towards Asia includes development initiatives such as 
human resources training, expanded economic cooperation and promotion of
44 Akio Watanabe, ‘What is Asia-Pacific Regionalism?’ Japan Review of International Affairs, 
Summer 1995, pp.189-94, esp. p. 193. Watanabe is a Professor of international relations 
at Aoyama Gakuin University.
45 Personal interview withTakashi Terada, 18 September 1996.
46 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, p. 66.
47 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, p. 193.
48 Personal interview withTakashi Terada, 18 September 1996.
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technological exchanges, as well as the facilitation of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and expanded imports.50 Adhering to the APEC objectives ideally 
complements Japan’s policy on Asia. In particular, Japan’s actions within APEC 
endear Asia to Japan, rather than causing alarm.
The Japanese government and various commentators have been aware for some 
time of the value of APEC as a neutral setting for advancing policy initiatives. The 
MOFA-produced Gaiko Forum (Foreign Relations/Diplomatic Forum), a monthly 
periodical in the vernacular, has provided a steady stream of articles on APEC 
since its inception; perhaps suggesting the that MOFA has been promoting and 
nurturing the APEC concept in Japan. (Refer to Appendices B & C.) Japanese 
academics wrote in 1993 that ‘APEC is the opportunity for members to get together 
and discuss issues which are of significance to the region’.51 Others call it the 
‘hidden agenda’ of APEC. 52 Some Japanese commentators believe that APEC 
enables eighteen leaders from the region to discuss issues, mainly economic, but 
also to improve political and strategic relations by strengthening personal 
relationships. It is argued that this is a very good way of stabilising the regional 
political and strategic situation without raising the ire of China or others. Japan 
used the 1996 Subic Bay summit to announce and discuss bilateral issues with 
various nations: officials saw fit to announce a new yen loan package worth 124.3 
billion yen (US$1.11 billion) for the Philippines; and significant advances were made 
in China-Japan relations, which were at a relative low point. Prime Minister 
Hashimoto met with China’s President Jiang Zemin and reassured him about the 
Diaoyu/Sankaku Island dispute, and reiterated an apology over Japan’s wartime
49 Personal interview withTakashi Terada, 18 September 1996.
50 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, p. 193.
51 M. Inouchi & T. Terada, ‘Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation and Australia-Japan 
Relations’, p. 10.
52 Personal interview with Sumio Kusaka, 3 September 1996.
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aggression. During further discussion, Hashimoto told President Jiang that Japan 
would not return to militarism, reassuring him that moves to strengthen security ties 
with the USA were not directed at any other country. He also said that Japan did 
not support the independence of Taiwan. To wrap up the talks, Jiang was invited to 
pay a state visit to Japan in 1997, the 25th anniversary of the resumption of 
diplomatic relations between Japan and China. The situation also allowed Jiang to 
thank Japan for restarting work on a 5.3 billion yen loan package for 1996-1999, 
which was halted during Chinese nuclear testing. Japan’s continued support for 
China’s bid to join the WTO was also raised. The relaxed ‘informal’ atmosphere of 
the APEC leaders’ summits, creates a good environment for regional leaders to 
discuss a broad spectrum of issues, especially bilaterally. According to one official, 
there is no other forum which enables regional leaders to come together on a 
regular basis and talk to so many other leaders.53
Leadership and Bridging
Japan’s early approach to APEC reflected Japan’s cautious nurturing of a 
relationship with Asia, particularly one with Southeast Asia. The so-called 
Hashimoto Doctrine, proposed by Prime Minister Hashimoto in January 1997 to 
broaden the Japan-ASEAN partnership, however, signalled a more assertive 
approach to Japanese leadership in the Asian region. It is also indicative of a 
determination by Japan to play an international role commensurate with its 
economic status. Japan is becoming more willing to translate its economic power 
into diplomatic clout. Japan’s efforts should not necessarily be seen as inspired by 
national pride or political ego, but because it sees Asia as almost ready to assume 
its place alongside Europe and the USA. Tokyo believes that it can help facilitate 
Asia’s transition from developing region to international powerhouse. There is a
53 Personal interview with Sumio Kusaka, 3 September 1996.
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need in the region for stronger, but not self-centred, leadership, and Japan believes 
that it is in a position to take that lead.
The economic focus of APEC is a great advantage for Japan, in that it takes pride 
in economic expertise and not military might. As definitions of power change with 
the end of the Cold War, Japan can seize the opportunity to define a new global 
role for itself. To date, this has been hampered by a number of factors, including 
Japan’s wartime legacy, a Japanese tendency towards consensus building, the 
USA’s strong influence and domestic political instability.54 Japan’s intentions, with 
regard to APEC, have been slow to emerge for similar reasons. However, this may 
be gradually changing as Japan appears to be experimenting with new varieties of 
leadership within APEC.
Leadership
The success of the APEC summit in Osaka was dependent on ‘Japan’s strong 
leadership’ according to Ippei Yamazawa.55 While this comment particularly referred 
to Japan’s hosting of the Osaka summit, many Japanese media reports focus on 
Japanese leadership in the Asia Pacific. Articles like ‘Japan is urged to weigh role 
as world trade shifts to Asia’ ,56 ‘Australia asks Japan to help build forum for 
cooperation in Asia’ ,57 and ‘Japan as a Leader in the Creation of Open Markets’58 
reflect Japan’s desire to be recognised as an important regional or global player. 
The potential for Japan to act, and be accepted, as a leader in Asia remains a 
constant theme throughout Japanese media reporting on APEC. Despite Japan’s
54 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, p. 220.
55 ‘Strong leadership by Japan is essential’, The Japan Times (Bound Volume), 16 
November, 1995, p. 354.
56 ‘Japan is urged to weigh role as world trade shifts to Asia’, The Japan Times (Bound 
Volume), May 1989.
57 ‘Australia asks Japan to help build forum for cooperation in Asia’, The Japan Times 
(Bound Volume), February 1989.
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reluctance to boldly demonstrate its leadership ability in the post-war period, there 
is clearly a sense that Japan has leadership potential. Despite Asians being 
sensitive to Japanese leadership, one government official said, ‘we [Japan] can play 
an important role in Asia’. 59 Through APEC, Asian countries can adjust to the role 
that Japan wants to play. In this sense, APEC allows Japan to closely integrate 
with Asia on equal terms, without raising Asian fears.60 Newspaper headlines like 
‘Japan expertise vital to Asia’s financial growth’,61 ‘Japan as a Leader in the 
Creation of Open Markets’,62 and ‘Japan’s Conduct as an Asia Pacific Model’63 
suggest there is a new desire to show Asia that it has something positive to offer 
and need not be feared.
Part of the reason for Japan’s low-key role in APEC in the first few years was 
related to Southeast Asian fears that the withdrawal of the USA would result in 
Japan’s domination of the region. This attitude changed in late 1993 when the 
Clinton administration showed new interest in the region and APEC. With APEC’s 
profile at new heights, and with no threat of the USA withdrawing, the Japanese 
government had the opportunity to show Asia its cooperative nature and 
communicate its hopes for the future prosperity of the Asia Pacific. Japan sought to 
remind Asia and the Japanese people that APEC was initially a MITI suggestion.64 
With Southeast Asia comforted by US assurances, Japan was able to publicly 
support APEC, and in doing so, strengthen its credibility with the Asian nations.
58 ‘Japan as a Leader in the Creation of Open Markets’, Gaiko Forum, no. 85, October 1995, 
pp. 68-70.
59 Personal interview with Sumio Kusaka, 3 September 1996. 
b0 Personal interview with Sumio Kusaka, 3 September 1996.
61 ‘Japan expertise vital to Asia’s financial growth’, The Nikkei Weekly, 18 December 1995.
62 ‘Nihon wa kaihö teki na shijö keishiki no sendö yaku ni nare’ (‘Japan as a Leader in the 
Creation of Open Markets’), Gaiko Forum, no. 85, October 1995, pp. 68-70.
63 ‘Nihon wa Ajia Taiheiyö no daihyö toshite no ködö o’ (‘Japan’s conduct as an Asia Pacific 
Model’, Gaiko Forum, no. 56, May 1993, pp. 22-39.
64 One headline informs readers that ‘MITI Claims Main Behind-the-Scenes Role in Group’s 
Founding’.
Chapter 3. Japan and Asia: The APEC Future 49
While US assurances comforted Southeast Asian insecurities, the change also lead 
to improved relations between MITI and MOFA over APEC, allowing a more 
cooperative relationship between the two. According to some Japanese 
academics, the change in tack resulted from MOFA recognising the following 
factors:
4
1. APEC was becoming too important to oppose, especially with American support;
2. various ministries and agencies became involved in APEC negotiations, thus 
leaving MOFA little option but to take on the role of coordinator; and
3. the start of the APEC leaders’ meeting in 1993 necessitated MOFA involvement 
as the Prime Minister’s international activities are managed by it.65
Leading in Osaka
Many Japanese saw the APEC Osaka meeting as a chance for Japan to show its 
true leadership potential. Japan was required to devise initiatives on behalf of the 
region instead of playing its usual supportive role. It was an opportunity to use its 
position to create understanding and cooperation.66 To ‘fulfill Japan’s 
responsibilities as conference host’, however, Japan had to incorporate initiatives 
that pleased both developing and developed economies. This was to be achieved 
by elaborating proposals to enhance current APEC programs for North-South 
economic cooperation, and by taking the lead in liberalising its own economy 
without demanding reciprocal concessions. By doing so, Japanese commentators 
felt that Japan would ‘be in a position to take initiatives and assert political 
leadership'.67
65 A. Hirata, et al., ‘Strategy toward APEC: the Case of Japan’, in I. Yamazawa et al., APEC: 
Cooperation from Diversity, p. 37.
66 Susumu Yamakage, ‘Plotting APEC’s Future: A Case for Holding the ASEAN Course’, 
Japan Review of International Affairs, Vol.9, no.3, (Summer, 1995), pp. 199-204, p. 204-5.
67 Susumu Yamakage, ‘Plotting APEC’s Future’, p. 204.
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The Osaka summit is recognised for the consensual and so-called Asian approach 
taken to reach the Osaka Action Agenda. The ‘Asian approach’ suggests a less 
structured and less bureaucratic approach to decision-making. At a press 
conference at the Osaka summit, Prime Minister Murayama stated that,
..the Action Agenda demonstrates the Asia Pacific Way, combining 
voluntary initiative with collective actions based on the momentum for 
voluntary liberalisation which already exists in this region. With continuing 
efforts and close consultation among the members’ economies, I believe 
that this is the only practical and effective means for advancing liberalisation 
in this diverse region.68
Japan was keen to impress upon the members that APEC should be a forum which 
relies less on institutionalism and more on consensus and flexibility. Newspaper 
headlines reminded readers that ‘Gradual Asia Development [is] To Be Urged’ .69 
This is considered to be very much in line with the ‘Asian approach’ and while this 
approach may have been natural to Japan, it also endeared Japan to Asia. 
Newspaper headlines reinforced this idea with articles reporting that ‘Japan’s job at 
APEC summit is to inject ‘Asian way’ of doing things’ .70 The Japanese government 
wanted to show Asia that by focusing on consensus decision-making, it was not 
ruled by its relations with the USA.71 Asian nations have long despaired of the 
legalistic, adversarial ‘American’ approach to decision-making in the region. Japan
68 Tomiichi Murayama, ‘Opening remarks at the press conference by Prime Minister Tomiichi 
Murayama’ in APEC 1995 Osaka Official Information, 
[http://Japan.tokio.co.jp/osaka/info/murayama.html], 19 November 1995.
69 ‘Gradual Asia Development To Be Urged’, The Japan Times, 18 November 1993.
70 ‘Japan’s job at APEC summit is to inject ‘Asian way’ of doing things’, The Nikkei Weekly, 7 
August 1995.
71 Some international commentators suggested that Japan’s ‘Asian approach’ was being 
used as a means to selectively approach free trade, especially in the area of agriculture.
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was prepared to support the Asian developing nations in resolving the differing 
stages of economic development, without siding with, or succumbing to, American 
pressure. With Japan as the host of the Osaka summit, it received much of the 
accolade for that achievement, especially from its Asian neighbours. The attitude 
that Japan took as host of the Osaka summit, is probably the strongest stance 
Japan has taken on behalf of Asia. This was evident in the media coverage of 
APEC (Refer to Appendix B: Graphs) which shows a gradual increase in interest, 
reaching its highest point in November 1995 when Japan hosted the summit, before 
a big decline in 1996. Perhaps this is indicative of the importance of foreign policy, 
rather than APEC. The APEC forum allowed Japan to achieve significant and 
comprehensive in-roads into achieving its Asia policy.
Southeast Asian Partners for Progress
Japan’s desire to endear itself to Asia may also be evident in the ‘Partners for 
Progress’ (PFP) proposal. The proposal was raised in Jakarta in 1994 and again in 
Osaka in 1995, to address cooperation between developed and developing 
economies in the areas of financial, human, natural and administrative resources.72 
The scheme called for the establishment of a special unit separate from the APEC 
Secretariat that would promote economic and technical cooperation among 
member nations. A country interested in one of the projects would volunteer to take 
responsibility for conducting the project, while inviting other members to participate. 
In the early stages, many APEC members objected to the Japanese proposal as it 
did not make clear how voluntary and obligatory steps towards liberalisation would 
be decided. Some members feared that this initiative detracted from APEC’s bold 
liberalisation goals. The USA, in particular, objected to Japan’s plan calling for 
APEC members to liberalise trade and investment unilaterally without reciprocity on
For example, Robert Garran, ‘Japan sees free trade flexibility as APEC’s strength’, The 
Weekend Australian, November 25-26, 1995, p.14.
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the part of other members. Some political analysts attributed Japan’s generosity in 
assisting developing countries to political, emotional, historical and humanitarian 
concerns.73 The Japanese government, however, explained that the proposal 
directly reflected Japan’s approach to APEC, in that it sought to promote facilitation 
and development, not just liberalisation.74 Former Prime Minister, Murayama, 
stated that Japan’s readiness to contribute ‘a total of up to 10 billion (no currency 
specified) to the APEC Central Fund...in support of appropriate cooperative 
projects related to the liberalisation and facilitation of trade and investment, 
including PFP..’.75 The Japanese government suggested that the PFP would 
complement and promote APEC, rather than detract from APEC’s liberalisation 
goals. Like Japan’s approach to the Osaka summit, the PFP proposal, which would 
benefit developing Asian nations over other APEC members, is indicative of 
Japan’s Asia policy.
Bridging
Japan’s history of using Asia as a springboard to the West is no longer relevant in 
Japan’s foreign policy as Asia has become too important in its own right. However, 
the image of Japan acting as a ‘bridge’ between ‘North and South’ or ‘East and 
West’ still rings true for many Japanese people. Japan can use its position of being 
culturally and geographically Asian, and its experience in the industrialised, western 
world to position itself in the international arena. The APEC forum is an obvious 
place for Japan to display this unique position. It can endear itself to both the USA 
or to the Asian economies by offering its services to act as a bridge between the
72 Viable projects drafted under this scheme were intellectual property, direct overseas 
capital investment, and training small-business experts.
73 It has been said that one model of Japanese aid incorporates a vision of an economically 
integrated Asia in which countries at all stages of development become interlinked through 
patterns of aid, trade and investment. Japan, as the most developed Asian nation, would 
be at the top of the pyramid. This argument is put forth by S.J. Pharr, ‘Japanese Aid in the 
New World Order’. In C.C. Garby et al., Japan A New Kind of Superpower.
74 Personal interview withTakashi Terada, 18 September 1996.
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two. This perspective is prevalent in media reporting, with headlines declaring 
‘Japan Should Try to Bridge the Gap between APEC Members on Trade’,76 Tokyo 
Set to Play APEC Mediator - US, Asia Expected to Take Divergent Stands on 
Issues’77 and ‘Japan Aims to be Mediator’.78 The Japanese people took this bridging 
role particularly seriously at the Osaka summit, seeing its position as of pivotal 
importance to the forum.79
The EAEC
Hopes of a role for Japan as a bridge were unsettled by the Malaysian proposal for 
the EAEC in December 1990.80 The Caucus virtually proposed a split between Asia 
and the West in the form of an Asian cooperative that excluded the USA. The 
Japanese government was concerned that the EAEC excluded the USA, Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand, and instead encouraged Asia Pacific nations to rally for 
the completion of the Uruguay Round of GATT. Although the EAEC presented 
Japan with a grouping of its own, it conflicted with Japan’s vision for globalisation. 
Japan had already been espousing that regional trade blocs could escalate friction 
and protectionism. The EAEC proposal put Japan in the centre of any friction that 
could drive a wedge through the middle of its already tenuous relations with the 
USA. The USA formally told the Japanese government that it was opposed to the 
plan for an EAEC, stating that the Caucus would have a negative impact on the
75 Murayama Tomiichi, ‘Opening remarks at the press conference by Prime Minister Tomiichi 
Murayama’ in APEC 1995 Osaka Official Information, 19 November 1995.
76 ‘Japan should try to bridge the gap between APEC members on trade’, The Nikkei Weekly, 
27 February, 1995.
77 Tokyo Set to Play APEC Mediator - US, Asia Expected to Take Divergent Stands on 
Issues’, The Nikkei Weekly, 15 November 1993. Also, ‘[Kakehashi kokka] Nihon to APEC’ 
(‘Japan as a bridge for APEC’), Shükan Töyö Keizai, 11 November 1995, pp. 88-91.
78 ‘Japan Aims To Be Mediator’, The Japan Times, 17 November 1993, p. 3.
79 For example, ‘Japan: APEC wants trade pace set by Japan bridging’, The Japan Times 
(Bound Volume) February 1995, ‘Japan urged to lead APEC by cutting trade barriers’, 
December 1995, and ‘Japan urged to lead APEC’, The Japan Times (Bound Volume) May 
1995.
80 The proposal was raised in December 1990, but was originally called the ‘East Asia 
Economic Group’.
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APEC forum. The formal statement by the USA made it very difficult for Japan to 
accept an invitation to join the EAEC.
Asian Acceptance?
On the other hand, the Japanese felt honoured at being asked to lead an Asian 
grouping.81 Given Japan’s relations with ASEAN and its extensive investment and 
trade involvement in the Asian region, Japan did not want to be left out of a 
grouping like the EAEC. Criticism from Malaysia that Japan’s position was 
dependent on the USA irritated many Japanese, giving rise to anti-American 
sentiments. In fact, criticism by the Malaysian Ambassador over Japanese 
reticence to join the EAEC, resulted in an announcement two days later that Japan 
would attend a luncheon82 with prospective members of the Caucus. Japanese 
officials stated that they would attend in order to discuss regional issues, the ARF 
and other issues of common interest, rather than the EAEC proposal. Ironically, 
while at the luncheon, Japanese representatives made it clear that the USA needed 
to be in support of the Caucus before Tokyo would agree to join. While Japan has 
been reluctant to commit itself to the EAEC, it is always careful not to criticise or 
voice opposition to the EAEC proposal. Japan does not want to harm its relations 
with Asia any more than it does with the USA.
The Japanese belief that the EAEC could ‘dilute the cohesiveness and force of 
APEC’83 was not unexpected. Even if the Japanese government views APEC as of 
relatively low-level significance in the global scheme of things, it still serves to 
promote Japan’s USA and Asia policies. With APEC’s current strength and 
momentum, Japanese bureaucrats believe ‘there is no overriding reason to try our
81 For example ‘Japan leadership urged for Asian bloc plan’, The Japan Times (Bound 
Volume), 3 April 1991.
82 The meeting was held on 25 July 1994 in Bangkok.
83 Personal interview with Keiichi Higuchi, 4 September 1996.
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luck at EAEC’ .84 The suggestion that the EAEC simply work as a group within 
APEC was also seen by APEC supporters as a potential source of conflict, because 
it would be unsettled by a grouping with alternate objectives. Nevertheless, the 
EAEC has not been totally rejected by Japan because it was put forward by one of 
the region’s political leaders. Japan has supported the ideas of Bob Hawke and 
Paul Keating on APEC, and Bill Clinton for the leaders’ summit. A complete 
rejection of the EAEC proposal would be considered a loss of face by Malaysia’s 
Prime Minister Mahathir. The Japanese government wants to avoid this at all costs, 
and therefore maintains that the EAEC requires high level attention and should 
remain as a discussion point at the top political level.85
Many Japanese commentators see the role of Japan bridging East and West as a 
very important function. Whether Asia thinks it needs a bridge to the West does not 
appear to be an issue by the Japanese. Instead, they appear to spend much time 
pondering how best to achieve it, even in an article, ‘How to Unite the Faces of Asia 
and the Advanced Countries’ .86 Because of the emphasis that Japan places in 
bridging, it appears to be more interested in APEC than the EAEC concept.87 
APEC allows Japan to play its role as bridge between Asia and the West, a position 
within which Japan is comfortable. The Japanese government believes that while 
acceptance of the EAEC concept might endear Japan to Asia, it would impair US- 
Japan relations. It would also mean excluding two useful allies in the Pacific: 
Australia and New Zealand.
84 Personal interview with Keiichi Higuchi, 4 September 1996.
85 Personal interview with Sumio Kusaka, 3 September 1996.
86 ‘Ajia no kao to senshin koku no kao o dö musubu ka’ (‘How to Unite the Faces of Asia and 
the Advanced Countries’), Shükan Töyö Keizai, 13 July 1991, p. 78.
87 Personal interview with Sumio Kusaka, 3 September 1996.
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Regional Security
Before Japan can assume a leadership role in Asia, it must first settle some of the 
still smouldering disputes left from Japan’s imperialist days. The major issue is 
recognising and apologising for Japan’s aggression before and during WWII. 
Some efforts have been made to settle accounts with the so-called Korean ‘comfort 
women’, but most Asian nations do not feel that these efforts have been sincere or 
adequate. Japanese aggression during the war, however, is only part of the 
problem. That Japan has mostly adopted a superior attitude to Asia since the Meiji 
era, is another issue that must be dealt with. Fukuzawa Yukichi’s slogan ‘Datsu-A 
nyü-Ö’ or ‘Out of Asia, into Europe’ has mostly been the course Japan has taken for 
over one hundred years, although perhaps it should have read ‘Out of Asia, into the 
USA’. The Japanese need to cooperate with Asia on an even keel if Japan is to be 
accepted by its Asian neighbours.
Asian Insistence on an American Presence
As has been discussed, APEC is serving the Japanese government by helping 
Japan renew its relations with Asia after Japan’s aggressive posture during the 
1930s and ’40s. Although APEC is an economic forum, it is now playing a small 
part in regional security. Due to Japan’s wartime history, any shift in Japanese 
military capacity is closely watched by Asia, and Japan’s neighbours are still 
alarmed by any independent action taken by Japan. While economic interaction 
often overcomes historical antagonism, any talk of Japan’s rearmament raises 
concerns in Asia. Japan’s current military expenditure of one per cent of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) is among the highest in the world.88 Despite criticism of 
the US presence in the region by Japan and other Asian nations, most Asians 
prefer the stability afforded by US engagement. Japan’s neighbours would grow
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alarmed if there was a possibility of Japan withdrawing from the bilateral security 
treaty and its close alliance with the USA.89 Japan has been wary of this view and 
studiously avoids talk of Japanese militarism. APEC engages the USA 
economically in the region, thus securing its military presence. The US presence 
allows Japan to amend its relations with Asia and to show its leadership and 
cooperation without raising concerns of Japanese bullying or re-militarisation. 
Japan’s relations with the USA will be discussed in greater detail in the following 
chapter.
The Importance of China
China is sure to become one of the most powerful countries in the world and is on 
the way to becoming the world’s second largest economy within the next decade, 
with the potential to surpass the USA early next century.90 Some already believe 
that China accounts for about six per cent of the world’s GDP, well above the share 
of G7 countries, except Japan and the USA. If only because of its population and 
the potential size of its economy, China probably poses the greatest security 
challenge in the Asia Pacific, if not the world. The uncertainty lies in how China will 
use its power and wealth. The high level of growth could lead to a subsequent rise 
in military expenditure. Asian countries fear that with China’s return to wealth, it will 
resume its perception of itself as the ‘middle kingdom’, rather than as an equal 
participant in the global arena. However, the economic development of China is 
generally welcomed in the region, because it directs China’s attention to 
cooperative relations with its neighbours and economic interdependence.91
88 Poh-Ping Lee, ‘Japan and the Asia Pacific Region: A Southeast Asian Perspective’. In CC 
Garby et al., Japan A New Kind of Superpower? p. 129.
89 Yuichirö Nagatomi, ‘Economic Regionalism and the EAEC’, Japan Review of International 
Affairs, Vol. 9, no. 3, Summer 1995, pp. 206-211, esp. p. 209.
90 Nicholas Lardy, China in the World Economy, (Washington: Institute for International 
Economics, 1994), pp. 116-19.
91 Stuart Harris, ‘Conclusion: The Theory and Practice of Regional Cooperation’ in A. Mack & 
J. Ravenhill (eds), Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the
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Considering the proximity of China to Japan, the Japanese government is all to 
aware of China’s strategic potential, as described in articles entitled The Key to 
East Asia’s Situation: China’92, The Asia Contest: China Power Takes Centre 
Stage’93 and ‘Rising Concerns with the Opening of China, and Chinese Reforms’94 
in Japanese journals. Many Japanese commentators believe that through APEC, 
Japan can peacefully engage China in the Asia Pacific.95 China is not a member of 
the WTO, but is trying desperately to be one. China’s good behaviour at APEC 
perhaps inspired by the desire to join the WTO; while APEC members use WTO 
membership as a carrot to regional cooperation. APEC enables China to participate 
in regional and global issues like no other forum;96 as such, APEC serves as one of 
the mechanisms for the peaceful engagement of China. China’s development is 
being measured by instituting cooperation, either by encouraging economic 
interdependence, or in collective security roles like the ARF. Japan and other Asia 
Pacific nations hope to bring China into a regional dialogue which emphasises 
economic and political cooperation, thus encouraging China into ‘a web of 
restraining interdependencies’ .97 The argument is that this approach could be 
reinforced by dialogue on common security strategies, a situation that is frequently 
avoided by China.
Asia Pacific Region, (Canberra: Allen & Unwin in association with the Program on 
International Economics and Politics, East-West Center, Hawaii, & Dept of International 
Relations, RSPAS, ANU, Australia, 1994), pp. 256-269, esp. p.264.
92 ‘Higashi Ajia jösei no kagi Chügoku’ (The Key to East Asia’s Situation: China’), Gaikö 
Forum, no. 68, May 1994, pp. 20-56.
93 ‘Ajia kyöen: Omote butai ni tatta Chaina pauwaa’ (The Asia Contest: China Power Takes 
Centre Stage’), Shükan TöyöKeizai, 2 November 1993.
94 ‘Chügoku no kaikoku: kaihö ni takamaru kiki ishiki’ (‘Rising Concerns with the Opening of 
China, and Chinese Reforms’), Shükan TöyöKeizai, 15 October 1994, pp. 67-69.
95 Personal interview with Sumio Kusaka, 3 September 1996.
96 Personal interview with Sumio Kusaka, 3 September 1996.
97 Stuart Harris, ‘Conclusion: The Theory and Practice of Regional Cooperation’, in A Mack et 
al., Pacific Cooperation, p.265.
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APEC enables countries of the region, with sometimes volatile diplomatic relations, 
to come together to strengthen their economic relations. At the first APEC meeting 
in Canberra, the Three Chinas’ - the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan98 and 
Hong Kong, were conspicuously missing. China’s omission from an Asia Pacific 
organisation was described as ‘like getting married without having a bride’.99 
Japan, however, was afraid that the immediate inclusion of China in APEC could 
politicise the grouping and thus derail it before it even started.100 This stemmed 
from ASEAN’s reluctance to include China, particularly without Hong Kong and 
Taiwan, as it feared that ASEAN’s collective voice would be muted and that its iife 
would be complicated by Beijing. Furthermore, Indonesia, Singapore and Brunei 
did not have formal diplomatic relations with China.101 The situation was further 
complicated for the original twelve members of APEC because of China’s 
crackdown on student protesters in Tiananmen Square in June of that year.
China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, who joined in 1991, are now well entrenched in the 
APEC structure. The Seoul meeting was the first occasion that the three countries 
met in an official, multilateral capacity. The addition of these three gave APEC new 
impetus and status. One Japanese official described China as an ‘indispensable 
piece of the jigsaw puzzle’ and saw its inclusion as giving APEC credibility as an 
Asian forum.102 Another official clearly stated that,
[l]t is important to keep China in the circle. There is no other circle than 
APEC that enables China to participate in regional global relations. APEC 
educates China to work in this type of cooperative forum.103
98 Within the APEC forum, Taiwan is referred to as Chinese Taipei.
99 Based on a personal interview with Bob Hawke by Yöichi Funabashi in Asia Pacific Fusion, 
p. 65.
100 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, p. 65.
101 Each has established formal ties since.
102 Personal interview with Irie Kazutomo, 18 September 1996.
103 Personal interview with Sumio Kusaka, 3 September 1996.
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The official saw APEC as a practice ground for China’s eventual graduation to 
global fora like the WTO.
Japan clearly sees APEC diplomacy as an important means of managing China’s 
development. APEC allows China to participate in the discussion of regional and 
global issues like no other forum. Furthermore, APEC’s ‘hidden agenda’, that 
enables eighteen leaders from the region to discuss issues, mainly economic, but 
also to improve political and strategic relations by strengthening personal 
relationships. This is a very good way of stabilising the regional situation, without 
raising the ire of China or other Asian nations. While the ARF might suit this 
purpose, APEC too can play an important role. 104
Conclusion
The economic dynamism being experienced in the Asia Pacific, as well as the 
global trend towards internationalisation or globalism, lead directly to the instituting 
of the regional economic grouping known as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation. In 
some streams of Japanese opinion, APEC was readily accepted in the region 
because it simply gave a name to regional interdependence, which was already 
happening of its own accord. Although reluctant to hastily implement deregulation 
and liberalisation, many Japanese commentators see that these reforms are 
necessary for Japanese economic security and future prosperity. The Japanese 
government sees the benefit in the removal of other economies’ trade or investment 
impediments. The importance of economics was most frequently cited as the 
reason for Japan’s involvement in APEC.
104 Personal interview with Sumio Kusaka, 3 September 1996.
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However, under the surface, there are streams of thought that consider that APEC 
is helping Japan improve its somewhat sullied regional relations with Asia, as a 
result of APEC negotiations. Japan has toed the APEC line very tentatively for fear 
of upsetting its Asian neighbours, and only showed a positive hand when Asian 
concerns were soothed by assurances of a continued US presence in the Asia 
Pacific. Japan’s attention is clearly focused on Southeast Asia and developing 
Asian nations’ requirements. It is these economies that will benefit from Japan’s 
concentration on cooperation and development objectives, and initiatives like 
Partners for Progress. While this approach is often interpreted as Japan marketing 
itself into lucrative business deals, the Japanese government argues that it is 
Western member economies that selfishly focus on liberalisation.
APEC is also considered by some Japanese commentators as enabling positive 
steps by Japan towards leadership in the region, and perhaps beyond. This 
posture had been denied to Japan during the Cold War because of its wartime 
legacy in Asia and its subordination by the USA. Japan was keen to make a good 
impression as host of the Osaka Leaders’ Summit and is prepared to make gradual 
concessions to its own domestic system, in order to give a good international 
impression. With already strong ties in the West, the immediate concern was with 
Asia. The Osaka Summit assumed an ‘Asian approach’ to decision-making that 
indicated deference for Asia and independence from the unilateralist USA.
There are some Japanese who consider APEC’s employment of Japan’s unique 
experience as a bridge between Asia and the West is beneficial. Japan sees this 
pivotal position as indispensable for Asia’s future as a global player, and 
encourages all members of the Asia Pacific to respect this. Without such a role to 
play, it is perceived that Japan would lose some of its competitive advantage and
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status in the region and the world. The combination of Western and Asian 
members in a regional economic forum is central to Japan retaining this advantage.
Although APEC is an economic forum, it plays an indirect role in the region’s 
security. The Japanese government knows that Asia is comforted by a US military 
presence in the region, and therefore encourages US involvement in APEC. It is 
also argued that APEC encourages regional dialogue through frequent meetings 
between senior government officials and leaders. This aspect is considered 
particularly important in steering China towards a peaceful evolution of social and 
political structures, while frequent dialogue between leaders is considered a 
preventative measure to ward off any bilateral conflict.
While trade and investment is central to APEC, Asia is a central concern in Japan’s 
foreign policy. The Japanese government’s actions have a lot to do with how Japan 
wants to be perceived by Asia. Its relations with Asia have a direct impact on the 
way in which Japan acts within the forum. Adhering to the APEC objectives ideally 
complements Japan’s policy on Asia.
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Chapter 4. Japan and the USA
The Japanese like to say that if America is not suitable, then we always 
have Asia. However, the Japanese people do not understand how we are 
judged by the world, including Asia. Who would take seriously a Japan that 
does not have any ties with the United States? 1
Ichiro Ozawa
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Japan’s self-image has been somewhat 
ambiguous: a country geographically and ethnically Asian, but one which has also 
embraced a Western culture. This chapter will outline the development of Japan’s 
Western identity and trace its close relations with the USA. Japan’s foreign policy, 
its institutions and attitudes are closely aligned with its development under the wing 
of the USA since World War II. More recent experience has seen a shift in US- 
Japan relations. Conflict over trade and security are central to this shift. 
Nevertheless, the maintenance of close links with the USA is still fundamental to 
Japanese foreign and defence policies. Most of this chapter will consider how 
APEC complements the Japanese government’s policy of maintaining this 
extremely important and powerful partnership. The Japanese policy advocates a 
US presence in Asia for both security and economic purposes. It also advocates 
globalisation and a free trade system. Japan sees APEC as the link between these 
two objectives. APEC provides Japan with an economic incentive with which to 
encourage the US government to maintain its presence in the region. If this is not 
incentive enough, Japan knows that the USA does not want to be excluded from a 
region that, according to most commentary, will assume a position equal to that of 
North America and Europe.
1 ‘Editor’s interview with Ozawa Ichiro’, Nikkei Business, 31 October, 1995.
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The policy changes being made within the USA and the voice of American public 
opinion being expressed since the end of the Cold War, have, however, made 
many speculate about the future of the USA’s Asia policy. The creation of a 
regional trade arrangement in the form of the North America Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA)2 which excludes most of Asia, as well as talks of a reduction in military 
forces in the Asia Pacific region have at times exacerbated these concerns. While 
many Asian people object to the heavy US influence in Asia, there is widespread 
belief that the withdrawal of the USA from Asia could have unsettling results in 
terms of both security and economics. Japanese leaders have been particularly 
keen to continue the US military presence in the region in order to maintain the 
status quo. A US departure could result in a power vacuum and subsequent arms 
race within the region. Japan and other Asia Pacific nations have seen APEC as a 
means of consolidating the USA’s position in the region.
Foreign Policy - Japan’s Western Identity
Japan has considered itself part of the industrialised West, with its diplomacy 
having been ‘grounded in the Asia Pacific region’ for almost forty years.3 The 
approach in the mid-1990s has shifted to one more focused on the international 
scene, with aspirations of engaging Europe at a level on par with its relationship 
with the USA.4 However, the emphasis on globalism in no way reduces the 
importance of Japan’s relations with the USA. While Japan’s new interest in 
Europe may be interpreted as a cooling of relations with the USA, Japan is actually 
seeking to strengthen relations with Europe, not reduce ties with the USA. 
Continued development of bilateral ties in the areas of politics, security, global 
cooperation and economic relations are part of the ‘extremely important
3 This grouping includes the USA, Canada, Mexico, and Chile.
3 According to the Diplomatic Bluebook series, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, approx. 1960-
1990.
4 Diplomatic Bluebook 1995.
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responsibilities’ for the peace and prosperity of the world. It is of great importance 
for both countries to maintain the Japan-US security alliance5 and to coordinate on 
major political issues.
An Historical Perspective
There was a conscious decision to bring Western industrialisation to Japan around 
the time of the Meiji Restoration in 1868.6 The famous educator, Fukuzawa Yukichi 
(1835-1901), put forth an argument to ‘dissociate from Asia’ rather than forge 
partnerships with Asia’s corrupt rulers, whom he called ‘Japan’s bad friends’. 
Sugita Junzan, mentioned earlier as a supporter of an Asian coalition, visited Qing 
China and changed his views in line with Fukuzawa’s ideas. Sugita was devastated 
by the backwardness and ignorance of the Chinese leaders and feared that an 
alliance with them would drag Japan backwards, and render it vulnerable to 
Western colonisation. He subsequently changed his argument: encouraging Japan 
to join the West, rather than be swallowed by it.7
The Allied Occupation of Japan (1945-52) had an enormous influence on the 
physical and psychological development of Japan. The Peace Treaty between 
Japan and the USA which was signed in April 1952, expresses the desire of the two 
partners ‘to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing 
between them and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the
5 The Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security - Alliance for the 21st Century was signed by
President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto in April 1996. It was the result of an 
intensive review of the political and security environment in the Asia Pacific region by the 
US and Japanese governments. The Joint Declaration is the first since the 1978 
Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation. Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security, 
MOFA, [http://Japan-US.tokio.co.jp/in_Japan/security.html],
6 Note ‘Western industrialisation’ is used rather than just ‘industrialisation’. This is in line with
Morris Low’s thesis that urbanisation and industrial development had occurred during the 
Tokugawa period (c. 1600-1868), prior to the arrival of Americans led by Commodore 
Matthew Perry in 1853-54. See M. Low, ‘Stagnation or Development? Japanese Science 
and Technology before Perry’, The Asia-Pacific Magazine, May, 1996, pp. 33-37.
7 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, p. 224.
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rule of law’.8 Some believe that the Occupation and subsequent tutelage through 
the Cold War helped make Japan the success that it is today.9 For example, 
Yoshida Shigeru, an early post-war Prime Minister (1946-47, 1948-54), wrote that 
Japan should side with the West both in pursuing economic growth and in playing a 
part in the Cold War.10 Although this was a staunchly anti-communist position, he 
was, in many respects, continuing the foreign policy tradition set in the Meiji era. 
Yoshida saw the economies and industrial bases of Asia and Africa as 
underdeveloped, describing them as ‘backward societies with low living 
standards’.* 11 As such, he asserted that Japan could not have ‘join[ed] hands with 
these countries to resist the former colonialist powers, especially America, Britain 
and France’ as some contemporary reformist intellectuals were suggesting.12
During (and after) Japan’s occupation by the Allied Powers, Japan adopted (either 
voluntarily or under US insistence) a number of US institutions and attitudes. 
During this period Japan became known as America’s ‘little brother’ or the American 
shadow. At times the Japanese government saw itself as part of Asia and 
sometimes as a member of the West. However, its view of Asia was more of a 
poor cousin than a close brother. It held the view that as an industrially advanced 
‘Western’ nation that had ‘developed’ economically and politically, Japan would 
assist the poorer, less democratic countries of Asia.13 This attitude began as early 
as 1955, when Japan attended the Afro-Asian Conference or Bandung Conference,
8 Hugh Cortazzi, Modern Japan A Concise Survey {London: MacMillan, 1993) p. 82.
9 Others like Etö Jun, in ‘A Nation in Search of Reality’ (1970), Japan Echo, Special Issue -
Japan’s View of the World, 1995, pp. 63-71, believed that the Japanese identity would 
remain in a world of make-believe until the USA exited the Japanese realm.
10 Shigeru Yoshida, The Coordinates of Japan’s Foreign Policy’ (1957), Japan Echo, Special 
Issue - Japan’s View of the World, 1995, pp. 51-55. (Translated from Kaisö Junen 
(Recollections of Ten Years) (Tokyo: Shinchösha, 1957, Vol.1).
11 Shigeru Yoshida, The Coordinates of Japan’s Foreign Policy’, pp. 51-55.
12 Shigeru Yoshida, The Coordinates of Japan’s Foreign Policy’, pp. 51-55.
13 Kazuo Ogura, ‘Japan’s Asia Policy, Past and Future’, Japan Review of International 
Affairs, Winter 1996, pp.3-15, esp. 7.
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which launched the Non-Aligned Movement. This was the first major international 
conference that Japan had attended since the war, and appeared to be an attempt 
by Japan to gain readmission to the ‘Asian family of nations’. However, there was 
some suggestion that Japan attended the conference under the instruction of the 
USA, who saw it as communist-inspired and fertile ground for communist 
propaganda. The USA hoped that the presence of Japan and the Philippines would 
‘counteract any put-up deals promoted by communists or their fellow travellers’ . 14 
There was a strong sense that Japan was more concerned about the international 
ramifications of its participation in the conference. The conference was effectively a 
gathering for third world nations with a history of peripheral economies, which 
sought to resist Western control. Japan did not feel the euphoria that brought the 
other countries together, nor did it want to be considered as a third world economy. 
The Foreign Minister, Shigemitsu Mamoru, stated that ‘Japan might be able to 
change the negative tone of the conference into a positive one’ . 15
Present-Day Relations
With the end of the Cold War and the demise of the bi-polar world, there is a school 
of thought that believes Japan has come to an historic turning point: it is time for 
Japan to cut loose from its American apron strings. Some cite evidence of this 
occurring, such as standing up to US threats over trade, signs of greater Japanese 
leadership, and involvement in the Asia Pacific. Others believe that Japan is still 
playing a role in the USA’s strategy for Asia. 16 Japanese actions within the Asia 
Pacific, whether it be the provision of economic aid, the encouragement of free 
trade, conduct of dialogue on regional security, or promotion of investment and 
technical cooperation, have been interpreted as both Americanism and Asianism.
14 Kweku Ampiah, ‘Japan at the Bandung Conference: The Cat Goes To The Mice’s 
Convention’, Japan Forum, Vol. 7, No. 1, April 1995, pp. 15-23, esp. p. 16.
15 Kweku Ampiah, ‘Japan at the Bandung Conference’, p. 19.
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Any change in US-Japan relations is set against the background of significant 
conflicts between the Japanese and US governments; in trade, most notably 
involving the automobile and photographic film industries, and over military-related 
matters such as the rape of an Okinawan school girl by Okinawan-based US 
military personnel. The US government argues that Japan’s market is closed to 
free trade. Many US government administrations have sought to push for ‘results 
oriented’ policies and ‘quantitative indicators’. These so-called bilateral initiatives 
have resulted in market oriented, sector specific (MOSS) agreements, structural 
impediments initiatives (Sll), voluntary import expansion (VIEs) and voluntary export 
restraints (VERs). Japan, which claims to have mostly open markets, objects to 
these unilateralist measures, and has recently responded by threatening to seek 
WTO intervention.
The division caused by disputes over trade is probably best illustrated by the Bush 
administration’s decision to expand the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement to 
include Mexico in 1989, and later specific Asia Pacific nations. Japan was not one 
of those invited to join the trade bloc. This arrangement would become known as 
NAFTA. Warnings of the possible effects that this bloc could have on Japan were 
included in MITI’s 1988 Sakamoto Report.17 The report recommended the creation 
of an Asia Pacific economic forum to avert the division of the world economy into 
competing regional blocs. It recognised the critical state of the global economy and 
argued that the region should stop depending on the USA and develop the region’s 
economy and trade structure through role-sharing cooperation. It also considered 
that the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) model 
was too rigid and should be changed to suit the Asia Pacific to something more like
16 This is according to once Japanese Deputy Vice-minister for Foreign Affairs in his article, 
Kazuo Ogura, ‘Japan’s Asia Policy, Past and Future’, p. 8.
17 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, p. 108.
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ASEAN: by operating a regional forum through consensus, gradual progress, and 
remaining open to other regions. It suggested that Japan could assist in this 
development by expanding its imports, increasing its FDI in the region and 
supporting human resources development.18 Fortunately for Japan, most Asia 
Pacific nations saw the prospect of a bilateral free trade agreement with the world’s 
largest economy as a threat.19 Many believed that they would be subordinated by 
US demands, and instead of embracing the American proposal, they pursued the 
less threatening grouping that became APEC.
It is a commonly-held idea in Japan that ‘the prosperity and stability of the region is 
not only based on cooperation among Asian countries but is unattainable without 
US involvement’.20 In Asia the US security presence is considered by many as 
integral to the region’s stability. For this reason, the Japan-US Security Alliance 
was renewed in April 1996. Nevertheless, the stationing of US troops on Japanese 
territory has been one of contention for both nations. The majority of the Japanese 
public objects to the US military presence, especially after the rape of a twelve year 
old Okinawan school girl by three US military personnel in 1995, which exacerbated 
this attitude and fuelled calls for a reduction in the US military presence. It 
highlighted the deep divisions in US-Japan relations and the security alliance. This 
is part of a broader anti-American sentiment in Japan today. In October 1995, 40.2 
per cent of people polled believed that the US-Japan Security Treaty should be 
abolished.21 The American public has also called for a change in the security
18 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion Japan’s Role in APEC, (Washington DC: Institute 
for International Economics, 1995), pp. 58-61.
19 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, p. 108.
20 Text of speech given by Japan’s Foreign Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 
Japan’s Role in Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation, July 1995, 
(http://www.nttls.co.jp/infomofa/apecinfo/www/role/mspeech/spches3.htm).
21 According to an article ‘Japan’s Security Dilemma’, The Weekend Australian, 28-29 
October 1995, p. 30. A poll was taken by the Nihon Keizai newspaper in late October 
1995.
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alliance. It is less willing to bear the costs of the military burden which the USA 
assumed during the Cold War.22 With US insistence on greater ‘burden sharing’ by 
Japan, there is the possibility of more joint US-Japan leadership initiatives in the 
region. However, this is less a desire to share its leadership in the Asia Pacific, and 
more an attempt to end Japan ‘free-riding’ on US defence spending.
APEC, Japan & the USA
The very sources of US-Japan conflict over trade and security can be found as the 
pillars of APEC. Australia’s original plans for a regional economic forum did not 
include the USA,23 but focused on Asia and the Southwest Pacific. It was on 
Japan’s insistence that the USA became a member.24 Although Japan wanted to 
counter regional trade groupings, especially NAFTA, the government decided to 
engage the USA in its own regional grouping. This would encourage it to minimise 
protectionism, and would avoid raising its ire by excluding it. The decision to include 
the USA was considered necessary for the very future of regional prosperity and 
security. It was believed that by including the USA, its attention would be focused 
on the Asia Pacific region, and not on North America.25
In addition, some Japanese believed that APEC allowed Japan to avoid one of its 
most difficult questions. 26 Prior to the creation of APEC, Japan was always asked, 
‘which do you prefer? East Asia or the USA?’ This was always a difficult question 
to answer. One government official said that the APEC forum makes it easy to 
answer ‘both’. The USA is important to Japan as a market for Japanese goods,
22 Richard Higgott, ‘APEC: A Sceptical View’, p. 78-79. In A. Mack et al., Pacific 
Cooperation.
23 Yuichirö Nagatomi, ‘Economic Regionalism and the EAEC’, Japan Review of International 
Affairs, Vol. 9, no. 3, Summer 1995, pp. 206-211, esp. p. 210.
24 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, pp. 55-73.
25 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, pp. 55-73.
26 Personal Interview with Sumio Kusaka, 3 September 1996.
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and as part of security arrangements in the Asia Pacific. Their security presence is 
a key to regional peace’,27 and limits its ‘tendency for isolationism’.28
As discussed in the previous chapter, Japan appeared to react cautiously to APEC 
in its early years. Some explain this as sensitivity to ASEAN’s uncertainty for the 
forum, but close attention to US attitudes may also have contributed. The 1992 
APEC Ministerial Meeting was a significant occasion in that the EPG was 
established, and there was an increase in APEC membership from fifteen to 
seventeen members. However, neither the USA, Japan nor Canada sent 
ministerial-level delegates to the ministers’ Bangkok meeting. Analysis of Japanese 
media reporting on APEC reveals low level interest in the issue, which barely 
increased from the previous year. (Refer to Appendix B: Graphs.) Japan’s lack of 
support and interest may have been in response to a general feeling that there was 
growing American disinterest in Asia Pacific cooperation. Without US support for 
APEC, Japan may have felt that the forum was not worth supporting either.
The election of Bill Clinton as US President in late 1992 saw a huge shift in the 
American approach to APEC, with the Clinton administration designating APEC as 
the cornerstone of its regional strategy towards Asia during early 1993.29 In a bid to 
raise the political profile of APEC, Clinton inaugurated a ‘leadership conference’ of 
APEC heads of government to take place immediately after the Seattle ministerial 
session in November 1993.30 This ‘informal’ summit was intended to symbolise a 
resumption of American presidential leadership in the Asia Pacific region, while 
focusing high-level attention on the priority issues of economic development and
27 Personal Interview with Sumio Kusaka, 3 September 1996.
28 Personal Interview with Sumio Kusaka, 3 September 1996.
29 Martin Rudner, ‘APEC: The Challenges of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation’, Modern 
Asian Studies 29, 2, 1995, p. 411.
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trade liberalisation.31 Regional leaders were primed on the leaders’ summit in early 
1993, with Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi, ‘a little reticent at first’,32 but eventually 
endorsing the idea in July of that year. Japan’s concern focused on ASEAN 
perceptions, rather than the actual concept itself. Japan was sensitive to ASEAN’s 
initial scepticism for the proposal. The government also feared that an APEC 
leaders’ meeting would cause the Taiwan issue to surface, thereby complicating the 
situation and disturbing the region’s relative calm. However, once the leaders’ 
summit got underway in November 1993, it attracted attention from around the 
world. Nearly 3000 journalists covered the conference, almost twice the number 
that attended Europe’s Maastricht summit.33 Japanese media reporting reflected 
the government’s renewed interest in the forum, with 68 articles on APEC during 
November, compared to the previous November total of only one. (Refer to 
Appendix B: Graphs and Appendix C: Article Titles from Surveyed Journals.) The 
meeting in Seattle amounted to a reassurance of the USA’s continued interest in 
the region; something which pleased Japan and other Asia Pacific nations.
Economic Pragmatism
APEC is an economic forum and its fundamental objectives lie in the economic 
realm. The most obvious reason for Japan becoming involved in APEC was 
economic necessity, which is made clear in many articles and responses to 
questions on the benefits of APEC for Japan. Japan’s insistence on USA 
involvement in APEC stems from this as well. The US-Japan relationship played a 
crucial role in Japan’s economic development. The large US market has long been 
more receptive to Japanese and East Asian goods than those from other regions of
30 The idea for a leaders’ summit was originally conceived by former Australian Prime 
Minister Paul Keating.
31 Martin Rudner, ‘APEC: The Challenges of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation’, p. 412.
32 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, p. 83.
33 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, p. 79.
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the world,34 and still provides an enormous marketplace for Japanese products. 
The involvement of the USA, the world’s largest marketplace, in APEC was 
paramount. Because of its enormous importance to the global economy and the 
global security system, the universal engagement of the USA is one of the best 
guarantees against the breakdown of the global economy. Japan’s future 
prosperity demands access to a global market. In particular, the Japanese 
government realised that even with continued rapid growth in the Asian market, ‘the 
Japanese economy would not be able to maintain its current level of affluence 
without the benefits accruing from the US market’ .35 One Japan Times headline 
warns the USA, ‘Don’t Miss APEC Boat, Think Tanks Tell US’ ,36 knowing that APEC 
can only really be successful if every member supports the objectives. Japan 
seeks to encourage the USA with the long-term economic rewards that APEC is 
expected to provide. If the USA cannot see the benefits, it may well close its doors 
on global free trade. There is a school of thought that believes APEC helps to keep 
US trade doors open.
APEC’s formation and structure allow each member equal weight and power, and 
the consensual approach to decision-making is fundamental to its principles.37 
However, Asia Pacific nations that were invited to join NAFTA feared economic 
manipulation by the USA38 because its was a USA-controlled forum. They saw
34 Peter Petri, ‘Is the United States bowing out of Asia?’, in Ross Garnaut et al., p. 306.
35 Ryo Sano, The Ambitions and Limitations of Japan’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War 
Era: Loosen the Ties or Reaffirm the US-Japan Alliance?’, Institute Reports, (Columbia 
University: East Asian Institute, June 1996), p.15.
36 ‘Don’t Miss APEC Boat, Think Tanks Tell U.S’, The Japan Times, November 1993.
37 Australian, Indonesian and Japanese Approaches Towards APEC, (Canberra: Australia- 
Japan Research Centre, Research Schools of Pacific and Asian Studies, ANU, 1994), p. 
3.
38 For example, the USA had pledged to impose US$2 billion worth of punitive sanctions on 
Chinese imports if American demands for greater access to the Chinese market were not 
met. The stand-off on intellectual property is one of a number of issues that have soured 
Sino-US relations over the past few years, with many Chinese officials and academics 
accusing Washington of blocking Beijing’s efforts to join the global trading community. 
Yang Chaoying of the China Institute for Strategic Studies stated that, ‘the United States
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NAFTA as another form of bilateral relations with the USA, the most powerful nation 
of the world. The USA would act as a hub, rather than a participant in a multilateral 
regional bloc. Therefore, involving the USA in APEC was seen as a way of 
ensuring that dealing with the USA would be done as an equal. The actions of any 
one member would be under the scrutiny of other members. In particular, Japan 
would have the power to combat US economic pressure,39 and loosen the shackles 
of its bilateral trade relationship. The multilateral environment would reduce the US 
government’s ability to threaten Japan with retaliatory measures such as the Super 
301 provision of the 1988 Trade Act for non-compliance.40 To do so would 
contradict its APEC promises. When the USA threatened Japan in 1995 over 
automobiles, the former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating advised Japan to 
use APEC to lessen bilateral tensions with the US government.41 The conflict was 
resolved, although probably with limited assistance from the threat of multilateral 
institutions, like the WTO and the APEC group. There are some Japanese 
commentators who look to the day when APEC might have its own trade conflict 
resolution sub-group.42 The sub-group would act in the manner of the WTO, but 
perhaps more quickly and efficiently due to its smaller size. This would allow trade 
to continue with limited delay.
has become the major obstruction to China’s entrance into the World Trade Organisation’. 
Richard McGegor, ‘US, China poised to settle copyright piracy war’, The Australian 18 
June, 1996, p. 9.
39 Personal interview withTakashi Terada, 18 September 1996.
40 The Super 301 is a provision of the 1988 USA trade act. The provision obliges the 
government to set deadlines for action against ‘priority foreign countries’ whose trading 
practices are considered to be ‘unfair’.
41 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, pp. 111-112.
42 For example, Ippei Yamazawa wrote that dispute settlement was one of the medium-term 
objectives relevant to realising the Bogor vision. He said that the ‘[ajdoption of an APEC 
code of practice for the settlement of policy and investment-related disputes based on 
existing multilateral mechanisms’ could complement trade liberalisation with potential for 
significant net gains to all economies involved. In I. Yamazawa, ‘Implementing the APEC 
Bogor Declaration’, Japan, Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, no. 3, (Summer, 1995), 
pp. 178-188, esp. p. 184.
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Although the Japanese government was adamant that the USA be involved in 
APEC, its involvement in APEC has not always been viewed as benign. There is a 
pervasive suspicion in some quarters about the USA’s intentions, as seen in these 
articles from Japanese journals, ‘APEC-led by America Won’t Succeed’ ,43 and ‘Will 
America be the Bully at the Seattle Meeting? ’ .44 Komiya Ryutaro, an academic and 
current director-general of a MITI research institute, expressed doubt about the 
goal of free trade set by the eighteen APEC member economies, citing potential US 
insincerity. He claimed that US participation in APEC is nothing more than one of 
the trade policy games that it plays all the time. The USA may not follow through 
with APEC’s program of trade liberalisation, even though it is pushing for Asian 
nations to do so. 45 Other Japanese commentators are concerned by non-Asian 
members, particularly the USA, pushing hard for rapid liberalisation. According to 
initial APEC objectives, APEC was to be a forum for multinational negotiation 
through consensus. According to many Japanese commentators, the USA is 
turning APEC into a forum for commercial negotiation, and a schedule for 
liberalisation.46
There is a school of Japanese thought that considers APEC objectives as being 
impossible to achieve, either in the time frame set by the members, or at all in some 
cases. The developed economies of APEC, specifically Australia, Canada, Japan 
and the USA, are now approaching the ‘hard core’ of their protected interests, 
where it will be difficult to advance trade liberalisation much further.47 The poorer 
developing economies may also find it difficult to achieve ‘free and open’ trade
43 Amerika shudö no APEC wa seikö shinai’ (‘APEC-led by America Won’t Succeed’), 
Shükan TöyöKeizai, 12 November 1994, p. 42.
44 ‘APEC ni Shiatoru kaigi Nichi-Bei wa gaki taishö ni naranai ka’, (‘Will America be the Bully 
at the Seattle Meeting?’), Shükan Töyö Keizai, 6 November 1993, p. 43.
45 Peter Hartcher, ‘Japanese Adviser Accuses US of Playing Trade Games’, Australian 
Financial Review, 16 July 1996, p. 4. Reuter’s Business Briefing, 18 July 1996.
46 Amane Ichikawa, ‘APEC is unnecessary for Japan’, pp. 96-99.
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within the agreed deadline of 2020.48 While the objectives of the forum are not 
necessarily criticised, there is a realist’s view that the goals set are unachievable, or 
at least ‘premature’.49
Fear of Protectionism
While some attribute pure economic pragmatism for the creation of APEC, others 
take this further: crediting the alleged source as fear of isolation. There have been 
fears that the USA might seek to extend NAFTA to include Asia. This would ‘be 
unfavourable to the prospects of the Asia Pacific region’.50 Japan, in particular, felt 
a sense of isolation. At the end of the Cold War, Japan felt as if it were the only 
major industrialised nation not including in a regional grouping, and that it did not 
have the support of a regional grouping like the EU or NAFTA. In particular, Japan 
only had the GATT forum as a means of trade policy negotiation, and this was 
stalling. The Japanese felt that an Asian forum was needed to enable them to 
negotiate on an even par with the Europeans and Americans.51 Japan’s history of 
involvement in establishing regional economic cooperatives, such as PBEC,52 
PAFTAD,53 and PECC, is also indicative of its desire to engage with other nations.
The removal of protectionism was one of the primary reasons for APEC’s 
establishment, according to the initial objectives set in 1989 by the first twelve 
members of APEC. Of the six major areas that the new organisation sought to 
address, two involved completing the Uruguay Round of GATT in order to
47 Personal interview with Kazutomo Irie, 18 September 1996.
48 Peter Hartcher, ‘Japanese Adviser Accuses US of Playing ‘Trade Games’, 18 July 1996.
49 ‘APEC kakuryö shunö kaigi. Saki-okuri ni naru jiyüka gutaisaku’ (‘APEC Senior Officials- 
Leaders’ Meeting. Premature Policies for the Realisation of Liberalisation’), Shükan Töyö 
Keizai, 19 November 1994, pp. 70-75.
b0 Nobuo Matsunaga, ‘APEC and PECC’, Japan Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, no. 3 
(Summer, 1995), pp. 195-198, esp. p. 196.
51 Personal interview with Kazutomo Irie, 18 September 1996. K. Irie was seconded to 
MOFA from MITI.
52 Pacific Basin Economic Council.
53 Pacific Trade and Development Conference.
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strengthen the global trading system and discourage the formation of regional 
trading blocs, particularly in Europe and North America, but also potentially in East 
Asia.54 APEC countries clearly regarded an open, multilateral framework for trade 
as the key to continued economic dynamism in the Asia Pacific region. APEC could 
potentially remedy the negative effects of these regional trading blocs. APEC 
sought to eliminate protectionist impediments to trade; such as exclusivist 
preferential trading agreements, trans-border investment enclaves, bilateral deals 
and market sharing arrangements. 55
The involvement of North America and East Asia in APEC has been viewed as 
minimising the harmful effects of NAFTA. The Japan Times headline reflected this 
with, ‘Hosokawa APEC Vision Seen Fighting Trade Blocs’ ,56 but there were still 
concerns about the negative potential of NAFTA in articles like ‘Fate of NAFTA 
Casts Shadow On APEC Meet’ .57 The establishment of NAFTA rang alarm bells, 
especially for those not invited to join, including Japan. The NAFTA arrangement 
has the potential to exclude Asian nations from trading with the USA, one of the 
world’s largest markets. The closure of the Americas from the global economy 
would probably result in the establishment of a number of other discriminatory trade 
blocs, especially in Europe and Asia. This situation would be detrimental to the 
continued development of the Asian region, which could not support itself at current 
levels. Japan is keen, therefore, to see the USA embrace multilateralism, rather 
than a regional trade arrangement that encourages protectionism.
54 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, p. 106. The other four objectives described by 
Funabashi are: defusion of US-Japan conflict; economic, cooperative engagement of 
China; maintenance of American commitment to the Asia Pacific, and provision of a 
political forum for regional dialogue.
55 Martin Rudner, ‘APEC: The Challenges of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation’, p. 429.
56 ‘Hosokawa APEC Vision Seen Fighting Trade Blocs’, The Japan Times, 9 November 
1993, p. 1.
57 ‘Fate of NAFTA Casts Shadow On APEC Meet’, The Japan Times, 18 November 1993, p. 
1.
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US protectionism is sometimes seen as responsible for Japan’s reluctance to 
support the EAEC. An Asian bloc that excludes the USA may have to contend with 
considerably reduced access to the American market, or worse, it may have no 
access at all, given that the USA would have no reason to resist protectionism 
against Asia Pacific goods. The impact would be severe, if not disastrous, for many 
Asia Pacific economies, including Japan and Taiwan which each export about a 
third of their total exports to the USA.58 Even China needs the US market for its 
economic development. Japan would have to be able to overcome any loss of the 
US market, and then serve as an alternative market for the Asian region, in order to 
alleviate the severe impact on growth of the region’s economy. One academic 
wrote that ‘nothing must be done to jeopardize this [US-Japan] relationship’ .59
Regional Security
The peace and security of the Asia Pacific is of significant concern to all those 
within the region and around the world. Since the end of World War II, the USA 
has helped to create an Asian balance of power which has allowed Japan and most 
of Asia to enjoy economic growth. International opinion suggests that the removal 
of the US military from the Asia Pacific could cause a power vacuum and 
widespread instability in the region. The US-Japan security alliance plays an 
important role in maintaining peace in the Asia Pacific region. Japanese leaders 
warn against any action that could disrupt relations between the two countries. 
Former Prime Minister Nakasone has declared ‘[i]t is impossible to imagine a 
secure Asia without a US presence’ .60 This opinion still holds weight with the
58 Poh-Ping Lee, ‘Japan and the Asia Pacific Region: A Southeast Asian Perspective’. In 
C.C. Garby & M. Brown Bullock (eds) Japan A New Kind of Superpower?, (Washington: 
The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), pp. 121-139, esp. p. 129.
59 Yuichirö Nagatomi, ‘Economic Regionalism and the EAEC’, Japan Review of International 
Affairs, Vol. 9, no. 3, Summer 1995, pp. 206-211, esp. p. 209.
60 Chalmers Johnson, Japan Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State, (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), pp. 296-323, esp. p. 313.
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Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security being resigned in 1996. APEC is a very 
convenient vehicle for Japan in this sense. The government knows that ‘improved 
political relations based on mutual economic interests will enhance the stability of 
the region’, 62 and that all the other nations are driven to comply with regional 
consensus in the search for economic development. If political leaders in the 
region place a sufficiently high value on economic growth and integration with the 
world economy, economic interdependence can be used to manipulate peace and 
security in the region.63
Although APEC is an economic forum, its three central objectives (liberalisation, 
facilitation and cooperation) may indirectly contribute to regional peace and 
security. Asian countries subscribe to this view and are often concerned that non- 
Asian APEC members see APEC simply as an economic mechanism.64 Japan and 
its Asian neighbours want a process of dialogue and socialisation that sets a 
general, rather than a detailed, framework for interaction in the region. The 
involvement of foreign ministers and heads of government makes it a political 
organisation; while it is not designed to discuss security, it is a confidence building 
regime, which may help facilitate the development of a stable regional 
environment.65 For this reason, there is a school of Japanese thought that sees US 
involvement and support for APEC as being essential for the region. Headlines
61 According to Sano Ryo, the call for a policy focusing on the UN lost momentum as the 
limitations of the UN’s role in the post-Cold War era became evident. The basis for 
Japan’s security policy turned back towards the USA. Ryo Sano, The Ambitions and 
Limitations of Japan’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era’, p. 13.
62 Ichiro Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan, The Rethinking of a Nation, (Tokyo: Kodansha 
International, 1994), pp. 132- 135, esp. p. 132. This book was originally published in 
Japanese as Nihon Kaizo Keikaku (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993).
63 Ichiro Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan, p. 132.
64 Stuart Harris, ‘Conclusion: The Theory and Practice of Regional Cooperation’, in A. Mack 
et al., Pacific Cooperation, p.266.
65 Stuart Harris, ‘Conclusion: The Theory and Practice of Regional Cooperation’, in A. Mack 
et al., Pacific Cooperation, p. 268.
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have declared, ‘President’s decision shakes faith in US commitment’,66 ‘No-show 
may hurt future American influence over forum’67 and ‘Clinton cancellation 
disappoints Osaka’,68 indicating the significance placed on US involvement.
Article 9 of Japan’s constitution clearly prohibits the use of military force outside 
Japan,69 and restricts Japanese forces to self-defence.70 This makes Japan feel 
slightly vulnerable, particularly in light of its proximity to two of the most volatile 
nations in the region, China and North Korea, both of which are suspected of 
having nuclear weapons and are in range of the Japanese archipelago. In 
addressing this vulnerability, Japan and other countries in the region71 have 
committed to a policy of constructive engagement through the promotion of trade 
and investment with the countries of the Asia Pacific, and ultimately the world. The 
implementation of multilateral trade creates an environment of interdependence by 
promoting economic integration and political cooperation. Each nation is drawn into 
a sphere of dependence on a scale that should lessen the risk of military conflict 
during the next decade.72 APEC is part of Japan’s policy of constructive 
engagement and is particularly relevant to Japan’s security situation, in that it 
covers East Asia. While APEC meetings do not officially encompass security and 
defence, the informal proceedings encourage dialogue on a broad range of regional 
issues. The gathering of leaders is the only situation in which countries like China, 
Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and the USA can meet. Until a more comprehensive
66 ‘President’s decision shakes faith in US commitment’, The Japan Times (Monthly), 17 
November 1995, p. 3.
67 ‘No-show may hurt future American influence over forum’, The Japan Times (Monthly), 17 
November 1995, p. 3.
68 ‘Clinton cancellation disappoints Osaka’, The Japan Times (Monthly), 17 November 1995, 
p. 3.
69 Ichiro Ozawa, Blueprint fora New Japan, p. 111.
70 Hugh Cortazzi, Modern Japan, pp. 89-90.
71 Australia and the USA, for example.
72 David Hale, ‘Asian Values’ The Australian, November 6, 1996, p. 39.
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regional security dialogue can be established,73 Japan recognises this as a way of 
securing the region.74
Japan’s military alliance with the USA, often termed the ‘linchpin’ of Asia Pacific 
security, is of importance for a variety of reasons. One is that it is perceived to act 
as a check on the emergence of Japan as an independent military power. This 
view is widely held in Asia, and among Japanese pacifists. 75 Japanese officials 
recognise that the security relationship is a requisite for Asian acceptance of Japan. 
Japan’s position with respect to Asia has been tightly linked with US global strategy; 
even to the extent of being accepted by Asia as a direct result of the role Japan 
played in the Western world as led by the USA.76 One Japanese diplomat has 
commented that ‘[t]here is no country in Asia that would welcome us if the US- 
Japan relationship was not maintained. With our past and our size, they would be 
too scared’ .77 This, among a litany of other reasons, encourages Japan to maintain 
close relations with the USA, and to keep the USA engaged in the Asia Pacific. 
Newspaper headlines reflect this: ‘Multilateral forums are OK, but don’t scrap US-
73 APEC supports the work of the ASEAN Regional Forum, which includes the ASEAN 
states, and observers: Australia, Cambodia, Canada, China, EU, India, Japan, Laos, 
Myanmar, PNG and Russia, USA and Vietnam.
74 For more detail on the relationship between economics and security in the Asia Pacific, 
see A. Mack et al., Pacific Cooperation.
75 D. P. Rapkin, ‘Leadership and Cooperative Institutions in the Asia Pacific’, in A. Mack et 
al., Pacific Cooperation, p. 113.
76 This is not to say that Japan always felt totally accepted by the USA, or believed itself 
equal. Japan was very distressed over not having been consulted about the USA’s 
complete reversal of foreign policy with China in 1971, known as the ‘Nixon Shock’, which 
prompted Japan to suddenly open the door to establishing diplomatic relations. Because 
Japan’s Asia policy was, in reality, a US policy, the fact that Washington took steps to 
restore diplomatic ties with China without consulting Tokyo led Japan to suspect other 
policy areas. Perhaps the biggest ‘shock’ of this incident was not that America restored 
relations with China, but that it made Japan painfully aware that Japan’s policy towards 
Asia was actually a policy toward the USA.
77 D. P. Rapkin, ‘Leadership and Cooperative Institutions in the Asia Pacific’ in A. Mack et al., 
Pacific Cooperation, p. 113.
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Japan pact’,78 ‘Japan is urged to back US presence in Asia’, 79and The US-Japan 
Relationship is central to the world’.80
Japan, Asia and the USA: Australia as a Bridge
While Australia has played a significant role in the history of APEC, this thesis has 
spent little time on Australia’s involvement. This is because Australia is not a 
significant player in Japan’s foreign policy: it is neither Asian, nor American. The 
significance of Australia to Japan is probably indicated by the one small paragraph 
that MOFA dedicates to ‘Oceania’ covering New Zealand and Australia in the 
Diplomatic Bluebook 1995. This serves as a useful reminder that, although Japan 
is of great importance to Australia, Australia is not of equivalent importance to 
Japan. Australia is going to have to compete for Tokyo’s attention in the future, as 
it has for Washington and London’s in the past.81 Australia, however, is still a 
useful ally for Japan in a number of areas. The Japanese government believes 
‘Australia can make a very important contribution to the Asian side of the 
dialogue’,82 because it is neither Asian nor American, but perhaps a bridge to both. 
Recognition of the mutually beneficial relationship were set down in the Joint 
Declaration on the Australia-Japan Partnership which was signed by the respective 
leaders in May 1995. The declaration states that the ‘Government of Japan 
..reaffirms that Australia is an indispensable partner in regional affairs’.83 It also 
states that
78 ‘Multilateral forums are OK, but don’t scrap US-Japan pact’, The Nikkei Weekly, 20 
February 1995.
79 ‘Japan is urged to back US presence in Asia’, The Nikkei Weekly, 22 May 1995.
80 ‘Sekai no naka no Nichi-Bei kankei’ (‘The US-Japan Relationship is central to the world’), 
Gaikö Forum, no. 75, December 1994, pp. 4-68.
81 Richard Woolcott in address to 18th Australia-Japan Relations Symposium, 31 July 1992. 
Published text of proceedings, Australia-Japan Relations in the Future, 1992, p. 22
82 Tony Boyd, ‘Doubts on Asia Policy an ASEM Barrier’, The Australian Financial Review, 23 
January 1997, p. 8.
83 Joint Declaration on the Australia-Japan Partnership, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 
[http://www.nttls.co.jp/infomofa/apecinfo/www/info/info2.htm].
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the two Governments pledge their commitment to APEC as the primary 
vehicle of regional economic cooperation. ...Australia and Japan share a 
vital interest in the maintenance and strengthening of the open multilateral 
trading system and in the effective operation of the WTO. 84
An American presence and strategic engagement in the Asia Pacific is highlighted 
as essential in the Joint Declaration to the peace and prosperity of the region, as is 
continued development of the ASEAN Regional Forum. The activities of the UN will 
also be supported by the Australian and Japanese governments, while Australia 
would support Japan’s pledge to gain Security Council permanency. This 
declaration clearly points to the similarities in Australia and Japan’s foreign policies. 
It is easy to see why Australia and Japan enjoy such good relations, in spite of their 
difference in world economic and political status.
It is probably because Australia and Japan share similar foreign policy strategies, 
especially in supporting a GATT-based multilateral free trade system, and keeping 
the USA engaged in the region, that we have seen the two countries share a close 
association throughout APEC’s history. Their complementary situations in 
international trade and politics have also allowed them to play complementary roles 
in promoting APEC. According to many Japanese commentators, Australia was 
encouraged by Japan to take on a leadership role in promoting and establishing 
APEC because Australia is not perceived as a threat by Asian nations.85 Australia 
also has close associations with the USA, a position valued by Japan. Japan on 
the other hand, must be sensitive to Asian memories of World War II, but has
84 Joint Declaration on the Australia-Japan Partnership
85 For example Yöichi Funabashi in Asia Pacific Fusion.
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strong historical links with Asia and is respected for its economic and global 
achievements.
However, according to recent media reporting, several Asian countries have told 
Japan, one of the four countries coordinating ASEM (the Asia-Europe Meeting), that 
they have doubts about Australia’s policy towards Asia.86 According to a MOFA 
official, ‘some Asian countries are looking at Australia’s foreign policy and asking 
whether it is Asia or Europe or something other’ .87 He said that, ‘we support you 
because we believe Australia can make a very important contribution to the Asian 
side of the dialogue’ .88 Whether Australia will continue to be perceived as a useful 
ally in the Asia Pacific remains to be seen. A change in this situation could change 
Japan’s attitude to Australia.
Conclusion
It is in each member economy’s interest that the APEC forum promotes economic 
globalism within the region and around the world. Its success could pay multifold 
dividends for each member. For Japan, APEC’s success in the long term means 
having free access to global markets. In the short term, it is considered in some 
schools of thought as a means of relief from American unilateralism, and a useful 
way of constraining potential American protectionism and the USA’s continued 
military presence, in the Asia Pacific.
For a number of reasons, the US-Japan relationship has played a crucial role in 
Japan’s economic development. The large US market has long been more 
receptive to Japanese and East Asian goods than those from other regions of the
86 Tony Boyd, ‘Doubts on Asia policy an ASEM barrier’, The Australian Financial Review, 23 
January 1997, p. 8.
87 Tony Boyd, ‘Doubts on Asia policy an ASEM barrier’, p. 8.
88 Tony Boyd, ‘Doubts on Asia policy an ASEM barrier’, p. 8.
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world.89 The increasing trade surplus with East Asia, however, has seen the USA 
become more unilateralist in its trade relations with Asia. The establishment of 
NAFTA at the end of the 1980s also suggested that the USA may resort to 
protectionist trade arrangements which would have discriminated against most of 
the Asian market. The implications for Japan and the Asia Pacific of an insular 
USA are immense, and would probably encourage Europe and Asia to create 
discriminatory trade blocs of their own. The burgeoning Asian market, however, is 
probably too large to be supported by an insular Asia alone. It is for this reason 
most Asian nations have chosen to support the non-discriminatory APEC forum to 
institute free trade in the region. Japan, and the other APEC members, hope that 
their actions will develop and strengthen an open multilateral trading system 
throughout the world economy. According to the majority of Japanese APEC 
commentators, it is through economic necessity that Japan has chosen the APEC 
forum to promote its economic policies.
The Asia Pacific region, although relatively calm, has the potential to dissolve into 
strategic disorder. Most Asia Pacific nations are attempting to secure stability 
through constructive engagement and cooperative efforts towards interdependence. 
Generally, the term ‘constructive engagement’ is interpreted as meaning China. 
However, Japan also regards the situation with the USA in a similar way. The US 
military presence is the best guarantee of regional stability. Without such stability, 
economic development may be jeopardised, and strategic development may 
accelerate into an arms race within the region. Some Japanese commentators 
consider that by engaging the USA in cooperative institutions and providing 
economic incentives, the USA will become enmeshed in the region. Its strategic
89 Peter Petri, ‘Is the United States bowing out of Asia?’, in Ross Garnaut et al., Asia Pacific 
Regionalism, p. 306.
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presence will remain intact in the Asia Pacific as long as the USA deems it in its
interest.
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Chapter 5. Japan and the World
In the post-Cold War era, Tokyo appears more willing than in the past to translate 
its economic power into an international role. This is most evident in its efforts to 
participate in large economic institutions and the UN. This trend began when 
Japan’s international profile was raised as a result of its success in investment and 
trade during the 1980s. This, in turn, provided an incentive to become more 
involved in international affairs, while the government was also put under pressure 
by other nations which expected Japan to play a more active role. It has been 
suggested that despite Japan having achieved prominent status as the second- 
largest economy in the world more than a decade ago, it has yet to demonstrate 
international leadership abilities or earn international respect.1 Obvious avenues for 
Japan to exercise a larger world role were through existing multilateral institutions: 
the UN, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, GATT, and the OECD. 
The 1990s has seen Japan increasingly focusing on an expanded international role 
in settling regional conflicts, providing aid, assisting in reconstruction, peace­
keeping and humanitarian relief operations.
Japan is already a regional political power in Asia, but it has sometimes been 
cautious about committing itself to greater global responsibility despite international 
pressure on it as a global economic power.2 In view of the world’s changing political 
and economic environment, however, many Japanese believe that it is time to 
elevate its position to a global political power, with a shift away from bilateral
1 Mayumi Itoh, ‘Japan’s Abiding Sakoku Mentality’ in Orbis, Spring 1996, pp. 235-45, esp. p.
243.
2 Inoguchi Takashi, Japan’s International Relations, p. 155.
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diplomacy, aimed mainly at the USA, to multilateral diplomacy focused on the WTO 
and the APEC forum.3
Japan’s efforts towards assuming ‘management of the global system’4 were 
reflected in the 1994 and 1995 editions of the Diplomatic Bluebook. In comparison 
with earlier editions, it has moved away from the focus on Japan as a major 
industrialised country only having ‘relations’ with Asia (i.e. not being Asian).5 The 
mid-1990s focus is on economic interdependence and globalism. The USA, Europe 
and Asia will make up three distinctive geographic/economic areas that will lead the 
global trading system into the twenty-first century. The Diplomatic Bluebook 1995 
declares, ‘now that the Cold War has come to an end, Japan is expected to play a 
major role in building a new framework for international cooperation’.6 This can be 
achieved through the promotion of ‘multilateral cooperation, including UN reform 
and the strengthening of the multilateral trading system’.7 It suggests that 
‘cooperation is indispensable in addressing a wide range of issues facing the 
international community’,8 and proposes that Japan, the USA and Europe should 
strengthen their relations. While APEC is probably considered by the Japanese as 
a relatively small institution that is not central to Japan’s vision of its future, Japan is 
supportive of this regional forum in the interests of achieving interdependence and 
multilateralism in the global economic system.
3 Heizo Takenaka, ‘Can Japan Glue Together Asia and the Pacific?’, Japan Echo, Winter
1995, pp. 18-22, esp. p. 18.
4 Jiro Ushio, ‘Spread the Gospel of the Market Economy’, The Japan Times, 7 December
1996, p. 1.
5 During the late 1970s and ‘80s, the Diplomatic Bluebook appeared to prefer seeing itself as
part of the Western world, and only claimed ‘relations’ with Asia. It did not refer to Japan 
as being part of Asia.
5 Diplomatic Bluebook 1995.
7 Diplomatic Bluebook 1995.
8 Diplomatic Bluebook 1995.
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While the data from four Japanese periodicals surveyed (refer to Appendices B & 
C) is not conclusive, it goes some way to supporting the theory that APEC plays a 
part in Japanese foreign policy, if only in a minor way. It plays a useful role in 
advancing some of Japan’s most significant foreign policy interests, in terms of Asia 
and the USA, and helps Japan achieve greater political credibility worldwide. 
Considering the world attention that Japan received during the Osaka summit, it 
could be said that the Japanese government was anxious to prove itself as a 
cooperative, pro-active leader, capable of driving multilateral organisations. This 
chapter will explore some of the factors motivating Japan towards globalisation, and 
how APEC fits into this strategy.
Globalisation of Trade
In light of Japan’s economic development under the GATT-based system, Japan’s 
international trade policy has long emphasised the primacy of the multilateral 
trading system. Japan’s commitment to the multilateral trading system translates 
easily into support for the WTO: the forum for multilateral trading. The system and 
the forum are viewed by many Japanese people, including officials, academics and 
business people, as the safest, most effective avenue through which Japan can 
protect and advance its international trade and investment interests.
MITI’s latest White Paper on International Trade 199tf sees globalisation and 
regional integration as a fact of international trade life. The paper emphasises the 
need for Japanese policy makers and corporate strategists to understand the 
current environment and consider strategies for Japan to best take advantage of 
these trends. The White Paper devotes a considerable section to examining the 
relationship between regional integration and the multilateral trading system. It
9 ‘Summary of White Paper on International Trade 1996’, MITI, 
[http://www.jef.or.jp/news/wp1996/wp96.html], August 1996.
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contends that the multilateral trading system benefits from regional integration 
because liberalisation in the services trade and direct investment sectors can be 
pro-actively pursued; these being areas not adequately covered by the WTO. It 
also states that the relatively small number of member nations helps to speed up 
negotiations and allows flexible operations and management. The inclusion of 
developing countries in regional integration frameworks ensures the liberalisation of 
these countries.10 Open regionalism* 11 practised within APEC encourages regional 
integration, and strongly supports the multilateral trading system and the WTO. In 
fact behind Japan’s APEC strategy is a desire for the forum to help build an Asia 
Pacific community with which to strengthen the global economic system.12 
Considering Japan’s global vision, APEC has become one of Japan’s economic 
policy initiatives.
Fear of Protectionism
Japan’s support for a multilateral trading system makes it clearly opposed to 
preferential regional trading arrangements. The managed trade system and 
discriminatory relations during the inter-war period caused Japan to become 
frustrated with, and isolated from, the Western elites.13 Many commentators 
explain that Japanese expansionism was the result of being isolated from the 
powerful Western nations in the 1930s. Japan still sees itself as the only major 
industrialised country that is not currently committed to discriminatory integration.14 
Multilateral organisations are seen as providing a system for promoting peaceful
10‘Summary of White Paper on International Trade 1996’.
11 According to Ross Garnaut, ‘Open regionalism’ includes market integration and also 
integration that is facilitated by government policy to the extent that it does not involve 
discrimination against non-members. R. Garnaut, ‘Open Regionalism: its analytical basis 
and relevance to the international system’, Journal of Asian Economics, Vol. 4.2, 
(American Committee on Asian Economic Studies, 1993).
12 Yöichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, p. 249.
13 M. Inouchi et al., ‘Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation and Australia-Japan Relations’, p. 5.
14 This idea is conveyed by M. Inouchi et al., ‘Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation and 
Australia-Japan Relations’.
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international economic interaction, and ‘[wjithout it, trade disputes, such as the one 
Japan and the United States recently had over automobiles and auto parts, would 
increase and destabilize the system’ . 15 In multilateral systems, however, the vested 
interests of participants helps to ensure the continued existence of the organisation, 
thus minimising interest in alternative economic activities (such as protectionism). 
Needless to say, trade protectionism that excludes Japanese involvement is much 
despised by the Japanese government and business sector.
Like the USA, Europe has had its share of bouts with Japan over fair trade 
practices. However, Japan’s current foreign policy asserts that cooperation and 
coordination between Japan and Europe on global issues should be on par with that 
between Japan and the USA. 16 The implication of this is twofold. It implies on the 
one hand that the US-Japan relationship is to remain at the same level, despite 
increasing conflict between Japan and the USA. It also infers that Japan is keen to 
take on very close relations with Europe. A Gaikö Forum article suggests that this 
position is simply the result of a maturing global economic system, calling “Out of 
Asia, Into Europe’: An Outdated Slogan’ . 17 The actual reason for this is not clarified 
beyond a desire to improve the international system. In effect, however, Japanese 
policy dialogue and mutual cooperation with Europe may prevent the EU from 
becoming more protectionist and exclusively regional. Like Japan’s strong support 
for American involvement in APEC, Japan is keen to maintain Europe’s interest in 
Asia, thus the advent of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), which has also received
15 A. Hirata et al., ‘Strategy toward APEC: the Case of Japan’, in I. Yamazawa et al., APEC: 
Cooperation from Diversity, p. 32.
16 Diplomatic Bluebook 1995.
17 ‘Datsu Ojin-A no giron wa mö furui’ (“Out of Asia, Into Europe’: An Outdated Slogan’), 
Gaikö Forum, no. 85, October 1995, pp. 74-81.
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media attention in Japan.18 ASEM brings together the heads of State from fifteen 
European countries and the European Commission, as well as the seven-member 
ASEAN group, Japan, China, and South Korea. Unlike APEC, ASEM is concerned 
with trade, investment, political and security issues. Japan’s focus on open 
regionalism within APEC is probably partially inspired by its fear of losing Europe, 
and others, as a market. Europe is a large and lucrative market, and by extending 
APEC benefits beyond the members, Europe is encouraged to continue to 
participate globally and is less likely to implement retaliatory protectionist measures.
Global Leadership: An APEC Platform
Since the end of the Cold War, the Japanese government has appeared more 
willing to elevate itself from the status of a position regional power to one of global 
political force. This posture had been denied to Japan during the Cold War 
because of its wartime legacy in Asia and its subordination by the USA. 
Consequently, Japan has been constantly reminded that although it has achieved 
the status of an economic superpower and the world’s largest creditor, it is mostly 
considered devoid of international legitimacy.19 In line with Japan’s efforts to 
improve its political status, it was keen to make a good impression as host of the 
Osaka ministerial and leaders’ summit in November 1995. Its posturing as host 
was not only to show Asian nations that Japan is prepared to take a stand on Asia’s 
behalf, but also to demonstrate its diplomatic and political skills to the world. The 
peak in Japanese press reporting on APEC during November suggests that such 
perceptions were shared by many Japanese people. (Refer to Appendices B & C 
for details).
18 For example, ‘Higashi Ajia o meguru kokusai kankyö to Öshu’ (‘Europe and East Asia’s 
International Environment’), Gaikö Forum, no. 91, April 1996, pp. 34-44, and ‘Ökii na 
zenshin o hatashita Ajia-Öshü kankei’ (‘A Big Step Forward for Asian-European 
Relations’), Gaikö Forum, no. 92, May 1996, pp. 74-80.
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Japan’s position on global leadership and sovereignty has been also influenced by 
the workings of the EU. Japan’s Deputy Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs,20 Ogura 
Kazuo, interpreted the EU’s alliance as going beyond economics and into the realm 
of world leadership. He contends that the EU is a ‘mechanism devised to constrain 
and adjust the exercise of sovereignty in the hope that Europe will exercise 
leadership with respect to the world order’ .21 While Ogura saw creating an Asian 
organisation like that of the EU as impractical, he asserted that, ‘it is most important 
...that Asian nations endeavour to use organizations like ASEAN or the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation forum to adjust the way national sovereignty is exercised’ . 22 
Ogura was suggesting that Asia would benefit from an alliance because it would 
reduce the emphasis on sovereignty, and promote unity in the region. He saw 
APEC as a potential forum to this end.
In terms of assuming a senior position in a global, multilateral institution, permanent 
membership on the UNSC is of particular interest to Japan. The UNSC plays a 
central role in the activities of the UN, as it is the sole body invested with the 
authority to make binding resolutions and bears the responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. The Japanese government is 
pursuing this objective in an effort to achieve greater political legitimacy, 
commensurate with its economic leadership, and to assume an identity that is not 
dependent on the West’ .23 Ichiro Ozawa wrote that, ‘if we succeed in reforming the 
UN and in encouraging the United States to work actively with it, Japan will help
19 Donald C Hellmann, ‘America, APEC and the Road Not Taken: International Leadership in 
the Post-Cold War Interregnum in the Asia Pacific’, in I. Yamazawa et al., APEC: 
Cooperation from Diversity, p. 8.
20 Ogura Kazuo held this position prior to the October 1996 election.
21 Kazuo Ogura, ‘Japan’s Asia Policy, Past and Future’, p. 13.
22 Kazuo Ogura, ‘Japan’s Asia Policy, Past and Future’, p. 13.
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build the basis for the new world order. We would stand among the founders of a 
new age’ .24 This assumes that Japan would gain international status by 
participating in large multinational institutions, ‘something it has not had since its 
defeat at the end of the Second World War’ . 25
Global Security
The change in Japan’s security situation since the end of the Cold War may be one 
reason for Japan’s strong support of the UN. Although important, total reliance on 
the US-Japan security alliance is no longer considered politically astute by the 
Japanese government. With the detente at the end of the Cold War, there were 
signs that the American government was intending to reduce its military presence 
further. One newspaper headline draws attention to this fear, reminding the 
Japanese readers that ‘Japan must remain globally engaged: narrow focus on 
Asian runs risk of creating instability’ .26 The Japanese government felt that it was 
limited in how it could respond to American troop reductions. Its Constitution and 
public opposition made an increase in Japan’s military presence unrealistic. 
Extending the bilateral alliance with the USA beyond the level established in the 
Cold War was opposed by Japanese and Americans alike, especially in light of 
rising trade conflicts. A third option was to rely on a multilateral security system. 
The UN option, known in Japan as ‘UN-Centrism’ ,27 would allow Japan to maintain 
some distance from the USA and would place authority for any military participation 
within a UN framework.
23 Ryo Sano, The Ambitions and Limitations of Japan’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War 
Era’, p. 17.
24 Ichiro Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan, p. 115-16.
25 Ryo Sano, ‘The Ambitions and Limitations of Japan’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War 
Era’, p. 6.
26 ‘Japan must remain globally engaged: narrow focus on Asian runs risk of creating
instability’, The Nikkei Weekly, 14 February 1994.
27 Ichiro Ozawa keyed the term ‘UN-Centrism’ in discussions after the Gulf War regarding an 
appropriate Japanese response.
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Ichiro Ozawa was one of the driving forces behind Japan’s support for the UN.28 He 
emphasised the need for Japan to revise its post-WW II foreign policy, suggesting 
that in order to survive the post-Cold War era, Japan must become a ‘global state in 
the true sense of the term’.29 This could be achieved by contributing to international 
peace efforts with the services of its armed forces. Ozawa saw multilateral security 
as the way ahead for Japan, because he believed that no one nation could hope to 
resolve modern conflicts, nor could a country hope to remove itself entirely from 
international conflict. He believed that cooperation between the USA and the UN 
‘would also be the ideal combination for world peace and prosperity’.30 He 
proclaimed that ‘as one of the world’s advanced democratic nations, Japan has a 
responsibility to cooperate with the US and Europe in building a new and stable 
order to replace the Cold War structure’.31
Where does APEC Fit in Japan’s Globalisation?
In the first instance, APEC fits into Japan’s global vision because it supports open 
regionalism that does not threaten the principles and practices of the multilateral 
trading system. While Japan is opposed to RTAs, regionalism that invites the 
participation of non-member economies is generally supported by Japan. The 
Diplomatic Bluebook 1995 contends that APEC has a positive influence in leading 
the way to global interdependence. One academic explained that proof of Japan’s 
commitment to improving its economic interdependence and the world trading 
system was shown in the way Japan made concessions at the expense its domestic 
concerns in terms of agriculture.32
28 Once a member of the LDP, and current leader of Shinshinto.
29 Ichiro Ozawa, Blueprint fora New Japan, p. 94.
30 Ichiro Ozawa, Blueprint fora New Japan, p. 94.
31 Ichiro Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan, p. 94.
32 Personal Interview withTakashi Terada, 18 September 1996.
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APEC has at its core, an agenda that is completely compatible with the WTO. The 
Japanese government supports fundamental APEC objectives because of the way 
it promotes the WTO. In fact, the WTO’s unwieldy size and young age mean that it 
is not without flaws. The WTO is said to follow the precedent of GATT, being 
based in legalism and punitive dispute resolution,33 which can make timely 
multilateral solutions difficult to achieve. However, APEC’s consensus-based 
decision making process can make APEC more effective in many ways. For 
example, the facilitation of loosening non-border measures, standards, product 
certificates and customs clearance procedures, are only partially covered by the 
WTO.34 The less bureaucratic structure of APEC also enables APEC to deal with 
issues that would otherwise be complicated and time-consuming at the WTO level. 
This aspect of APEC is particularly appreciated by the Asian nations and all efforts 
are made to prevent APEC becoming any more bureaucratic. Japan’s focus on the 
‘Asian way’ at Osaka was indicative of this perspective.
From another perspective, the government is increasingly supportive of the APEC 
forum because it provides a stage on which Japan can promote its cooperative and 
leadership skills in a multilateral organisation. Some Japanese academics believe 
that ‘APEC is an appropriate place for Japan to practise its leadership role’ .35 As an 
economic forum, APEC allows Japan to participate in an area of its expertise. The 
Japanese government believes that some nations will interpret Japan’s actions 
within APEC as a projection of its capacity to assume greater global responsibility, 
and this is increasingly influencing how Japan acts within the forum. Dedicated
33 Rikki Kersten, ‘Cultural Impasse to Free Trade’, The Australian, 9 December 1996, p. 11.
34 A. Hirata et al., ‘Strategy toward APEC: the Case of Japan’, in I. Yamazawa et al., APEC: 
Cooperation from Diversity, p. 35.
35 A. Hirata et al., ‘Strategy toward APEC: the Case of Japan’, in I. Yamazawa et al., APEC: 
Cooperation from Diversity, p. 33.
Chapter 5. Japan and the World 97
Japanese involvement and leadership in APEC may assist Japan in achieving 
international legitimacy as a global leader.
Conclusion
The Japanese government also seeks to respond to the current international 
environment by working with other major economic powers to maintain the 
multilateral economic system. Japanese foreign policy is focusing on economic 
interdependence between the USA, Europe and Asia. These three economic 
regions are expected to make up the structure of the global trading system for the 
twenty-first century. Japan seeks to integrate these regions, rather than allowing 
the emergence of major trading blocs. Protectionism would severely impede Asian 
development and subsequently Japanese prosperity. Therefore the Japanese 
consider that keeping the global trading system open is imperative.
Japan’s commitment to globalisation translates easily into support for a forum like 
APEC. APEC, although regional and trade-focused, provides a small platform on 
which Japan can promote its cooperative and leadership skills. Since the end of the 
Cold War, the Japanese government appears to be more willing to elevate itself 
from the status of a regional power, to one of global political force. A greater 
emphasis on global political leadership, commensurate with its economic power, 
has lead the Japanese government to focus on assuming senior positions in large 
multilateral institutions. Obvious avenues for Japan to exercise a greater world role 
are existing multilateral organisations such as GATT, the UN and the WTO.
Some Japanese believe that APEC enables Japan to make positive steps towards 
leadership in the region, and perhaps beyond. This posture had been denied to 
Japan during the Cold War because of its wartime legacy in Asia and its 
subordination to the USA. Japan was keen to make a good impression as host of
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the Osaka leaders’ summit and commentators believe that Japan is prepared to 
make gradual concessions in order to maintain a good international profile. The 
Osaka summit assumed an ‘Asian approach’ to decision-making that indicated 
deference to Asia and independence from a unilateralist USA. Some 
commentators believe that Japan wanted to show Asia that it is prepared to take a 
stand on its behalf, as well as demonstrate its diplomatic and political skills to the 
world as a whole. Japanese press coverage suggests that such perceptions were 
shared by many Japanese people. This thesis has identified some of Japan’s 
foreign policy goals. These are not only manifested in APEC participation, but can 
also be seen in Japan’s desire to assume a permanent seat on the UNSC, as well 
as in its interest in carving out a role in other large multinational institutions. 
Although APEC has a smaller structure than institutions like the WTO, the World 
Bank and UN, it gives Japan a platform on which to demonstrate its leadership
skills within Asia to Western leaders.
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Chapter 6. Conclusion
This thesis sought to gain a better understanding of Japanese perceptions of 
APEC, and to find the motivating factors for Japan’s involvement in this forum. This 
investigation, although limited in size and based on a limited sample of Japanese 
opinion, has exposed perceived benefits from APEC that go beyond APEC’s core 
business of liberalisation, facilitation and cooperation. This regional economic 
forum, is considered in some Japanese circles, as playing a part in Japan’s larger 
foreign policy strategy. Japan’s foreign policy focus on Asia, the USA and 
globalisation is reflected in how Japan advances APEC.
The Japanese government and business conglomerates, that once viewed Asia as 
a springboard to the West, now see Asia as central to their future. APEC fits into 
Japan’s Asia policy by serving to improve its relations with Asia. The frequent 
meetings with Asia Pacific nations, the equitable nature of APEC, and the 
consensus-based decision making process, provide Japan with a forum to portray a 
cooperative, non-aggressive leadership style. APEC is especially important, 
because it enables Asian leaders to meet and discuss regional economics, but also 
allows for discussion of political and strategic issues.
APEC has also proved useful in helping to promote Japan’s US policy: engaging 
the USA economically, and securing a US military presence in the region. The USA 
was included in APEC at the behest of Japan, citing economics, politics and 
security, in its reasons for insistence on US membership. In terms of economics, 
the USA provides a large and reliable market for Asian goods. The USA’s recent 
tendency towards protectionism could mean the loss of a large export market, and 
limited access to the Americas. The Japanese government values the fact that the
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APEC forum encourages the USA and other members of NAFTA to remain active in 
the Asia Pacific region.
APEC also allows Japan to deal with the USA from an equitable perspective. The 
Japanese government believes that the USA uses bullying tactics that resemble 
unilateralism, rather than bilateralism. The multilateral arrangement of APEC 
minimises unilateralism and heavy-handed threats by any member, as well as 
providing a ready made fora for conflict resolution that does not take twelve months 
to process as per the WTO.
APEC also plays a small part in Japan’s defence policy. The economic 
engagement of the USA in the Asia Pacific transcends into military engagement. If 
the USA remains economically engaged in the region, the US government will want 
it to remain secure and stable, and therefore will maintain a military presence. The 
Japanese government believes that a US presence is needed to stabilise Asia, but 
it also recognises that its presence helps ease Asian sensitivities to any change in 
Japanese power. APEC provides Japan with one way of keeping the USA engaged 
in the Asia Pacific region.
Japan’s commitment to globalisation translates easily into support for a forum like 
APEC. APEC, although regional and trade-focused, provides a platform on which 
Japan can promote its cooperative and leadership skills. Since the end of the Cold 
War, the Japanese government appears to be more willing to elevate itself from the 
status of a regional power to one of global political force. A greater emphasis on 
global political leadership, commensurate with its economic power, has lead the 
Japanese government to focus on assuming senior positions in large multilateral
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institutions. Obvious avenues for Japan to exercise a greater world role are existing 
multilateral organisations such as GATT, the UN and the WTO.
Some Japanese believe that APEC enables Japan to make positive steps towards 
leadership in the region, and perhaps beyond. This posture had been denied to 
Japan during the Cold War because of its wartime legacy in Asia and its 
subordination to the USA. Japan was keen to make a good impression as host of 
the Osaka leaders’ summit and commentators believe that Japan is prepared to 
make gradual concessions in order to maintain a good international profile. The 
Osaka summit assumed an ‘Asian approach’ to decision-making that indicated 
deference to Asia and independence from a unilateralist USA. Some 
commentators believe that Japan wanted to show Asia that it is prepared to take a 
stand on its behalf, as well as demonstrate its diplomatic and political skills to the 
world as a whole. Japanese press coverage suggests that such perceptions were 
shared by many Japanese people. This thesis has identified some of Japan’s 
foreign policy goals. These are not only manifested in APEC participation, but can 
also be seen in Japan’s desire to assume a permanent seat on the UNSC, as well 
as in its interest in carving out a role in other large multinational institutions. 
Although APEC has a smaller structure than institutions like the WTO, the World 
Bank and UN, it gives Japan a platform on which to demonstrate its leadership 
skills within Asia to Western leaders.
It is important to keep the significance of APEC to Japan in perspective. The 
subsequent decline of media interest in APEC in 1996 may not necessarily indicate 
a decline in interest in the goals of APEC, so much as reflect APEC’s relatively 
minor role in overall Japanese foreign policy. Although APEC is part of Japanese 
foreign and economic policy, it is not ranked alongside the UN or WTO. However,
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the Japanese government supports this regional economic forum because it 
provides a useful platform for Japan to promote its more significant foreign policy 
initiatives, such as improving Japanese relations with Asia, maintaining US 
engagement in the Asia Pacific, and showing that Japan is ready to assume greater 
responsibility in world issues. Consequently, APEC is currently valued by the 
Japanese government for the support it brings to Japan’s foreign policy strategies
for the future.
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Appendix A: A Chronology of Japanese History and APEC
Year Significant Events in Modern Japanese & APEC History
1919 Japan recognised at Paris Peace Conference as one of the ‘Big Five’(USA, UK, 
France & Italy)
1920s Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) established by Nitobe Inazo
1921 In parallel to League of Nations, Asia Pacific countries meet in Washington to enact 
naval disarmament.
1943 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere discussed in Japan. Japanese colonies 
already included Korea and Manchuria.
1955 Japan admitted to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Bandung Conference - African & Asian countries launched Non-Aligned Movement.
1956 Japan admitted to membership of the United Nations.
Restored diplomatic relations with USSR.
1960 Revised US/Japan Security Treaty comes into force.
1964 Japan joined the OECD.
1965 Treaty on relations with the Republic of Korea signed.
1966 Tokyo Conference - Southeast Asia Development Ministerial Conference.
1967 ASEAN formally established.
1972 Joint statement issued by the governments of Japan and China establishing diplomatic 
relations.
1974 Anti-Japanese demonstrations in Bangkok & Jakarta
1975 Japanese Prime Minister attends first G7 summit in France.
1977 ASEAN-Japan Forum, Manila.
1979 Japan chairs G7 summit in Tokyo.
1970-80s NIE development
1980 PECC established.
1987 Japanese MITI minister calls for a ‘Pacific Rim Trade & Industrial’ ministerial body.
1988 Japanese PM Takeshita instructs MITI to explore the prospects for economic 
cooperation in Asia Pacific. MITI launches a study, under Sakamoto.
Sakamoto Report is released (includes warnings against trading blocs).
Japan & Australia informally discuss the findings of Sakamoto Report.
1989 Australian PM Hawke announces plan to create APEC. Writes to region to explain 
proposal.
MITI seeks to gauge support in the region for APEC concept.
Japan does not publicly advocate APEC until June, when MITI minister Mitsuzuka 
becomes Foreign minister.
USA announces support for APEC, June.
ASEAN endorses APEC, July.
APEC inaugurated at ministerial conference in Canberra. Twelve economies present, 
November.
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1990 2nd APEC Ministerial Meeting - Singapore.
Special APEC trade ministerial convened to discuss deadlock in the Uruguay Round of 
GATT.
Malaysian PM Mahathir proposes the East Asia Economic Group (EAEG), December. 
1991, January Hong Kong, Taiwan & PRC agree to join APEC.
EAEG becomes East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC).
3rd APEC Ministerial Meeting, November. 15 member economies. (Includes Hong 
Kong, China and Taiwan.)
1992 Japanese Self Defence Forces (600 personnel) sent to Cambodia with UN.
Australian Prime Minister Keating recommends APEC be elevated to the leaders level.
Fourth APEC ministerial meeting - Bangkok. USA does not send ministerial level 
delegate. Foreign ministers from Japan, Canada and Malaysia do not attend.
Secretariat and Eminent Persons Group (EPG) established.
Special taiks held to help stimulate the Uruguay Round to a successful resolution.
1993 President Clinton proposes an APEC leaders’ summit in Seattle.
ASEAN Regional Forum officially established. Includes six ASEAN nations and seven 
observers.
First APEC informal leaders’ summit held in November.
PNG and Mexico are included as members of APEC. (17 members)
GATT Uruguay Round completed in December.
1994 APEC ministerial and leaders’ meeting held in Bogor, Indonesia. ‘Bogor Declaration’ 
accepted by leaders. PM Kono puts forward Partners for Progress.
Chile becomes 18th member of APEC.
NAFTA activated.
First ARF meeting held.
1995 Japanese PM Murayama urges counterparts to make progress at the Osaka summit a 
personal priority.
US-Japan auto trade dispute.
Rape of Okinawan school girl by US military service personnel.
APEC ministerial and leaders’ meeting held in Osaka during November. President 
Clinton does not attend, due to domestic political crisis.
1996 China holds live missile testing in seas off Taiwan.
Okinawa refuses to sign land lease for US bases.
President Clinton visits Japan and South Korea during April. US-Japan security 
alliance renewed.
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Appendix B: Graphs
Month Number of APEC Articles
The Nikkei 
Weekly
The Japan Times Gaiko Forum Shukan Toyo  
Keizai
Jan-89 0 0 0
Feb-89 0 0 0
Mar-89 1 0 0
Apr-89 0 0 0
May-89 0 0 0
Jun-89 0 0 0
Jul-89 1 0 0
Aug-89 0 0 0
Sep-89 0 0 0
Oct-89 0 0 0
Nov-89 6 1 0
Dec-89 2 1 0
Jan-90 0 0 0
Feb-90 2 0 0
Mar-90 0 0 0
Apr-90 o 0 0
May-90 1 1 0
Jun-90 0 0 0
Jul-90 0 0
Aug-90 0 0
Sep-90 7 7 0
Oct-90 0 0
Nov-90 0 0
Dec-90 0 0 0
Jan-91 0 0 0
Feb-91 0 8 0
Mar-91 0 1 0
Apr-91 0 0 0
May-91 0 0 0
Jun-91 0 1 1
Jul-91 0 0 1
Aug-91 1 0 0 1
Sep-91 1 0 0 0
Oct-91 2 2 0 0
Nov-91 2 10 0 2
Dec-91 1 1 0 0
Jan-92 2 0 2 0
Feb-92 1 0 0 0
Mar-92 0 0 0 0
Apr-92 1 1 0 0
May-92 0 1 0 0
Jun-92 1 1 0 0
Jul-92 1 0 0 0
Aug-92 3 1 0 0
Sep-92 2 9 0 0
Oct-92 1 0 5 1
Nov-92 1 0 0 0
Dec-92 1 0 1 1
Jan-93 0 0 0 2
Feb-93 2 1 0 0
Mar-93 4 0 0 1
Apr-93 0 1 0 0
May-93 3 3 6 1
Jun-93 1 o o 1
Jul-93 7 8 1 0
Aug-93 4 2 0 0
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M onth N um ber of A P E C  A rtic les
The N ikkei 
W eekly
The Japan  T im es G aiko  Forum S hukan  T o yo  
K eizai
Sep-93 5 4 0 0
Oct-93 9 5 0 0
Nov-93 17 47 0 4
Dec-93 4 2 0 3
Jan-94 4 2 1 0
Feb-94 5 1 0 0
Mar-94 8 8 1 0
Apr-94 1 2 0 0
May-94 3 1 0 0
Jun-94 1 2 0 1
Jul-94 0 2 0 1
Aug-94 4 6 0 1
Sep-94 1 11 0 0
Oct-94 3 18 0 2
Nov-94 12 42 0 6
Dec-94 5 7 3 0
Jan-95 5 4 0 1
Feb-95 4 10 1 1
Mar-95 3 4 0 0
Apr-95 4 12 4 0
May-95 6 12 2 0
Jun-95 5 8 0 0
Jul-95 7 8 0 0
Aug-95 2 9 o 1
Sep-95 3 15 0 1
Oct-95 7 31 10 1
Nov-95 25 115 0 3
Dec-95 6 7 2 2
Jan-96 4 2 2 0
Feb-96 3 0 2 0
Mar-96 12 5 0 o
Apr-96 7 1 2
May-96 6 7 1 2
Jun-96 7 3 4 0
Jul-96 4 9 1 0
Aug-96 5 0 0
Sep-96 2 1 0 0
Oct-96 1 8 0 0
Nov-96 0 0 0
Dec-96 2 0 1
Total 254 491 70 45
Max 25 115 10 6
Annual
Summary
1989 0 10 . 0
1990 0 10 8 0
1991 7 13 10 5
1992 14 13 8 2
1993 56 73 7 12
1994 47 102 5 11
1995 77 235 19 10
1996 53 35 11 5
Total 254 491 70 45
Note: No records available where blank
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Appendix C: Article Titles from Surveyed Journals
The Nikkei Weekly
Data collected electronically from Reuter Business Briefing, 1996-97.
1992 (data not available prior to 1992)
January
‘Asia forum cutting political teeth’
‘Japanese government to promote training 
for APEC personnel’
February
‘Summit Leaders leave hard act to follow’
April
‘Government to seek permanent office for 
APEC’
June
‘Asia Pacific Economic group to establish 
permanent secretariat’
July
‘New Regional body to monitor damage 
from use of coal’
August
‘Goal is strengthening economic ties in 
Asia Pacific region’
‘Osaka lobbying to be seat of Asia forum’s 
secretariat’
‘APEC members considering summit’
September
‘Leaders agree on need for strong Asia 
Pacific forum’
‘APEC ‘experiment’ will dictate region’s 
role - our view’
October
‘MITI urges economics over politics in 
Asia’
November
‘East Asia tipped to be economic driving 
force’
December
‘Kansai sees future lying in business 
training - Management seminars target 
developing nations’
1993
February
‘APEC completes transition from informal 
to formal’
‘Japan seeking to strengthen ties in Asia’
March
‘Asia card aids Keating election victory - 
Australian PM affirms commitment to 
region’
‘APEC membership to expand’
‘APEC sees action on trade liberalization 
before year-end’
‘Australia asks Japan to boost regional 
trade’
May
‘The 10 goals of the US’s Asia policy as 
outlined by Winston Lord’
‘Malaysian premier claims EAEC would 
foster liberalization’
‘APEC mulls standardization as way to 
promote trade’
June
‘APEC advisers claim progress in talks on 
economic union’
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‘ASEAN fails to agree on trade forum - 
ministers delay decision on how to 
organize trade caucus’
‘Mahathir refuses to budge on APEC 
summit - Malaysian PM tells Suharto 
he won’t be going’
‘ASEAN to rule on East Asian trade forum’
‘Leaders divided on APEC invitation’
‘Clinton’s Asia policy must take local 
sensibilities into account - our view’
‘Clinton spotlights APEC in summit bid - 
US leaders outlines policy on Pacific 
Rim’
‘US initiative gets mixed response in Asia’
August
‘Australia looks toward Asia in economic 
restructuring’
‘Hosokawa administration faces full slate 
of pressing issues - our view’
‘ASEAN may expand trade forum’
‘ASEAN settles rift over trade forum’
September
‘Hosokawa, Kim to meet in US’
‘Keating courts Washington with Asia 
Pacific trade pitch’
‘East Asia Economic Caucus finds life - 
EAEC proposed amid global trend 
toward economic blocs’
‘APEC offered joint research’
‘Suharto active player on international 
stage - ties with US remain on shaky 
ground’
October
‘APEC meeting seen as chance to rethink 
Asia’
‘Asia Pacific community can become a 
functioning reality - our view’
‘Li Peng rejects pressure on N. Korea - 
sees Seattle meet as chance to ease 
tension with US’
‘Officials finalize Hosokawa trip to S. 
Korea’
‘ASEAN ministers agree on caucus 
membership - EAEC moves closer to 
light of day’
‘Suharto to attend APEC Seattle summit’
‘Jiang to hold talks with Clinton’
‘Hosokawa, Clinton easygoing - so far’
November
‘APEC comes of age - summit meeting 
seen affirming Asia as economic entity, 
player in new power game’
‘Japan must redefine role in Asia - China, 
US challenge Tokyo’s dominance’
‘Asian unease over US role in APEC 
requires rethinking of region’s goals - 
our view’
‘Growth called key to Pacific cooperation’
‘Thatcher raps EC protectionism, sees 
likelihood of free China’
‘APEC majority resists target date for free 
trade - many prefer loose alliance to 
formal institution’
‘Clinton lauds Hosokawa’s political 
initiatives’
‘Enter the century of the Asia Pacific - 
Cooperation is central to continued 
prosperity’
‘Asian APEC nations, US differ on free- 
trade time goal’
‘Tokyo set to play APEC mediator - US, 
Asian expected to take divergent 
stands on issues’
‘MITI claims main behind-the-scenes role 
in group’s founding’
‘Evans- point man for ‘middle-power’ - 
Australian minister carries banner 
against protectionism’
‘Australia accused on ignoring Pacific 
Isles’
‘Malaysian trade minister to attend Seattle 
meeting’
‘APEC - bold vision, bad vibes - free-trade 
proposal causes anxiety in Southeast 
Asia’
‘New Trade vehicle on APEC agenda’
‘A reprieve on US construction sanctions’
‘Jiang to hold talks with Clinton’
Appendix C: The Nikkei Weekly 112
December
‘Security, trade issues see major shift in 
focus’
‘Mahathir’s criticism of US strikes a chord 
in Asia - row with Australia underlines 
frustration’
‘US learning art of compromise in drive to 
forge Asia Pacific trade community’
‘Keating offers olive branch to Mahathir’
1994
January
‘Malaysia pushes free trade - Anwar 
pursues AFTA cause during visit to 
Indonesia’
‘Rusli to head APEC forum’
‘Bureaucratic power has origins in poor 
quality of politicians’
‘Tokyo mulls participation in East Asian 
Economic Caucus - Shift in stance 
could strain ties with US’
February
‘West accused of using human rights to 
stifle free trade’
‘Impact of prolonged trade dispute will 
extend beyond Japan and the US - our 
view’
‘Singh stresses political stability - lower 
import tariffs in the pipeline’
‘China warning ignored as Suharto meets 
Lee’
‘Japan must remain globally engaged - 
narrow focus on Asia runs risk of 
creating instability’
March
‘Taiwan economic regeneration plan aims 
to turn island into Asia Pacific hub’
‘Aloha spirit at APEC seen short-lived - 
major issues unresolved among 
member entities’
‘Japan’s tilt to Asia gaining momentum - 
region’s integration will cause shift in 
global power balance’
‘Agency keen to promote science’s 
answer to APEC - region could team 
up for nuclear space research’
‘APEC business leaders to hold forum’
‘How to foster free trade in the Pacific - 
Umbrella organization would lead to 
global economic integration’
‘Japan to support GATT entry of Taiwan, 
China at APEC’
‘Policy alignment not on agenda for APEC 
summit’
April
‘Europe’s future linked with Asia - 
Cooperation the key to mutual 
prosperity’
May
‘US learning art of compromise in drive to 
forge Asia Pacific trade community’
‘Business group seeks APEC observer 
status’
‘Concessions needed to avoid trade war 
with US’
June
‘Southeast Asia sees prosperity in unity’
August
‘APEC sets guides for foreign investment’
‘APEC sets 2020 goal for free-trade pact’
‘Vietnam looks for ASEAN membership in 
‘95’
‘Clinton’s short shrift of Asia could bring 
future rift with region’
September
‘Free-trade trend gathers momentum’
October
‘China says GATT rejection could hurt 
APEC’
‘Nuclear blast roils Tokyo-Beijing ties - 
China’s test comes on heels of Taiwan 
leader’s Japan visit’
‘Aiming to resolve potential energy threat’
November
‘Multilateral forum the best way to resolve 
Spratlys dispute’
‘’Casual’ APEC gets stamp of formality’
‘East Timor protest dims Indonesia’s 
limelight’
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‘Creation of APEC free-trade zone will 
take discipline, flexibility’
‘Broad agreement at APEC summit likely 
to get bogged down in the details’
‘Japan fears APEC open trade unrealistic 
goal- Group OKs principle, but no 
blueprint’
‘Mahathir-Suharto rift threatens APEC 
unity - ‘Malaysian leader remains vocal 
opponent of regional forum’
‘Japan must get off fence regarding 
APEC’
‘US or Asia? At APEC, Japan pressed to 
show hand’
‘Indonesia uses APEC limelight to trumpet 
gas venture - Exxon to sign 
development deal for Natuna’
‘Suharto presses free trade on summit 
eve - Malaysia, China holding out 
against timetable’
‘Free-trade zone to be backed - vaguely - 
Japan in role between Asian 
neighbours and US’
December
‘Complacent Japan in danger of being 
eclipsed by others - strategic ties with 
US must remain strong’
‘Keidanren officials step behind EAEC’
‘Murayama trip to US aimed at 
‘relaunching’ bilateral relationship’
‘Mahathir presses for Asian initiatives - 
Premier wants trade group with or 
without Japan’
‘APEC should return to original objectives 
- US efforts to reshape forum not in 
interests of Japan’
1995
January
‘Elections needed to restore stability’
‘Asia Pacific needs a Japan with 
backbone’
‘Summit sets for softer tone for Japan-US 
relations’
‘Cooperation sought from China, 
Malaysia’
‘Murayama’s trip to US a bid to forestall 
tensions - domestic concerns may 
distract Clinton’
February
‘Japan should try to bridge gap between 
APEC members on trade’
‘Multilateral forums are OK, but don’t 
scrap US-Japan pact’
‘In race for growth, Kyushu bets on Asia’s 
mad-dash economies’
‘Japan’s APEC initiative shifts focus’
March
‘Osaka shoots for sharper image - city 
wants to raise its international profile’
‘MITI to help APEC members foster small, 
midsize firms’
‘ASEAN trade spurring growth among 
members’
April
‘Premier says India will push for APEC 
membership’
‘APEC trade talks pit action against 
caution’
‘APEC studies currency-stabilization fund- 
plan would rely on special drawing 
rights’
‘Dalai Lama visit [to Japan] approved 
despite Chinese protest’
May
‘Mondale cites hope for auto settlement’
‘Aid offered for building of nuclear power 
plants’
‘Japan fears China backlash from US’s 
Taiwan Shock”
‘Japan is urged to back US presence in 
Asia’
‘Asian nations reject US demand for ‘open 
skies”
‘Murayama expressed ‘deep repentance 
for the intolerable pain”
June
‘Seeking free trade, APEC must now get 
down to details’
‘Australian vision of Indian Ocean Council 
seeks to join patchwork of cultures’
‘Now it’s Japan’s turn to welcome 
stopover by Taiwan’s President’
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‘Next ambassador to US expected to be 
Saito’
Taiwan President hints at desire to visit 
Japan for APEC meet, but chance of 
Tokyo OK is slim’
July
‘EU ‘free-ride’ issue divides APEC’
‘Local leaders aim to build info hub’
‘Local governments boosting Kansai as 
future summit venue’
‘APEC summit will give region a chance to 
show off its strengths’
‘Asia will become locomotive of growth for 
rest of the world, Mahathir predicts’
‘New groupings build up trading regime, 
block by block’
‘Defusing domestic and cross-border 
tensions key to sustained prosperity’
August
‘On China policy, Japan takes off kid 
gloves’
‘Japan’s job at APEC summit is to inject 
‘Asian way’ of doing things’
September
‘Another dragon roars as Malaysian 
economy takes off’
‘APEC struggles to nail down free trade’
‘Deregulation will have impact beyond 
Japan’s borders’
October
‘Expectations of APEC riding too high’
‘Osaka hotels ready red carpet for APEC’
‘Japan risks damage in long run by 
sticking to demand for rice exemption’
‘Kansai spiffs up for APEC summit’
‘Kim urges end to North Korea rice aid’
‘As host nation, Japan criticized for 
divisive flip-flop’
‘Murayama’s SDP trapped between rock 
and a hard place’
November
‘Malaysian Premier decides to attend 
Osaka summit’
‘Japan expects to close APEC rift’
‘Organization a big player by any measure 
- APEC forum’
‘Osaka tightens security for APEC meet’
‘Kansai firms establishing production 
bases in Asia’
‘Japanese companies are stepping up 
efforts to operate on a pan-Asian 
scale’
‘APEC - technology shift stymied by 
copycats’
‘APEC - China to seek exemptions to 
liberalization’
‘Background to the formation of APEC’
‘Leaders to iron out differences on trade’
‘APEC forum the fruit of years of 
preparation’
‘APEC objectives’
‘The Bogor Declaration’
‘Osaka forum to leave free-trade vague’
‘Clinton’s no-show leaves its mark’
‘Action agenda addresses small issues 
first’
‘Perry urges deeper security ties among 
US, Japan, China’
‘China poses no objection to Japan-US 
arms pact’
‘APEC agrees to remain ‘flexible’ on trade’
"Unseen hand’ enforces APEC free trade’
‘Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum 
meeting in Osaka November’
‘Australia raps US on agriculture trade’
‘Despite compromises, Osaka APEC 
meeting can be called a success’
‘Help offered to cut emissions in Asia’
‘APEC opening to security issues - Formal 
framework unlikely, but talks held on 
sidelines’
December
‘Asia, Europe can learn from each other’
‘Japanese must learn to face security 
matters head-on’
‘APEC says ‘no’ to open airline market’
‘Japan expertise vital to Asia’s financial 
growth’
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‘Flexibility key to success of APEC’
‘Keating predicts key role for APEC in 
world trading system’
1996
January
‘Market openings a tough sell for Manila’
‘Reluctance to loosen controls leads to 
stop-start liberalization’
February
EAEC idea born of frustration with west’
Summit agenda caught in Bangkok jam’
March
‘Mahathir visit to test ties with kinder, 
gentler Australia’
‘ASEAN at vanguard of region’s rapid 
growth’
‘Volatility in emerging-market currencies 
spells danger for global currency 
stability’
‘APEC forex agenda short on specifics’
‘Thailand seeks accords for currency 
stabilization’
‘MITI rising star hopes to shine in China’
‘Greater China looms over Asian 
economies, alliances’
‘Brazilian President’s visit brings trade, aid 
agreements’
‘For Asia-Europe summits to work, touchy 
issues must be addressed’
April
‘National-car edict stands to hurt 
Indonesia’s credibility abroad’
‘ASEAN moves to ease investment 
barriers’
‘Japanese couple opens home to 
journalists from Indonesia’
May
‘Government need persistence to ensure 
regional teamwork’
‘Ramos reaches for new peak at APEC 
summit’
‘Leaders confident, not complacent, on 
growth’
‘Bilateral pact could pave way for 
regionalism’
‘Region should expand student 
exchanges’
June
‘Group rejects trade plans - APEC officials 
indicate development to become more 
important for group’
‘APEC should take opportunity to send a 
message for free trade’
‘Japan faces balancing act with Taiwan’
‘Leaders express hopes and concerns on 
what lies ahead for a region in dynamic 
change’
July
‘Japanese adviser accuses US of playing 
‘trade games”
"Free Trade’ is a tricky banner to unfurl’
‘Asian investors find their niche in 
Australia’
Chile’s exporters target Asia, slash 
reliance on copper’
‘New trade deadline allows brief breather’
August
‘Four nations blaze trail for freer trade’
‘Australia seeks to embrace both US, 
Asia’
‘Mongolian President Ochirbat seeks 
closer ties with US’
‘Election seems likely before end of year’
‘Indonesia to stay stable, Suharto vows’
September
‘Japan backs Peru’s APEC bid’
‘APEC meeting avoids nuclear question’
October
‘Japan, US to resume insurance talks’
November
(No reports!)
December
‘APEC summit shows group’s limitations- 
free trade hesitancy, lack of
enforcement cloud forum’s future’
‘WTO seeks united front in Singapore’
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The Japan Times (Bound Volume)
1989
January
‘Australia, Japan vow partnership’
‘Events planned to promote partnership in 
Asia Pacific’
‘Australia gets more Asia-conscious’
February
‘Hawke calls for Asia Pacific economic 
bloc talks’
‘Australia asks Japan to help buiid forum 
for cooperation in Asia’
‘Hawke, Gandhi hold talks in New Delhi; 
Asians told to unite’
March
‘Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Pact: 
MITI is asked to draft Asia Pacific 
treaty’
April
‘Asian Leaders favour economic bloc’
‘Idea of Asian trade bloc gaining favour’
May
‘Australian cooperation plan divides 
ministries: MITI at odds with the 
Foreign Ministry over idea for regional 
economic solidarity’
‘Japan is urged to weigh role as world 
trade shifts to Asia’
‘Asia to be economic leaders, investor 
says’
June
‘Pacific Rim cooperation urged: Agency 
envisions Asia Pacific free trade zone’
July
‘ASEAN allies to urge economic dialogue’
‘Pacific Rim grouping, China issue raised 
at Brunei talks’
‘Envoys from ten Asia Pacific regions ask 
Uruguay Round wrap up in ‘90’
‘Events to focus on regional exchange 
PP21’
August
‘Australia slates summit talks to 
strengthen Asia Pacific ties’
‘Hawke hawking to form cooperative Asia 
Pacific institution’
‘Hill says she favours Asia Pacific trading 
group’
‘Hong Kong to join talks in regional 
economic ties’
October
‘ASEAN cool to Pan-Pacific cooperation’
‘Asia Pacific economic meeting set’
November
‘Twelve Pacific Rim ministers set to meet 
in Australia to plan formation of new 
bloc’
‘ASEAN countries approve new Pacific 
economic area plan’
‘Asia Pacific economic body inaugurated’
‘Asia Pacific ministers send a message of 
commitment’
‘Official travels to Australia for talks on 
regional trade’
‘Pacific Rim nations mix formation of 
trading bloc’
December
‘Gathering in Singapore to promote 
cooperation of twelve Asia Pacific 
states’
‘Mexico seeks support for Asia Pacific 
role’
1990
February
‘Envoy sees more need for Pacific 
cooperation’
‘Japan may back Vietnam for Asia 
economic body’
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May
‘Region to cooperate on telecom projects’
(copies of The Japan Times Bound 
Edition July, August, October and 
November 1990 were missing)
September
‘ASEAN, Canada ask Japan to open 
agricultural market; Diet should think 
again, Muto says’
‘Farm trade remains problem for APEC’
‘Flexibility urged in setting intellectual 
property rules’
‘Japan’s trade hit at APEC meeting’
‘GATT round failure couls threaten 
region’s prosperity’
‘Muto makes no concession on rice ban’
‘Trade plan rejected’
1991
January
‘Malaysia’s hasty plan for Asian alternative 
to GATT’
April
‘Ramos says economic cooperation is key 
to Asia Pacific area’s security’
‘Soviet leader to propose Asia Pacific 
conference’
‘Australian minister rejects Malaysia’s 
trade bloc plan’
‘Japan leadership urged for Asian bloc 
plan’
Nakao wary of East Asia bloc plan’
October
‘Malaysia sets the record straight’
‘Pan-Pacific traders must face reality of 
Asia’s common interests’
November
‘APEC seen evolving into political body’
‘APEC to mull new memberships in Seoul 
meet’
‘Asia needs a wider pacific regionalism’
‘Editorial: In praise of open regionalism’
‘Hills in Seoul for talks on trade in Pacific 
Rim’
‘Baker tells Asian ministers at talks US 
interest in region undiminished’
‘Ministers set to debut at meeting in Seoul’
‘MITI chief, foreign minister leave for 
meeting of APEC’
‘Pacific Rim chiefs pledge resolve on 
GATT talks’
‘Pacific Rim ministers urge GATT 
compromise’
1992
April
‘Australia, Indonesia mending their fences’
May
‘Miyazawa said to back regular APEC 
summits’
June
‘APEC agrees on permanent secretariat’
August
‘Japan’s plan for APEC revealed’
September
‘A divided APEC gropes for a place in the 
world’
‘Analysis: Some balk at broadening APEC 
forum’
‘APEC may already be outdated’
‘APEC ministers appeal for end to trade 
round’
‘Asia Pacific body urges agreement in 
trade talks; ’95 meeting in Japan’
‘Four nations vie to provide a home for 
Economic Cooperation forum’
‘Japan to voice worries over NAFTA’
‘Keating to stress trade in talks with 
Miyazawa’
‘Miyazawa backs Keating proposal for 
Pacific summit’
October
‘US official omits Japan from list of Asia 
Pacific free trade candidates’
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‘Malaysia presses Japan on East Asian 
grouping’
November
Tokyo proposes talks over trade bloc 
fears’
Trade talks will be held in Seoul’
1993
February
‘Japan, Australia seek to open APEC’
April
‘APEC should focus on trade’
May
‘Economic Impact: APEC is a vision for 
the Pacific century’
‘Seattle APEC summit considered’
‘US seeks Japan’s approval to upgrade 
APEC to summit’
July
‘APEC leaders endorse summit’
‘APEC urged to strengthen’
‘Asian bloc looks for a home’
‘Backing seen for upgrade of APEC’
‘Japan will ask ASEAN to back APEC 
summit’
‘Malaysia rejects call for APEC summit’
‘Malaysia won’t attend Asia Pacific 
summit, Suharto heads for home’
‘US airs possible APEC date’
August
‘APEC: too good to be true?’
‘Ecuador eyes APEC for economic ties’
September
‘Informal APEC talks seen likely to 
proceed’
‘Nations play political chess’
Technology transfer plan to be urged at 
APEC meet’
‘US rosy on possible Asia meeting’
October
‘Jiang will meet Kim in Seattle’
‘Keating urges Suharto to attend APEC 
summit’
‘Malaysia wants ASEAN to decide on 
APEC’s future direction’
‘Panel favours free trade for Asia Pacific 
region’
‘US sharpens focus on Pacific trade as 
host of APEC’
November
‘APEC winds up high-level meet’
‘APEC hopeful in Seattle’
‘China wants APEC to avoid focusing on 
values and rights’
‘Clinton takes the reigns in guiding 
unprecedented meeting of APEC’
‘Don’t miss APEC boat, think tank tell US’
‘Economic Impact: The last economic 
frontier’
‘Editorial: The Pacific adventure begins’
‘Fate of NAFTA casts shadow on APEC 
meet’
‘Finance ministers to greet in spring’
‘From the Vernacular Press: APEC
perception gap’
‘Gradual Asia development to be urged’
‘Hosokawa APEC vision seen fighting 
trade blocs’
‘Hosokawa will propose cultural exchange 
forum’
‘Japan plans APEC proposal’
‘Japan will urge APEC to focus on Asia 
business’
‘Larger APEC trade role seen’
‘Mahathir sticks to his vision for Asia’
‘Mexico and Papua New Guinea join’
‘NAFTA rejection could thrash US plans in 
Pacific Rim’
‘Progress on trade is vital, Evans says’ 
‘Special statement on tariff cuts expected’ 
The post-Atlantic world takes shape’
‘US to call for APEC fiscal unity’
‘Japan aims to be mediator’
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‘Mixed feelings greet US moves’
‘Action on Uruguay Round urged’
‘APEC backs global trade pact plan’
‘APEC ministers urged to create 
‘community”
‘APEC split on creating Pacific Rim trade 
bloc’
‘APEC summit leaders pledge to create 
closer economic ties’
‘APEC summit under way; Japan to stress 
integration’
‘Canadian prime minister plays down rifts 
with US’
‘Clinton passes up benefit concert’
‘Growth principles proposed’
‘Hosokawa restates need for stimulus’
‘Hosokawa, Goh say APEC should be 
loosely knit body’
‘Jiang says world needs China’
‘Kim, Clinton to discuss North Korean 
threat’
‘Major points of statement issued by 
APEC ministers’
‘No plan to isolate China, Clinton says’
‘Pacific leaders get to know each other at 
retreat’
‘Pacific leaders shatter the calm of Blake 
Island; Dressing for success’
‘Presidents of China, S. Korea meet, 
discuss North Korean nuclear issue’
‘US proposes trade haven in Pacific via 
APEC; Two new members’
‘APEC’s economic vision statement’
APEC Summit ‘Gist of Statement’
‘Full text of declaration on APEC’
December
‘Editorial: A concept with a future’
‘The EC surveys its options’
Tokyo to decide on EAEC next year’
1994
January
‘APEC ministers to meet in March’ 
‘Bensten announces Hawaii APEC meet’
February
‘Malaysia names representative for APEC 
panel’
March
‘APEC finance minsters agree on future 
course; APEC’s five principles’
‘APEC finance ministers debut Hawaii 
meeting set’
‘APEC financial meeting kicks off’
‘APEC nations ill at ease over hints US 
may delay agreed tariff cuts’
‘Fuji emphasizes capital markets’
‘Pacific Rim forecasted for 4.1 % growth 
in ’94; Hosokawa address’
‘Pacific Rim nations to meet on 
environment’
‘Colombia eyes APEC membership’
April
‘APEC members to meet in Osaka’
‘Japan plans to host APEC meeting’
May
‘[PBEC] Council to apply to join APEC as 
an observer; Mahathir to attend’
June
‘Annual business meeting set for October 
in Osaka’
‘Fujimori voices wish for APEC 
membership’
‘Malaysian Ambassador raps Japan over 
EAEC’
‘US directly states opposition to proposed 
East Asian caucus; Japan to host talks’
July
‘Keating promises further integration with 
Asia’
‘Russia asks for invitation to APEC talks’
‘Japan invited to economic caucus’
‘Japan to attend luncheon on EAEC’
‘Malaysia seeks EAEC commitment’
‘The Global Perspective: Japan’s quiet 
snub of EAEC makes sense’
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August
‘APEC official report urges trade bloc on 
Pacific Rim’
‘APEC panel calls for slower trade 
liberalization’
‘APEC urged to establish free trade by 
year 2000’
‘Arbitrating body urged for APEC’
‘Osaka to host APEC in ‘95’
The Global Perspective: APEC opts for 
intelligent liberalization’
‘EAEC idea called dead’
‘Mahathir rallies support for EAEC’
‘Malaysia continues to push for EAEC’
September
‘An Asian way for APEC’
‘APEC OKs draft of investment rules’
‘APEC urged to aim for unity’
‘APEC urged to draw up specific trade 
plan by ‘95’
‘Can Keating be APEC’s honest broker?’
‘Huge Asia Pacific trade zone backed in 
report to Suharto’
‘Japanese Perspective: Business charts 
course for Asia Pacific network’
‘The Global Perspective: APEC defies the 
odds, so far’
‘The Global Perspective: Can APEC read 
its roadmap?’
‘Singapore backs India in joining APEC’
‘Japan may inherit burden of trade 
liberalization plan pledged for APEC 
nations’
October
(15 titles missing)
‘APEC ministers to focus on small firms’
‘Guest Forum: APEC thrashes out its 
goals; Japan’s role by Ippei 
Yamazawa’
‘Japan to propose APEC energy body’
‘Malaysia reassures US on EAEC’
November
‘APEC aims at free trade’
‘APEC backs trade code’
‘APEC business panel seen’
‘APEC chiefs eye ‘immediate action”
‘APEC confirms capitalism advancing 
slowly but surely’
‘APEC energy meeting planned’
‘APEC is pinning high hopes on upcoming 
Jakarta meet’
‘APEC misses out on Asia’
‘APEC to set free trade target’
‘APEC trade bloc slow but sure’
‘APEC’s ministers leave trade timetable to 
leaders’
‘Canada launches investment program in 
Indonesia’
‘Clinton spells out conditions for trade 
links with China’
‘Clinton urged to push Indonesian rights’
‘Declaration highlights’
‘Economic Impact: America’s Asian pipe 
dream’
‘Economic Impact: Is APEC too
ambitious?’
‘Economist weighs impact of free-trade 
agreement among APEC members’
‘Editorial: APEC, the bilateral dimension’
‘Editorial: Between the idea and the reality’
‘Forum to act on product standards, draft 
shows’
‘Full text of Bogor Declaration issued by 
APEC leaders’
‘Gist of statements’
‘Indonesia hopes APEC forum will help its 
image’
‘Japan to take subtle lead in APEC’
‘Jiang reassured of one-China policy’
‘Mahathir hits APEC’s plans for free trade’
‘Mahathir Mohamad: Asia’s odd man out’
‘Malaysia voices strong reservations’
‘Murayama to urge APEC to cooperate 
on trade’
‘Murayama , Clinton back free-trade 
plan’
‘South Korean President Kim to attend 
APEC summit’
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Taiwan official to attend summit’
The Global Perspective: Help Indonesia 
to be free’
The Global Perspective: A reversion to 
authoritarianism in Indonesia’
The Global Perspective: APEC wonders if 
10 years is enough’
The Global Perspective: Bulding a real 
Asia Pacific community’
The Global Perspective: Indonesia under 
the microscope’
The Global Perspective: It’s the East 
Asian economy, stupid’
The Global Perspective: Less rhetoric, 
more reality for APEC’
The Global Perspective: No reason to 
fear APEC’
Tokyo to complete action guideline’
‘China restates support for EAEC’
‘Repay debts with leadership, not money’
December
‘APEC meeting to be held in November’
‘APEC states urged to see union as loose 
regional identity’
‘Editorial Sampler: A welcome vision of 
the region’s future’
Ex-assistant trade representative may be 
first US envoy to APEC’
‘Firms asked to fund Osaka APEC 
gathering’
‘Japanese Perspective: Basic economics 
not limited by national borders’
The Global Perspective: Helping the 
weak to help themselves’
EAEC: Endorsement of EAEC urged’
1995
January
‘APEC top priority for Osaka police’
‘Lee won’t join APEC summit; Japan tells 
China’
‘Mahathir sets conditions for attendance at 
APEC summit’
‘Osaka gears for APEC talks’
Frustrations increase over EAEC’
February
‘APEC cooperation plan proposed’
‘APEC delegates discuss trade action 
plan’
‘APEC holds special session on free 
trade’
‘APEC officials to meet in Fukuoka’
‘APEC officials vow efforts toward Osaka 
session’
‘EU envoy calls for APEC dialogue’
‘Seki to become APEC ambassador’
Thai chief seeks APEC intiative’
‘APEC wants trade pace set by Japan 
bridging US’
Tokyo to urge APEC to up developing 
states’ assistance’
March
‘APEC envoy plays balancing act’
‘Canada official urges concrete trade 
measures’
‘Japanese perspective: A practical
approach to global cooperation’
‘Russia to join APEC forum’
April
‘APEC discusses plans to enhance trade, 
investment’
‘APEC free-trade guidelines are sought’
‘APEC meet starts with call to stabilize 
monetary markets’
‘APEC ministers urge stability’
‘APEC set to focus on capital flow’
‘Finding balance in a tripolar world’
‘Forums set on trade, environment’
‘Japan is called on to lead green effort’
Talks on environment, trade urged at 
APEC’
The Global Perspective: APEC rightly 
chooses caution’
The Global Perspective: More than good 
intentions required’
‘US remains skeptical of economic 
package’
‘Japan to skip Phuket talks’
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‘Spokesman denies EAEC participation 
has been rejected’
May
(11 titles missing)
‘Japan urged to lead APEC’
June
‘APEC advising panel to back early tariff 
cuts’
‘APEC given draft of ‘Action Agenda”
‘APEC officials to work on free trade’
‘APEC will implement free trade plan in 
1997’
‘Group seeks say in APEC forum’
‘Jiang issues threat over APEC talks in 
Osaka’
‘Ministers may visit APEC members’
‘US lists major action plan for APEC 
summit in Osaka’
July
‘APEC members back plan to expand 
economic cooperation’
‘APEC seeks free trade consensus’
‘APEC seeks heightened cooperation’
‘Asia Pacific culture meeting planned’
‘Collective, individual action urged to help 
APEC advance’
‘Ministers planning to visit APEC states 
after election’
‘Taiwan deputy leader won’t get APEC 
invitation’
‘Philippines, Japan to push free trade in 
Pacific Rim’
August
‘Efforts mount to ensure success of 
Osaka’s November APEC forum’
‘Japan to urge APEC economic 
cooperation plan’
‘Lee angered by Tokyo’s APEC snub’
‘MITI to seek APEC funds’
‘Murayama mixes faster APEC trade 
liberalization’
‘Ramos calls on APEC to counter Europe’
‘Suharto vows to help APEC meeting’
‘The Global Perspective: Pursue the 
dream of APEC’
‘Green APEC proposal’
September
‘All-out free trade is difficult ideal’
‘APEC agrees on action program’
‘APEC summit should include Lee, Taipei 
says’
‘APEC’s focus changes as Asian nation 
liberalize markets’
‘ASEAN to work for fruitful APEC meet’
‘Australia confident on APEC pact’
‘Business urges APEC to adopt trade 
plans; Lee not invited’
‘Business urges APEC to move up world 
trade’
‘Expect change after APEC’
‘Osaka castle is groomed’
‘Readers are invited to APEC symposium’
‘Seminar to debate China’s future’
Tokyo may cut tariffs on some tropical 
imports’
‘US panel criticizes APEC trade outlines’ 
‘Will Osaka burst the APEC bubble?’
October
‘APEC disagreements go unresolved’
‘APEC members join Osaka parade’
‘APEC vague on farm trade’
‘Australians say US threatens region’s 
trade’
‘Credibility of APEC on the line at Osaka’
‘Editorial: APEC requires Japanese
consistency’
‘Farm trade thorn in APEC’s side’
‘Hopes high for APEC conference’
‘Japan and APEC: Trade moves closer to 
home’
‘Japan reiterates ban on Taiwan at APEC’
‘Japan searches for way to break APEC 
logjam’
‘Japan urged to take active role at APEC 
summit’
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‘Japanese Perspectives: Private sector 
plays key role for APEC’
‘Japanese Perspectives: Understanding 
key for APEC progress’
‘LDP explains farm stance to US’
‘Most bets are off during APEC’
‘Politicians may solve APEC summit 
problems’
Taipei urged to change APEC envoy’
‘The Global Perspective: APEC depends 
on political will’
The Global Perspective: No backsliding 
from the Bogor commitments’
Tokyo plan likely to draw APEC flak’
Top execs urge action plan to reach 
APEC goals’
Trade talks focus on APEC, autos’
‘Youth ecology talks at APEC time set’
November
‘APEC conference to remember’
‘A taste of Japan - from foreigners’
‘Accord was reached in many areas’
‘Action Agenda gist’
‘Activists set to advise APEC forum’
‘Agenda’s key role underlined’
‘Analysis: President’s decision shakes 
faith in US commitment’
‘APEC and post-Cold War world’
‘APEC chiefs exit, trade goals in hand; 
Philippines ‘ready”
‘APEC heads to start arriving in Osaka on 
Nov. 16’
‘APEC inconveniences hard to miss’
‘APEC leaders safe, police say’
‘APEC marks real progress’
‘APEC members fail to reach consensus 
on free trade’
‘APEC ministers agree on Action Agenda 
draft’
‘APEC moves towards farm trade 
agreement’
‘APEC must not hide behind ‘flexibility” 
‘APEC opts for Asian values’
‘APEC procurement info hits Internet’
‘APEC talks not just focused on 
liberlization: Hashimoto’
‘APEC voluntary approach praised’
‘ASEAN officials agree to talk more often’
‘Asian peace pinned on unity of Japan, 
US, South Korea; ‘Face up to past”
‘Aum may have been planning APEC hit; 
Suspended sentence’
Editorial ‘Australia calls for free trade; 
Mahathir supported; Taiwan issue’
‘Brittan lauds China’s plan to cut tariffs’
‘Buddhists protest Lee’s ban’
‘Canada opposes APEC exclusions; 
Voluntary free trade’
‘China rules out meeting with Taiwan 
representative’
‘China to unveil liberalization plan’
‘Clinton calls off meeting with Jiang’
‘Clinton cancellation disappoints Osaka’
‘Deal-making leaders fail at tea making’
‘Delegates play musical hotels’
‘Delegates play musical hotels’
‘Delegates’ wives tour the ‘kitchen”
‘East Timorese accuses Indonesia of 
harassment; Koreans squelched’
‘Editorial: An empty chair in Osaka’
‘Editorial: Making APEC work for
everyone’
‘Editorial: Real progress in Osaka’
‘Envoy meets Lee on APEC issue’
‘Espresso gets warm welcome’
‘Frei confident APEC is helping Chile’
‘From the Vernacular Press: An APEC 
opportunity’
‘Goal nonbinding, Rafidah reiterates; 
Ramos wants council; Japan urged to 
look at past correctly; Jiang, Ramos 
meet’
‘Hey guys, your job isn’t done, report says; 
Focus on economics’
‘Hotels gearing to put best foot, food 
forward for summiteers’
‘Human rights not addressed’
‘Initial Action plans of APEC members’
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‘Japan called weak on APEC liberalization 
drive’
‘Japan compromise set to end impasse’
‘Japan to maintain agriculture stance’
‘Japan unveils fund worth Y10 billion for 
APEC projects’
‘Japanese Perspectives: Osaka abuzz 
with behind-the-scenes prep work 
ahead of APEC meetings’
‘Kansai centre is disappointed’
‘Kantor indicates free-trade flexibility’
‘Keating seeks support for task force on 
security’
‘Kim, Jiang urge ’correct’ understanding of 
history’
‘Koreans here seethe as Kim arrives’
‘Leaders push liberalization’
‘Leader’s fashion sense less than keen’
‘Locals eye own agenda as leaders 
converge on Osaka’
‘Mahathir coming to APEC summit’
‘Maintaining momentum key to ensuring 
continued success’
‘Majority of APEC members enjoying 
steady economic growth’
‘Ministers unveil vision for APEC 
liberalization; Confrontation; Informal 
agenda’
‘Murayama hails ‘new chapter’ for region’
‘Murayama, Gore affirm security pact’
‘No-show may hurt future American 
influence over forum’
‘Nonbinding, voluntary commitments 
stressed’
‘Osaka ’95: success or failure?’
‘Osaka makes most of spotlight’
‘Osaka nightlife turns sour’
‘Osaka security a bother for locals’
‘Policies seen as farmers’ foes’
‘Post-APEC initiative urged’
‘Private sector gaining clout’
‘Prospective members in limbo’
‘Report sees liberalization bolstering 
APEC growth’
‘Representatives arrive, vow to cooperate’
‘Seeking greener pastures’
‘Seoul seeks special deal on farm trade’
‘Singapore stokes free-trade zeal’
‘Steps forward must be taken on equal, 
consultative basis’
‘Successful meetings don’t come cheap’
‘Talks on security possible: Murayama ; 
Ramos vows continuation’
‘Text of APEC ministers’ joint statement’
‘Thailand steps up APEC debate’
The Global Perspective: APEC and the 
benefits of free trade’
‘The Global Perspective: APEC moves 
slowly toward freer trade’
‘The Global Perspective: APEC must 
keep its eyes on the goal’
‘The Global Perspective: Clinton’s
absence at APEC damages US image’
‘The Global Perspective: The long and 
short of APEC’
‘Time not yet ripe for talks with China: 
Koo’
Time Out: Something fishy for APEC 
delegates’
Time to revive NEATO?’
Trade issues left for APEC heads; 
Taiwan negotiator’
Turmoil seen easing for Yokohama’
‘Unilateral, voluntary aspects key to 
APEC’
‘United executive raps Japan’s airline 
industry’
‘White House advance team arrives’
‘Will the environment survive APEC?’
"Few interested in Osaka meeting”
Perspectives on APEC:
‘Action, not rhetoric, will be the real litmus 
test’
‘Meeting to decide if APEC strengthens or 
stagnates’
The idiosyncrasies of East Asia must not 
be forgotten’
December
‘An active agenda except for human 
rights’
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‘APEC direct investment up’
‘APEC hoopla over but area still upbeat’
‘Editorial Sampler: APEC’s agenda tries to 
please everybody’
‘EU-Asia meet to be less formal than 
APEC, official says’
‘Japanese Perspectives: Osaka APEC 
meetings left great hopes for the 
future’
‘Japan urged to lead APEC by cutting 
trade barriers’
1996
January
‘APEC finance execs to meet Feb’
‘APEC ministers plan Kyoto gathering’
February
‘APEC-style trade eyed’
March
‘APEC to push dollar’
‘Currency stability backed; Main points of 
joint statement; APEC ministers urge 
macroeconomic prudence’
‘Hanoi visitor seeks APEC backing’
‘Indonesia to aid Pakistan in effort to join 
APEC’
‘The WTO should take a page from 
APEC’
April
(Data not available)
May
‘APEC eyes laws on chemical fishing’
‘APEC members agree to more liberalized 
trade’
‘APEC unanimous on more free trade’
‘Australian deputy chief urges Japan to 
keep up APEC role’
‘Businessmen named to APEC body’
‘Philippines prepare for APEC summit’
‘Ramos lauds benefits of APEC forum’
June
‘APEC corporate chiefs mull trade’
‘Business leaders from APEC call for freer 
travel, other trade reform’
‘MITI to start APEC energy studies group’
July
‘APEC backs new environment actions’
‘APEC to launch study of regional energy 
woes’
‘APEC to mull zero tariffs on computers’
‘Free trade pledged by APEC ministers’
‘Guest Forum: APEC learns to start 
thinking ‘green”
‘Japan wants APEC pledges on
environment’
‘Public works pitched as an economic 
cure’
‘Ramos hails APEC summit’
‘The Global Perspective: Cut the hype 
about APEC’
August
(Data not available)
September
‘Howard urges stronger Japan ties’
October
‘APEC backs cutting ‘info-tech’ tariffs’
‘APEC to launch labor databases’
‘Asia Pacific execs urge APEC to 
liberalize laws’
‘Japanese Perspectives: It is time to face 
up to APEC decisions’
‘Ramos urges simpler customs rules’
‘Senior APEC officials gather in Manila’
‘The Global Perspective: Ramos should 
reverse ban’
‘Tokyo nixes idea for unified visa’
November
‘Stagnant caucus exposes East Asia’s 
weak points’
‘Clinton to meet Hashimoto at APEC’
‘Manila asks for help with APEC’
‘Women’s conference warns of threat to 
food security from trade reforms’
‘APEC trade rule support to be sought’
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‘Manila finalizes APEC planning’
‘Ramos requests APEC information 
campaign’
‘Japan to seek APEC commitment on 
trade rules’
‘APEC forum will highlight ’96 progress’
‘China, US to top Hashimoto’s APEC 
conference agenda’
‘APEC officials set for informal talks’
‘APEC forum opens; officials fine tuning 
trade proposals’
‘Clinton reaffirms Asia Pacific role’
‘Japanese proposal’
‘APEC ministers meet to discuss new 
members’
‘APEC adopts trade plan, hits snag over 
info accord’
‘Ramos urges free trade’
‘Manila action plan’
‘Keating proposes political agenda for 
APEC forum’
‘APEC ministers pledge action - Vision 
affirmed, but some members wary of 
rapid pace’
‘Highlights of APEC declaration’
‘Japan, China ease tensions over isles’
‘US eyes deal to let China enter WTO’
‘Full text of declaration on economic 
cooperation’
‘Malaysia tells rich not to push poor’
‘Panel dilutes US info tech tariff proposal’
‘Kantor wants insurance row settled with 
Japan by December 15 deadline’
‘Clinton, Jiang plan state visits’
‘APEC protesters delayed on way to 
summit site’
‘Kim to visit Japan early next year’
‘Clinton calls on Japan to settle insurance 
row’
‘Hashimoto, Jiang stress need for stable 
bilateral relations’
‘Draft declaration backs China, Taiwan for 
WTO’
‘APEC chiefs push action. Manila 
declaration avoids sensitive trade 
issues’
‘Summit affirms ventral role of business’
‘Clinton has boosted forum’s profile’
‘Text of leaders’ declaration’
‘Clinton - Jiang trade talks fail’
‘Clinton, Kim cordial, apart on peace talks’
‘Protesters block roads, offer APEC 
alternative’
‘Gist of declaration’
December
‘Spread the gospel of the market 
economy’
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Gaiko Forum
1989
‘Kyöryoku kösö to Tönan Ajia’ (The 
concept of Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation & South-East Asia’), no. 
14, November 1989, pp.50-55.
‘1989-nen - Nihon no keizai gaikö o 
kaerimite’ (‘1989: Reviewing Japan’s 
economic diplomacy’), no. 15, 
December 1989, 28-36.
1990
‘Ajia Taiheiyö kara mita Nihon no anzen 
hoshö seisaku sono shörai wa doo 
naru ka’ (‘From the Asia Pacific 
perspective, what is to become of 
Japan’s security policy in the future?’), 
no. 20, May 1990, pp. 69-77.
‘Ajia Taiheiyö kyöryoku no keizaiteki 
sokumen’ (‘Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation’s economic side’), no. 20, 
May 1990, pp. 20-27.
‘Beikoku no Ajia Taiheiyö kösö’ 
(‘America’s Asia Pacific concept’), no. 
20, May 1990, pp. 28-35.
‘20-nen no keiken kara mita Tönan Ajia 
no hen yö’ (‘Looking at the changed 
appearance of South-east Asia from 
twenty years experience’), no. 20, May 
1990, pp. 36-42.
‘Ajia Taiheiyö chiiki wa sekai keizai no 
seichö sentaa’ (‘The Asia Pacific 
region is the worlds economic growth 
centre’), no. 20, May 1990, pp. 43-52
‘Shindankai o mukaeru ka, Ajia Taiheiyö 
chiiki’ (‘The Asia Pacific region: do we 
go forward into a new stage?’), no. 24, 
September 1990, pp. 18-26.
1991
Feature: ‘Posuto reisen to Ajia Taiheiyö 
no shinchyöryü’ (The post-Cold War 
and the Asia Pacific’s new trend’), no. 
29, February 1991.
‘APEC no genjyö to kadai’ (‘APEC’s 
current state of affairs and its task’), 
no. 29, February 1991, pp. 61-68.
‘Uchigawa kara mita tenkanki no ASEAN’ 
(‘Looking from the inside at ASEAN’s 
turning point’), no. 30, March 1991.
‘Oosutoraria gaikö no migaru sa’ 
(‘Australia’s diplomatic freedom’), no. 
33, June 1991, pp. 98-99.
1992
Gareth Evans, ‘Oosutoraria kara Nihon e 
no kitai’ (‘Expectations of Japan, from 
Australia’), no. 40, January 1992, pp. 
16-19.
‘Ajia ni okeru shinchitsujyo keisei to 
Amerika’ (‘American and the formation 
of a new order in Asia’), no. 40, 
January 1992, p. 38-43.
‘Ajia Taiheiyö gaikö no shintenkai’ 
(‘Feature: Asia Pacific’s diplomacy 
development’), no. 49, October 1992.
‘Nichi-Bei dömei atte koso’ (‘In general, it 
is the US-Japan alliance, indeed’), no. 
49, October 1992, pp. 4-16.
‘Anzen hoshö daiarogu no teishö. Nihon 
ni totte no ASEAN to Oseania’ 
(‘Advocating the Security dialogue/ 
ASEAN and Oceania to Japan’), no. 
49, October 1992, pp. 16-26.
‘Chukoku wa naze baishö o höki shita ka’ 
(‘Why did China abandon its 
reparations?’), no. 49, October 1992, 
pp. 27-40.
‘Seijiteki ketsui o ködö ni. Daishikai 
APEC kakuryö kaigi o oete.’ 
(‘Conducting a political resolution/ 
Completion of the fourth APEC 
Ministerial meeting’), no. 49, October 
1992, pp. 41-44.
‘Chiiki tögö to Nihon no sentaku’ 
(‘Regional integration & Japan’s 
Choices’), no. 51, December 1992, pp. 
4-11.
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1993
Tökyö sumitto ni mukete’ (‘Feature: 
Facing the Tokyo Summit’), no. 56, 
May 1993.
‘Nihon wa Ajia Taiheiyö no daihyö toshite 
no ködö o’ (‘Japan’s conduct as an 
Asia Pacific model’), no. 56, May 1993, 
pp. 22-39.
‘Sekaiteki kadai ni kokusai kyöchö wa 
kanö ka’ (‘Is there the possibility of 
international cooperation being a 
global theme?’), no. 56, May 1993, pp. 
40-50.
‘Ajia Taiheiyö no anzen hoshö no 
wakugumi köchiku e mukete’ (Turning 
to building an Asia Pacific Security 
Framework’), no. 56, May 1993, pp. 
13-21.
‘Ajia keizai hatten wa tsuzuku ka.’ 
(‘Feature: Will Asia’s Economic Sphere 
continue?’), no. 58, July 1993.
Ippei Yamazawa, ‘Ajia Taiheiyö shokoku 
no Nihon e no kitai’ (‘Asia Pacific 
countries’ expectations of Japan’), no. 
58, July 1993, pp. 49-55.
1994
‘Ajia Taiheiyö kyöryoku o ika ni susumeru 
ka’ (‘Feature: How to stimulate Asia 
Pacific Cooperation’), no. 64, January 
1994.
‘1995 nen no fushime ni mukatte: Ajia 
Taiheiyö chiiki no anzen höshö’ 
(‘Toward the major stage of 1995: the 
Asia Pacific region’s security’), no. 64, 
January 1994, pp. 12-23.
‘Ajia no shiten kara no hatsugen o’ (‘A 
Proposal from Asia’s Viewpoint’), no. 
64, January 1994, p. 24.
‘APEC kyöryoku e no shönenba; Shiatoru 
kaigi o fumaete’ (‘Japan seeking how it 
can support APEC; The Seattle 
meeting had a crucial role’), no. 64, 
January 1994, pp. 40-45.
‘Ösutoraria kara no messeji: [kaihö sareta 
keizai renkö] e no hatten ni mukete’ (‘A 
message from Australia: Turning to the 
growth/development of ‘an economic
alliance which has been thrown 
open”), no. 64, January 1994, p. 46.
‘Chügoku gaikö no yukue’ (‘Where will 
Chinese diplomacy go to?’), no. 64, 
January 1994, pp. 52-58.
‘[Ajia-shugi] denai Ajia gaikö-o’ (‘We need 
Asian policy, not ‘Asianism”), no. 65, 
February 1994, pp. 52-58.
‘Nichi-Bei keizai kyögi ga tsukitsikete 
mono’ (‘Japan-US economic 
discussions are thrust under one’s 
nose’), no. 67, April 1994, p. 4.
‘Higashi Ajia jösei no kagi Chügoku’ 
(‘Feature: The key to East Asia’s 
situation: China’), no. 68, May 1994, 
pp. 20-56.
‘Sekai no naka no Nichi-Bei kankei.’ 
(‘Feature: the US-Japan relationship 
central to the world’), no. 75, 
December 1994, pp. 4-68.
‘Kurubeki Ajia Taiheiyö jidai no Nichi-Bei 
anzen hoshö kyöryoku.’ (The US- 
Japan security relationship and the 
coming of Asia Pacific era’), no. 75, 
December 1994, pp. 4-15.
1995
‘Nihon no ODA’ (‘Feature: Japan’s ODA’), 
no. 78, February 1995, pp. 6-61.
‘APEC no shintenkai to Nihon gaikö’, 
(‘APEC’s new development and 
Japanese diplomacy’), no. 77, 
February 1995, pp. 62-72.
Terada Takashi, ‘APEC ni okeru Nihon no 
yakuwari’ (‘Japan’s role in APEC’), no. 
79, April 1995, pp. 58-63.
‘Ajia Taiheiyö o meguru keizai funsö.’ 
(‘Economic disputes surrounding the 
Asia Pacific’) no. 79, April 1995, pp. 
15-23.
‘Takokukan shugi to riijyonarizumu no ryö 
ritsu wa kanö ka’ (‘Can multilateralism 
& regionalism co-exist?’), no. 79, April 
1995, pp. 24-31.
‘Uruguai Raundo to wa nan datta no ka.’ 
(‘What was the Uruguay Round?’), no. 
79, April 1995, pp. 44-47.
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‘FTAA wa chiiki shugiteki burokku de wa 
nai’ (‘Is the FTAA a regionalistic 
economic bloc?’), no. 80, May 1995, p. 
44.
‘APEC Osaka kaigi’ (‘Feature: the APEC 
Osaka meeting’), no. 85, October 
1995, pp. 16-81.
‘APEC wa keizai shikö no genten ni kaere’ 
(‘Returning to APEC’s original 
economic goals’), no. 85, October 
1995, pp. 4-6.
‘[Ajia Taiheiyö bunmei] seiritsu e no jöken’ 
(‘Conditions for the creation of an ‘Asia 
Pacific Civilization’), no. 85, October 
1995, pp. 16-25.
‘APEC no yakuwari wa nani ka’ 
(‘Increasing expectations of APEC’s 
role’), no. 85, October 1995, pp. 26-35.
‘Hayawakari APEC: Osaka kaigi wa 
könarimasu.’ (‘An APEC primer: 
prospects for the Osaka meeting’), no. 
85, October 1995, pp. 37-41.
‘Bijinesu ni koso APEC wa yakudatsu.’ 
(‘APEC is good for business’), no. 85, 
October 1995, pp. 42-53.
‘Anzen hoshö wa APEC to heizon - 
bungyö de susumu: ARF no kadai’ 
(‘Defence and security issues of the 
ASEAN Regional Forum: Coexistence 
and Division of Labor with APEC’), no. 
85, October 1995, pp. 54-60.
‘Takokukan gaikö no seiki: Nihon gaikö to 
takokukan taiwa’ (‘The century of 
multilateral diplomacy: Japanese
diplomacy and a framework for 
multilateral dialogue’), no. 85, October 
1995, pp. 61-67.
‘Nihon wa kaihö teki na ship keishiki no 
sendö yaku ni nare’ (‘Japan as a 
leader in the creation of open 
markets’), no. 85, October 1995, pp. 
68-70.
‘APEC ni ‘taiyö’ suru node wa naku 
‘sodatete iku’ kimochi de atare’ 
(‘Nurture’ rather than ‘respond to’ 
APEC’), no. 85, October 1995, pp. 71- 
73.
‘Datsu Öjin-A no giron wa mö furui.’ (“Out 
of Europe, into Asia’: an outdated 
slogan’), no. 85, October 1995, pp. 74- 
SI.
‘Antei ka fuantei ka? Higashi Ajia o 
meguru Nichi-Bei kyöryoku’ (‘Stable or 
unstable? Japan-US cooperation in 
east Asia’) no. 87, December 1995,p. 
4.
1996
Feature: ‘Reisengo no gaikö wa doo 
kowatta ka’ (‘How has Diplomacy 
changed in the Post-Cold War era?’), 
no. 88, January 1996, pp. 14-71.
‘[Hirakareta chiiki shugi] to sekai chitsujo’ 
(‘The need to think ‘open regionalism’ 
globally’), no. 88, January 1996. pp. 4- 
12.
‘Muchitsujo jidai no Nihon gaikö’ 
(‘Japanese Diplomacy in an era 
without order’), no. 88, January 1996, 
pp. 14-25.
‘Atarashii kenjin kaigi o APEC Osaka kaigi 
sukuku’ (‘Proposal for a new Eminent 
Persons Group: Summing Up the 
APEC Osaka Meeting’), no. 89, 
February 1996, pp. 82-91.
Feature: ‘Yakudö suru Tönan Ajia’,
(‘South-East Asia Stirring’), no. 91, 
April 1996, pp. 22-75.
‘Higashi Ajia o meguru kokusai kankyö to 
Öshü’, (‘Europe and East Asia’s 
International Environment’), no. 91, 
April 1996, pp. 34-44.
‘Ökii na zenshin o hatashita Ajia-Öshü 
kankei’, (‘A Big Step Forward for 
Asian-European Relations (Reflections 
of the First ASEM)’), no. 92, May 1996, 
pp. 74-80.
‘Futsu no hanbei shugi e no gimon’, 
(‘Doubts about the two Anti- 
Americanisms’), no. 93, June 1996, p. 
4.
‘Böeki jiyüka to shokuryö anzen hoshü- 
kankyö hozen no Jiremma’, (‘The 
Dilemma of Food and Environmental 
Security in the Face of Trade
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Liberalisation’), no. 93, June 1996, p. 
49.
‘APEC Osaka kaigi ni okeru göl’ (‘From 
the agreement at the Osaka APEC 
Meeting’), no.93, June 1996, p. 67-72.
‘Kokusai enerugii jösei to IEA no yakuwa’ 
(‘Developing Energy Policy at the 
International Level’), no.93, June 1996, 
p. 73.
‘GoshQ no [Ajia-ka} seisaku wa 
kaewaranai’ (‘No Change in Australia’s 
‘Asianization’ Diplomacy’), no. 94, July 
1996.
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Shukan Toyo Keizai
No previous mention of APEC.
1991
‘Nihon to Ajia NIEs, ASEAN, Ajia wa sekai 
buroku-ka no hö hatei’ (‘Japan and 
Asian NIES, ASEAN. Asia is the world 
bloc’s breakwater’), 29 June 1991, p. 
166.
‘Ajia no kao to senshin koku no kao o dö 
musubu ka’ (‘How to unite the faces of 
Asia and the advanced countries’), 13 
July 1991, p. 78.
‘Ajia to Nichi-Bei: Nichi-Bei kankei no 
aratano hidane: Amerika ga osoreru 
Nihon no Ajia shihai’ (‘New sparks fly 
between US and Japan. Japan’s 
domination of Asia, and American 
fears’), 17-24 August 1991, p. 54-61.
‘APEC Soüru kaigö : Ajia kyögitai toshite 
honkaku hatsugi’ (‘APEC Seoul 
Meeting: Taking serious initiatives as 
an Asian forum’), 30 November 1991, 
p. 36.
1992
‘Hokubei jiyü boeki-ken (NAFTA) no hoyö 
shugi: Haita sei o tettei kaibö suru’
(‘Preservation of the North America 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) policy 
A complete analysis of its 
exclusionary nature.’), 24 October
1992, p. 106.
‘Kokusai ha nagara kowai köshö shisei ni. 
[Kurinton seiken no taigai seisaku] 
honsha NY seminä’ (‘At a New York 
corporation seminar on Clinton’s 
foreign policy. Taking a tough 
negotiating position, while maintaining 
an international outlook’), 26 
December 1992, p. 72.
1993
‘ASEAN-Miyazawa Shushö EAEC ni kyori’ 
(‘Prime Minister Miyazawa keeps his 
distance from the EAEC’), 30 January
1993, p. 46.
‘Koyö yüsei, taiNichi seisaku wa 
atomawashi’ (‘Employment given 
priority, Japan policy left until later’) 6 
May 1993.
‘Kurinton taiNichi seisaku ritsuan no 
tsutsu’ (‘Behind Clinton’s draft Japan 
policy plans’), 22 May 1993, p. 54.
‘Nihon koso ga jiyü böeki o mamoru tame 
ni ketsu o nagasu chikara o motte iru?’ 
(‘Does Japan have the strength to 
shed blood in order to protect free 
trade?’), 26 June 1993, p. 58.
‘Ajia kyöen: Omote butai ni tatta Chiaina 
Pauwaa’ (‘The Asia Contest: China 
Power takes centre stage’), 2 
November, 1993.
‘APEC koso nozomashii chiiki tögö da’ 
(‘APEC as a desirable regional forum’), 
2 November 1993.
‘APEC ni Shiatoru kaigi Nichi-Bei wa gaki 
taishö ni naranai ka’ (‘Will America be 
the bully at the Seattle Meeting?’), 6 
November 1993, p. 43.
‘Sugata o arawasu Ajia Taiheiyö kyodötai’ 
(The Asia Pacific cooperative body 
shows its form’), 13 November 1993, 
pp. 56-60.
‘Chükoku-nanshin-saku e no taiö ga 
shöten ni’ (‘A spotlight on China’s 
southward-advance-policy’) 13
November 1993, pp. 61-65.
‘Nuri-kaerareru taiAjia töshi senryaku’ 
(‘Strategy for investment in Asia is 
revised’),13 November 1993, pp. 66- 
67.
‘Ajia kakkoku no töshi kankyö’ (The 
investment outlook for Asia’), 13 
November 1993, pp. 68-73.
‘NAFTA hossoku ga imi suru mono’ (The 
meaning of the establishment of 
NAFTA’), 4 December 1993, p. 3.
‘APEC Sumitto: Taiheyö jiyü böekiken’ ni 
muke shizuka na ippo’ (‘APEC
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Summit: A quiet step towards ‘Pacific 
Free Trade Zone”), 4 December 1993, 
pp. 42-45.
‘94nen no Nihon to sekai: Zai-Nichi 
tokuha-in zaidankai. Nichi-Bei-Chü ga 
Ajia de hari au’ (Japan & the world: 
1994 Delegates Round Table 
Discussion on Japan. Japan-USA- 
China competing in Asia’), 18 
December 1993, p. 26-31.
1994
‘Kurinton ba-atari gaikö no jimetsu’ 
(‘Clinton’s popular speech: the decline 
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